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INTRODUCTION 
In the coming years the Second Amendment will face a historical 
crossroads.  Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago1 and District of Columbia v. Heller,2 it is settled, as a 
matter of constitutional jurisprudence, that the Second Amendment 
protects armed self-defense in the home with a handgun, and applies 
equally to the federal and state governments.  In both opinions, the 
majority was guided by a historical theory dubbed the Standard 
Model3 right to arms.4  Under this Model, the Second Amendment 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 3. For the purpose of historiography, in previous writings I referred to the 
Standard Model as the Individual Right Model.  As a matter of original intent, 
meaning, purpose, and understanding, I have always interpreted the Second 
Amendment as guaranteeing both an individual and collective right to participate in 
defending one’s liberty in a government sanctioned militia.  Standard Model writers 
often refer to this interpretation as the “modified collective right” approach. See 
PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS 
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provides an individual right to possess and use arms, divorced from 
government sanctioned militias, as a means to (1) check government 
tyranny through an armed citizenry,5 (2) provide the means to repel 
force with force should one be assailed in private or public,6 and (3) 
provide for the common defense.7  Indeed, the history supporting an 
“individual right” to arms is vast and undeniable.8  However, the 
historical evidence supporting the Standard Model theory is 
circumstantial at best,9 leaving the future of Second Amendment 
 
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009) [hereinafter 
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT].  This right was derived from the English 1689 
Declaration of Rights. See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An 
Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and 
Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (2009) [hereinafter Charles, “Arms for Their 
Defence”?].  For more on this author’s historiography, see infra notes 9 and 18. 
 4. See Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1211 (2009).  The first commentator to coin the term was Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 463 (1995). 
 5. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 600 (“If . . . the Second Amendment right is no more 
than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia—if, that 
is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a 
safeguard against tyranny.”) (citations omitted). 
 6. See id. at 592 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that 
they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”); id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the 
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the 
First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”). 
 7. See id. at 595 (“In United States v. Miller, we explained that ‘the Militia 
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.’  
That definition comports with founding-era sources.”) (citations omitted). 
 8. Prior to the Heller decision, historians were in agreement that the Second 
Amendment and its English predecessor enshrined an individual right connected to 
militia service. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA AND THE ORIGINS 
OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, 1689, at 74–78 (1981); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE 
MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 
165 (2003). 
 9. The Heller Court relied on a textual approach to constitutional interpretation. 
See 554 U.S. at 578–603.  The Court buttressed this claim by relying on the flawed 
thesis of historian Joyce Lee Malcolm. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND 
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).  Lois G. 
Schwoerer was the first historian to point out numerous problems with Malcolm’s 
thesis. See Lois G. Schwoerer, Book Review, 61 J. S. HIST. 570 (1995) (reviewing 
JOYCE LEE MALCOM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)) [hereinafter Schwoerer, Book Review]; Lois G. Schwoerer, 
To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN 
LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS 207, 207–21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) [hereinafter Schwoerer, To Hold 
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history at a critical juncture.  Which end of the historical spectrum is 
to guide future opinions?  Does the evidence have to gain the support 
of the historical community?  Does it have to be clear and convincing, 
or does it merely have to be circumstantial and plausible through 
hypothetical word association?10 
The answers to these questions are significant for a number of 
reasons, including the long-term validity and objectivity of new 
originalist paradigms in constitutional interpretation, the role that 
accepted historical methodologies should play in constitutional 
jurisprudence, and whether judges can objectively weigh historical 
evidence or recognize poor and subjective analyses.11  All three issues 
are intertwined when examining the constructs of the Standard Model 
right to arms.  A close look at the past four decades of the Model’s 
scholarship reveals that it was the repeated advancement of poor 
historical paradigms—particularly incomplete research, textualism, 
legal hypotheticals, and word games—that pushed aside accepted 
historical methodologies, which in turn led to ahistorical 
conclusions.12  To be more candid, a survey of the past four decades of 
 
and Bear Arms].  Malcolm has never answered for these scholarly deficiencies.  Since 
then, I have found numerous other problems with Malcolm’s thesis, both factually 
and methodologically speaking. See generally Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, 
supra note 3; Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and 
Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1836–37 (2011) [hereinafter Charles, Scribble 
Scrabble]; Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the 
Home: History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter Charles, The Faces]; Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation 
and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American 
Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18 [hereinafter Charles, The Right of 
Self-Preservation].  To date, the historical consensus is that Malcolm’s thesis is 
severely flawed and unacceptable. See Brief for English/Early American Historians 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by twenty-one scholars and historians). 
 10. This question is not only important as an everyday practical matter.  It also 
presents itself in Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, where he stated that conducting “historical analysis can be difficult,” yet 
found it to be “the best means available in an imperfect world.” 130 S. Ct. at 3056–58 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 11. For an interesting discussion of this dilemma before the Heller and McDonald 
decisions were decided, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in 
Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 12. For historians’ critiques of the Standard Model approach taken by the Heller 
and McDonald majorities, see Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and 
Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 629 (2008) 
[hereinafter Cornell, Originalism on Trial]; Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, 
and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1095, 1106–07 (2009) [hereinafter Cornell, Heller, New Originalism]; Paul 
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Standard Model scholarship reveals numerous errors that break the 
bounds of historical elasticity, leaving the entire Model unreliable 
moving forward. 
The errors come in all forms, such as ad hoc textualism, creating 
historical myths with circumstantial or no historical evidence, and a 
minimalist understanding of the ideological and intellectual origins of 
the right to arms.  In some cases, Standard Model scholarship discards 
historical methodologies altogether.  One such example is a continued 
reliance on rebutted historical facts or conclusions.  One historical 
myth has been cited to build another, and so on, until separating 
historical reality from fairytale is something that only a handful of 
scholars can do.  As Robert J. Spitzer has catalogued, this has been an 
ongoing affair in law reviews for quite some time, and unless the 
Supreme Court discards or significantly tailors the Standard Model to 
be in line with accepted historical methodologies, there may be no 
end in sight.13 
The purpose of this Article is not to question or discard the 
holdings in Heller and McDonald.  A homebound right to armed self-
 
Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267, 
267–82 (2008); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: 
Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in 
Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1297–1334 (2009) [hereinafter 
Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble]; David Thomas Konig, Heller, 
Guns, and History: The Judicial Invention of Tradition, 3 NORTHEASTERN L.J. 175, 
178 (2011) [hereinafter Konig, Heller, Guns, and History]; Nathan Kozuskanich, 
Originalism, History, and the Second Amendment: What Did Bearing Arms Really 
Mean to the Founders?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413, 446 (2008); William G. Merkel, 
Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the 
Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1225–26 (2010) 
[hereinafter Merkel, Heller as Hubris]; William G. Merkel, District of Columbia v. 
Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 349, 352–54 (2009) [hereinafter Merkel, Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism]. 
 13. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW 
LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 33–60 
(2008); Robert J. Spitzer, Why History Matters: Saul Cornell’s Second Amendment 
and the Consequences of Law Reviews, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 312, 321–52 (2008); 
Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 349, 352 (2000); see also Robert E. Shalhope, Book Review, 108 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1442, 1442 (2003) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. 
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)) (“[L]aw reviews ranging from the most prestigious 
to the least distinguished offer their readers any number of interpretations of the 
[Second Amendment’s] original meaning as well as the manner in which it should be 
read today.  The result has been an abundance of sound and fury and a dearth of 
intellectual substance.  All suffer from the same handicap: a lack of understanding of 
the historical context within which the Second Amendment was written.”) (emphasis 
added). 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
1732 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
defense with a handgun was neither the impetus for the 1689 
Declaration of Rights14 or the 1791 Second Amendment.15  Still, as a 
jurisprudential matter, the core holding can be squared in either one 
of two ways.  The first is the acceptance of the castle-doctrine, with 
“common use” weapons, as a part of a longstanding Anglo-American 
tradition.16  The second is through a living Constitution approach, 
which recognizes that many state constitutions protect armed defense 
of the home in some form.17  Either of these approaches provides the 
necessary constitutional justification for a right to armed self-defense 
in the home.18 
 
 14. 1 W. & M. sess. 2 c. 2 (1688–89) (Eng.) (“By causing several good subjects 
being protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and 
employed contrary to law. . . .  That the subjects which are protestants may have arms 
for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.”); Charles, The 
Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 42–54 (showing the “have arms” provision 
was adopted to secure concurrent Parliamentary power over the militia). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”); see also Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-
Regulated Militia” Asserted and Proven With Commentary on the Future of Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NORTHEASTERN L.J. 1, 67–71 (2011) (showing the 
neglected intellectual history of a “well regulated militia” and its republican link to 
arms bearing) [hereinafter Charles, Constitutional Significance]. 
 16. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136, 
ch. 63, § 8 (1716).  As a matter of historical context, it should be noted that Hawkins 
makes no mention of a right to guns, arms or any modern weaponry to exercise this 
right.  Hawkins is merely talking about the larger natural right principle of self-
defense.  However, at least one prominent founder, James Wilson, viewed the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, not the United States Constitution, as protecting this 
right. See 2 JAMES WILSON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1142 (Kermit L. 
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).  Wilson described the Second Amendment of the 
United States Constitution in terms of the “common defence.” Id. at 1141. 
 17. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 549, 594-98 (2009); Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the 
State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108, 111 (2008); David B. Kopel, The 
Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 122.  
For a survey of state constitutional “bear arms” provisions, see Eugene Volokh, State 
Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191 (2006). 
 18. In terms of personal historiography, my initial disagreement with the Heller 
opinion rested with its misuse and abuse of the Constitution’s text and the historical 
record, not the recognition of self-defense as a natural right. See generally CHARLES, 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3.  When McDonald came before the Court, 
my argument remained that the historical record was severely flawed and needed to 
be corrected, or at a minimum squared, before the Heller opinion should be 
incorporated to the states. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 
455–56; Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9; 5 Questions for Patrick 
J. Charles (Britannica Contributor) on Gun Control and the Second Amendment, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (June 1, 2010), http://www.britannica.com/ 
blogs/2010/6/5-questions-for-patrick-j-charles-britannica-contributor-on-gun-control-
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Instead, the purpose of this Article is to educate legal academics, 
lawyers, and jurists, and to steer the proverbial ship away from 
Standard Model myths back to historical reality.  This Article sets out 
to accomplish this in three parts.  In Part I, this Article exposes the 
Standard Model for what it is not—an objective and thoroughly 
researched history.  It identifies four unquestioned historical 
methodologies to which the Model has failed to adhere and how one 
poor account has been built upon another, which ultimately has made 
the “modern” Second Amendment unrecognizable to the founding 
generation. 
Part II then summarizes why historians view the Standard Model as 
nothing short of a historical embarrassment.  In particular, Part II 
focuses on the rise and fall of Joyce Lee Malcolm’s work on the right 
to arms.  It then illustrates the interpretative consequences that 
Malcolm and other Standard Model accounts have had on the Anglo-
American understanding of the right to arms. 
Lastly, Part III discusses the prudential reasons for reevaluating 
the Standard Model.  In particular, it weighs three historical options 
that the Supreme Court could adopt for adjudicating future Second 
Amendment cases and controversies.  It then concludes that there is a 
simple and reasonable construct available to the Court when 
weighing history.  Known as a “historical guidepost” approach, the 
construct not only ensures the preservation of our history in context, 
but also allows for constitutional jurisprudence to evolve in the 
process. 
I.  THE STANDARD MODEL SECOND AMENDMENT EXPOSED 
For over thirty-five years now, aspects of the Standard Model have 
appeared consistently in law reviews.  From the Model’s early 
beginnings in the 1970s, its architects have pawned assumptions and 
opinions as historical fact.  Take, for instance, a 1976 article published 
 
and-the-second-amendment.  Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Associate 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, agreed with this argument 
before proceeding with incorporation. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3120–22 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Since McDonald, my stance remains 
that the historical model advanced by the Heller majority is incorrect and 
problematic moving forward, but can be gradually amended or fixed through 
“historical guideposts.” See Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of 
Review After McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 17-39 (2010) 
[hereinafter Charles, Historical Guideposts].   
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by this Journal.19  Authored by David I. Caplan, a former board 
member of the National Rifle Association, the article contained a 
significant number of false claims: notably, the purpose and history of 
the Statute of Northampton,20 the “have arms” provision in the 1689 
English Declaration of Rights,21 and the events of the American 
Revolution.22  Yet the most damaging myth that Caplan pawned to 
the public was his mischaracterization of the Founders’ well-regulated 
militia.  According to Caplan, the right to “keep and bears arms” in a 
“well-regulated militia” ensured (1) “the people’s ability to organize 
the militia would be guaranteed and strengthened by their prior 
anonymous keeping of arms,” and (2) “the people’s right to keep 
arms [would] not depend upon the actual existence of an organized 
militia” because Congress has the power to terminate it.23 
In advancing this theory, Caplan did not even attempt to meet the 
required historical burden.  Instead, he relied exclusively on two 
pages of constitutional debates—out of context—as a theoretical 
launching point to reach a number of unsupported conclusions.24  This 
 
 19. See David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment 
Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976); see also Kates, supra note 4, at 1213 
(discussing Caplan’s important role in the Standard Model movement). 
 20. Caplan’s understanding of the Statute of Northampton was based solely on a 
subjective reading of Rex v. Knight, [1686] 90 Eng. Rep. 330, not on the history of the 
case itself, nor the Statute’s text, enforcement, history, or public understanding. 
Caplan, supra note 19, at 32.  For a complete history of the Statute of Northampton, 
see Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 7–41. 
 21. Caplan primarily relied on nineteenth century case law for the history of the 
1689 Declaration of Rights, not primary sources from either the late seventeenth or 
early eighteenth centuries. Caplan, supra note 19, at 33–34.  For a detailed history of 
the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision, see generally Charles, “Arms 
for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 356–85 and SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 74–78.  Caplan also takes William Blackstone out of 
context. Compare Caplan, supra note 19, at 34, with Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation, supra note 9, at 26–60. 
 22. Caplan audaciously claimed there was a Second Amendment link between the 
British confiscating arms and the Second Amendment. See Caplan, supra note 19, at 
35–36.  This myth continues today, primarily through the work of Stephen P. 
Halbrook. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: 
ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2008).  To date, no historian, scholar, or 
originalist has found any substantiated evidence linking the two. See Charles, supra 
note 15, at 55–56 and Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 443–49.  
Also, the historical claim makes little sense seeing the Founders did the same to 
suspected loyalists and those who were not in support of just government. See 
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 41–42, 81–87 (addressing the 
disarming of Shays’ Rebellion insurgents); Charles, supra note 15, at 59–61 
(addressing the disarming during the American Revolution). 
 23. Caplan, supra note 19, at 39. 
 24. See id. 
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is not only problematic in terms of historical objectivity, but we know 
today that Caplan’s theory is not even historically viable.25  This issue 
will be unpacked in various segments of this Article, but for now the 
point worth making is that Standard Model scholars have propped up 
a political theory as historical fact without the required evidence.  
Worse yet, the four corners of Caplan’s theory remain the foundation 
upon which the Model is built. 
A. The Historical Dilemma Presented by the Standard Model 
It is from this weak foundation that numerous myths have formed 
and flourished.  With the Model’s folklore stretching over a thirty-five 
year period, it has created a layered web of illusions and deceptions 
so thick that only a handful of historians and scholars can pinpoint the 
inconsistencies or problems.26  The objective dilemma this presents 
can have a number of legal consequences, particularly, what role—if 
any—accepted historical works and methodologies are to be used for 
future constitutional questions.  If we use Heller as the benchmark, 
accepted historical methodologies are insignificant and objective legal 
history is in peril, for the Heller majority essentially acquiesced to a 
Necessary and Proper Clause approach to history.27 
For those unfamiliar with Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence, since 1805 the Supreme Court has stated that Congress 
has the “choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means 
which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the 
Constitution.”28  This deferential approach to congressional power 
 
 25. See Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15, at 1–101; Patrick J. 
Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and Individual 
Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 
339–390 (2011) [hereinafter Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act].   
 26. One such mistake is the continued reliance on a 1770 Georgia law as evidence 
that the Second Amendment ensures individuals have a right to be armed for public 
safety. See Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 34 & n.14, 
Shepard v. Madigan, No. 12-1788 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012) (“[C]olonial statutes 
required individual arms-bearing for public safety . . . .  Some colonies even required 
citizens to carry their firearms to church services and other public gatherings.”) 
(citing An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants, By Obliging the Male White 
Persons to Carry Fire Arms To Places of Public Worship (Ga. 1770), reprinted in A 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157–58 (1800)).  That statute was 
not an endorsement of the right to public carriage, but an attempt to maintain the 
institution of slavery. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 18.  
 27. See, e.g., Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, supra note 12 (discussing how 
Heller picked and applied historical evidence selectively). 
 28. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 396 (1805) (emphasis added).  For a 
history of the origins of Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to the Necessary and 
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was restated by Chief Justice John Marshall in 181929 and remains the 
law of the land today.30  If we apply this standard to historical analysis, 
it stipulates that constitutional text and historical evidence may be 
adapted to support any conclusion so long as the author, lawyer, or 
jurist believes it to be plausible.  Universally recognized historical 
methodologies, however, do not accept such a deferential or “choice 
of means” approach.31  It is accepted among historians that historical 
methodologies require something more substantial.32  If anything, to 
reasonably adapt the evidentiary means to support a desired 
historical end is contrary to intellectual integrity and objectivity, for it 
fails to take into account the whole historical equation of the era and 
topic at issue.33 
Therein lies a problem with the foundation upon which the 
Standard Model rests—it is full of historical adaptations and false 
conclusions that resemble the approach assumed by the Court’s 
Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence.  Take for instance two 
recent Standard Model historiographies by Don B. Kates and David 
T. Hardy.34  Both authors claim that any interpretation other than the 
Standard Model is unsupported by the historical record.  Beginning 
with Hardy, he writes there remains “no evidence of any 
understanding that the right to arms was restricted to militia 
service.”35  Instead, he believes there is “strong evidence of in an 
 
Proper Clause, see Patrick J. Charles, Originalism, John Marshall, and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause: Resurrecting the Jurisprudence of Alexander Addison, 58 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 529 (2010). 
 29. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419–36 (1819). 
 30. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010).   
 31. See Quentin Skinner, The Limits of Historical Explanations, 41 PHIL. 199, 202 
(1966) (stating that the role of historian is to not suggest a “casual relation,” but that 
events and ideas are intimately connected). 
 32. See id. at 209 (“To see historical relationships in terms of repeated patterns of 
thought or action is to imply not merely that thinking or acting are uniformly 
purposive, but that they do characteristically result in patterns.  There is thus a very 
strong predisposition, particularly evident in histories of thought, to ignore the 
difficulties about proper emphasis and tone which must arise in making any sort of 
paraphrase of a work, and to assume instead that its author must have had some 
doctrine, or a ‘message’, which can be readily abstracted and more simply put.”). 
 33. See J.G.A. Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of 
Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353, 362–64 (1981) (discussing how “law-centered” 
paradigms lead to “liberal” historical claims because they do not take into account 
the whole). 
 34. See David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” 
Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (2011); Kates, 
supra note 4. 
 35. Hardy, supra note 34, at 330 (emphasis added). 
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intent to recognize an individual right to arms that is independent of 
militia service.”36  Similarly, Don B. Kates claims any state-sanctioned 
or government militia interpretation is “gibberish” or “ahistorical.”37  
And in agreement, both claim that any militia right limitations are 
nothing more than a fabrication of the twentieth century.38  Not true. 
Before dissecting these misguided historiographies, it is worth 
noting that in the thirty-five years of Standard Model scholarship, not 
one publication has ever sought to examine the ideological, 
intellectual, legal, and constitutional significance of the Founders’ 
well-regulated militia.39  Indeed, many Model supporters wrote their 
personal opinions on the subject.  However, each made generalized 
claims as to its legal character without conducting a proper historical 
inquiry or conducting intensive research.  And this somehow 
manifested into the myth that an “unorganized,” “ill-regulated,” or 
“unregulated” militia was the equivalent of a constitutional “well 
regulated militia.”40  Again, not true.  
Hardy even went so far as to equate a well-regulated militia with a 
“well-regulated” appetite or family.41  Meanwhile, Standard Model 
 
 36. Id. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 37. Kates, supra note 4, at 1227–30. 
 38. See id. at 1231; Hardy, supra note 34, at 342–59. 
 39. See generally Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15 (rebutting 
nearly four decades of Standard Model conceptions of what constitutes the Founders’ 
well regulated militia). 
 40. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 85 (2d ed., 1994) [hereinafter HALBROOK, 
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED] (arguing that the Second Amendment should be 
interpreted to read: because a “well-organized militia is necessary to security of a free 
State” that the people should be armed); id. at 144 (“Recognition of the right of the 
people to have arms promoted a well-regulated militia.”); Randy E. Barnett, Was the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 237, 275 (2004) (reviewing UVILLER & MEREL, supra note 8) (“What the 
federal government cannot do . . . is abolish the militia altogether rather than to leave 
it unorganized.  Nor can Congress abolish the individual right to arms simply by 
failing to well-regulate the militia-of-the-whole.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George 
Tucker’s Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty”, 3 
TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 120, 130 (2007) (“[T]he Second Amendment was prompted by the 
perceived need to protect the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, which would 
encourage a well-regulated militia.”); Nelson Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the 
Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 229, 
246–47 (2008) (arguing that the purpose of the Second Amendment was not 
“exclusively, or even primarily” connected with a well-regulated militia, but was a 
means to check tyranny by the people being armed); see also Caplan, supra note 19, 
at 36–41; David T. Hardy & John Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 62, 67–78 (1974). 
 41. See David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia v. Heller and 
the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO. 61, 67. 
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writers have gotten away with playing word scenarios by parsing text, 
using dictionaries to elicit meaning, and reassembling the whole.42  
This is not history nor does it objectively aid in constitutional 
interpretation.43  As I show in a forthcoming Article, such ad hoc 
approaches to deduce constitutional meaning are problematic for a 
number of prudential reasons.44  It also does not help Standard Model 
writers when the historical record unequivocally shows us that a 
constitutional well-regulated militia consisted of a state-sanctioned 
body of citizen soldiers capable of bearing arms.45  This is confirmed 
by the English origins of the right,46 the excruciatingly detailed 
seventeenth and eighteenth century tracts on the constitutional 
significance and purpose of a well-regulated militia,47 the inclusion of 
a “well regulated militia” protection in five state constitutions by 
1789,48 and the First and Second congressional debates over 
implementing a national well-regulated militia.49 
In addition to these findings, I have found even more evidence 
illustrating that the Standard Model’s depiction of the Second 
Amendment is more of a fantasy and illusion than an objective 
history.  For our purposes now, two examples will be provided: (1) 
Thomas Jefferson’s recollection of the adoption of the Bill of Rights 
 
 42. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 323–38; HALBROOK, THAT EVERY 
MAN BE ARMED, supra note 40, at 84–87; Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace 
Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801–12 (1998) (defining the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause with hypothetical wordplay and parsing text). 
 43. See Patrick J. Charles & Kevin Francis O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause From 
Ruin: The Customary Origins of a “Free Press” as Interface to the Present and 
Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 56), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012563 (showing the 
interpretational consequences when relying upon text and word scenarios to find 
constitutional meaning). 
 44. See id. at 8–11, 56.  For some scholarly rebuttals to textualism, see Thomas B. 
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009); Carl H. Esbeck, 
Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment Clause 
Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489; William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too 
Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007). 
 45. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1836.  For the importance of 
being “capable” to bear arms, see Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 
25, at 336–39, 367–72. 
 46. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 40–54. 
 47. See Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15, at 9–35. 
 48. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. IX; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXV; N.H. CONST., art. 
XXIV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL; VA. CONST. of 1776, § XIII.  For a breakdown of 
the right to arms in state constitutions circa 1789 and 1803, see Charles, Historical 
Guideposts, supra note 18, at 43–49. 
 49. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 331–47. 
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in 1803, and (2) Massachusetts Adjutant General William Donnison’s 
articulation of the right to “keep and bear arms” in general orders 
dated March 1, 1794. 
Starting with Thomas Jefferson, Standard Model writers often 
claim the former president understood the right to “keep and bear 
arms” to include a right to hunt, and that he believed an armed 
citizenry was the equivalent of a well-regulated militia.50  Given such 
frequent mischaracterizations of Jefferson have been corrected by 
historian David Thomas Konig, they will not be restated or 
elaborated here.51  The historical piece worth mentioning, however, is 
Jefferson’s direct opinion on the purpose of the Bill of Rights in 
relation to Article I, Section 8. 
The opinion can be found in an 1802 letter to Joseph Priestly, and, 
not surprisingly, not one Standard Model work has ever addressed 
it.52  In the letter, Jefferson corrected Priestly’s belief that he “more 
than any other individual” had “planned and established” the 
Constitution.53  First, Jefferson confirmed that he was in “Europe 
when the Constitution was planned and established, and never saw it 
till after it was established.”54  Second, the only contribution Jefferson 
could claim was the push for a Bill of Rights: 
On receiving it I wrote strongly to Mr. Madison, urging the want of 
provision for the freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by 
jury, habeas corpus, the substitution of militia for a standing army, 
and an express reservation to the States, of all the rights not 
specifically granted to the Union.  [Madison] accordingly moved, in 
the first session of Congress, for these amendments, which were 
agreed to and ratified by the States as they now stand.  This is all the 
hand I had in what related to the Constitution.55 
 
 50. See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear 
Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 517–18 
(2008) (using Jefferson’s failed hunting law as evidentiary proof of a broad 
interpretation of “bear arms”); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the 
Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1519 (“Thomas Jefferson . . . promoted 
the right to arms for reasons totally unconnected to the militia.”).   
 51. See David Thomas Konig, Historical Approach: Thomas Jefferson’s Armed 
Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250 (2008). 
 52. See Konig, supra note 51, at 268–69; H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, 
The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403, 494 (2000). 
 53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly (June 19, 1802), in 2 LIFE 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JOSEPH PRIESTLY 483, 485 (London, R. Hunter, M. Eaton, 
and C. Fox 1832). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Jefferson’s request for a provision that substituted a “militia for a 
standing army” was the very essence and purpose of the Second 
Amendment—a constitutional counterpoise to a standing army.56  A 
well-regulated militia was never intended to be a policy option for the 
common defense—i.e. a standing army or a well-regulated militia.  It 
was the palladium of liberty or the very essence by which liberty was 
to be understood and earned.57  This explains why Elbridge Gerry58 
preferred that the Second Amendment read “necessary to the 
security of a free state” rather than “being the best security of a free 
state.”59  He feared the latter insinuated that while a militia was the 
“best security,” it also admitted that a standing army was a secondary 
option.  Gerry moved that it should read, a “well regulated militia, 
trained to arms,” because this version would make it the federal 
government’s duty to ensure that a militia was maintained.60  
Although the motion was not seconded (most likely because the 
Constitution already vested the states with plenary power to train), 
the language reading “being the best security of a free state” was 
eventually removed.  The phrase “necessary to the” replaced “the 
best,” thus making the Amendment constitutionally protect what 
Gerry, Jefferson, and the framers wanted it to—a “well-regulated 
militia” that was to be the only security of a free state.61 
What is also intriguing about Jefferson’s 1802 letter is that memory 
served him correctly.  Frequently, when historical figures recollect 
past events there are a number of inconsistencies.  Jefferson’s 
 
 56. Id.; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 
(1765) (“[The militia] is the constitutional security, which our laws have provided for 
the public peace, and for protecting the realm against foreign or domestic violence; 
and which the statutes declare is essentially necessary to the safety and prosperity of 
the kingdom.”); accord Stephen Skinner, Blackstone’s Support for the Militia, 44 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2000). 
 57. The palladium of liberty did not have to do with “arms” per se, but with a 
constitutional “well-regulated militia.”  This is confirmed by numerous sources where 
not one commentator referred to “arms” or individual self-defense as the “palladium 
of liberty.” See Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15, at 71–82. 
 58. In 1810, Elbridge Gerry also referred to the militia, not “arms” or individual 
self-defense, as the palladium of liberty. See Elbridge Gerry, A Proclamation, for a 
Day of Public Thanksgiving, Praise and Prayer, THE SUN (Pittsfield, Ma.), Nov. 7, 
1810, at 2; Elbridge Gerry, A Proclamation, for a Day of Public Thanksgiving, Praise 
and Prayer, VERMONT REPUBLICAN (Windsor, Vt.), Nov. 12, 1810, at 1 (“For the 
patriotic and marital spirit which animates the Militia, that great and sole palladium 
of liberty . . . .”). 
 59. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 188–89 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
 60. Id. at 188.   
 61. Id. at 175.   
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memory, however, was exact in more than one instance.  For 
example, when Jefferson reminisced on the Declaration of 
Independence’s intellectual origins nearly forty years after drafting it, 
he properly recalled its inspiration and sentiment.62 
The same can be said here with the Second Amendment.  In a 
letter dated December 20, 1787, Jefferson did in fact urge Madison to 
include a Bill of Rights that included a protection against standing 
armies: 
There are other good things [in the Constitution] of less moment.  I 
will now tell you what I do not like.  First, the omission of a bill of 
rights, providing clearly, and without the aid of sophism, for 
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against 
standing armies, restriction of monopolies, the eternal and 
unremitting force of habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all 
matters of fact triable by the laws of the land, and not by the laws of 
nations.63 
Standard Model writers will undoubtedly continue to claim that an 
“armed citizenry” is what Jefferson meant as the constitutional 
“protection against standing armies.”  The intellectual and ideological 
origins of a well-regulated militia do not support this conclusion.  The 
historical record, including the legal works of early eighteenth century 
commentators, is clear that an armed rabble or unorganized militia—
i.e. a mere “armed citizenry”—was a danger to republican liberty, not 
an advancement of it.64 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight and separate Jefferson’s 
enforcement of national militia policy with his preference for a select 
militia.  The latter confirms and illustrates that Jefferson did not 
believe that an armed citizenry was sufficient for the national defense.  
In terms of policy enforcement, the 1792 National Militia Act 
prescribed that every person enrolled shall “provide” the prescribed 
arms and accoutrements.65  The manner in which the arming provision 
was enforced remained a state matter, not a federal one, as the Act’s 
 
 62. See 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 343 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1899); Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Happiness” in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 470–71, 477–501 (2011) [hereinafter Charles, 
Restoring]. 
 63. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 2 
MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 273, 275 
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829). 
 64. See Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15, at 8, 21, 67. 
 65. 1 Stat. 271 (1792). 
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debates and subsequent implementation prove.66  In some cases the 
arms were provided by the individual—who would then be subject to 
fines for non-compliance—and in other cases the arms were provided 
by the state.67  Jefferson never showed a preference for either 
solution.  He merely sought to arm all militia members enrolled, and 
Jefferson became particularly alarmed upon learning that nearly half 
(forty-eight percent) of the 429,200 militiamen enrolled were 
unarmed.68 
Jefferson’s efforts to arm the entire enrolled militia according to 
the letter of the law, however, does not coincide with his preference 
for a class-structured militia.  Jefferson made numerous attempts to 
discard the 1792 National Militia Act and replace it with a select-
militia, consisting of men between the ages of twenty and twenty-six.69  
He personally felt that the general militia, enrolled through the 
National Militia Act, would not slow down an army of regulars, and 
he hoped that Congress would adopt some medium solution that 
prevented the maintenance of a permanent standing army.70  
 
 66. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 340–43. 
 67. See id. at 344.  For a more inclusive history on the problems of enforcing the 
1792 National Militia Act’s arming provision, see CHARLES, THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 71–79, 139–53. 
 68. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 146. 
 69. See Konig, supra note 51, at 277.  Naturally, Jefferson was not the first or only 
Founder to support a class structured or select militia.  Both George Washington and 
Henry Knox supported such plans given their experience with militia in the field of 
battle. See 26 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 374–98 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1931); HENRY KNOX, A PLAN FOR THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE MILITIA 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1786).  For a historical narrative, see Don Higginbotham, 
The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment 
Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39, 42–43 (1998). 
 70. See Thomas Jefferson, Draft of First Inaugural, March 4, 1801, in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 5–6 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897) (“A 
well discipld militia, our best reliance in peace, & for ye first moments of war, till 
regulars may relieve them”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William A. Burwell, 
(Jan. 15, 1806), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 416 (New York, G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1897) (“The classification of the [select] militia has been reported 
against by a committee.  But if any judgment can be formed from individual 
conversations it will be established.  If it is, we need never raise a regular in 
expectation of war.  A militia of young men will hold on until regulars can be raised, 
& will be the nursery which will furnish them.”); THE ADDRESSES AND MESSAGES OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM WASHINGTON TO HARRISON 142 
(New York, Edward Walker 1841) (“For a people who are free, and who mean to 
remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security.  It is therefore, 
incumbent on us, at every meeting, to revise the condition of the militia, and to ask 
ourselves if it is prepared to repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories 
exposed to invasion.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Armstrong (May 2, 
1808), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 193, 194 (H.A. Washington ed., 
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Jefferson even once wrote to Madison that a “militia of all ages” was 
“entirely useless for distant service.”71  At first, Jefferson’s push for 
militia reform can be attributed to his concern over the rise of 
Napoleon Bonaparte and the threat the French Revolution 
ideologically presented.72  However, Jefferson also maintained larger 
fears—the national defense—and the War of 1812 served as the “I 
told you so” moment for the former President.73 
In the end, Jefferson’s hope for militia reform never materialized.  
Congress made it clear throughout Jefferson’s and subsequent 
presidencies that the duty to make the militia a bulwark in war rested 
upon the diligence of state governments, not the federal 
government.74  As the 1810 Senate informed then-President Madison, 
“[t]he constitution of the United States gives to Congress only a 
qualified agency on the subject of the militia . . . .  If the States are 
anxious for an effective militia, to [the States] belong the power, and 
to [the States] belong the means of rendering the militia truly our 
bulwark in war, and safeguard in peace . . . .”75 
This brings us to the second piece of new historical evidence that 
conflicts with the Standard Model: Massachusetts Adjutant General 
William Donnison’s articulation of the right to “keep and bear arms” 
as being intimately linked with a well-regulated militia.  Again, 
 
New York, Derby & Jackson 1859) (“Against great land armies we cannot attempt it 
but by equal armies.  For these we must depend on a classified militia, which will give 
us the service of the class from 20 to 26, in the nature of conscripts, composing a body 
of about 250,000, to be specially trained.”). 
 71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 5, 1807), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 49 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1898). 
 72. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Brown (Oct. 27, 1808), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 71, at 211 (“I as little fear foreign 
invasion.  I have indeed thought it a duty to be prepared to meet even the most 
powerful, that of a Bonaparte, for instance, by the only means competent, that of a 
classification of the militia, & placing the junior classes at the public disposal; but the 
lesson he receives in Spain extirpates all apprehensions from my mind.”). 
 73. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William H. Crawford (Feb. 14, 1815), in 
8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 259 (J. Jefferson Looney 
ed., 2011) (“As to men, nothing wiser can be devised than what the Secretary at war 
[James Monroe] proposed in his Report at the commencement of Congress. It would 
have kept our regular army always of necessity full, and by classing our militia 
according to ages, would have put them into a form ready for whatever service, 
distant or home, should require them.  Congress have not adopted it, but their next 
experiment will lead to it.”). 
 74. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 348–50. 
 75. Report of a Committee on the Militia System of the United States (Mar. 6, 
1810), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 256 (Washington, Gales 
and Seaton 1832), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llsp101610200102620256.tif 
(emphasis added). 
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according to Standard Model writers, any governmental militia 
understanding of the Second Amendment is “gibberish,” 
“ahistorical,” and the record allegedly provides us with “no evidence” 
to support it.76 
However, Donnison provides us with more proof illustrating 
otherwise.  In General Orders dated March 1, 1794, Donnison wrote 
to the state’s militia officers the following: 
A well regulated Militia, composed of the great body of the Citizens, 
is always the chief dependence of a free people for their defence.  
Americans have ever esteemed the right of keeping and bearing 
Arms, as an honorable mark of their freedom; and the Citizens of 
Massachusetts, have ever demonstrated how highly they prize that 
right, by the Constitution they have adopted, and the laws they have 
enacted, for the establishment of a permanent Militia—by the 
readiness and alacrity with which they equip themselves, and march 
to the field—and by the honest pride they feel whenever they put on 
the exalted character of Citizen-Soldiers.77 
Donnison’s linking of arms bearing with a well-regulated militia is 
consistent with other late seventeenth century, eighteenth century, 
and early nineteenth century writings on the right to arms.78  
Undoubtedly, Donnison understood the virtuous link between militia 
arms bearing, liberty, and the advancement of the public good.79  In 
General Orders dated May 1, 1798, he confirmed that “the 
advantages” of an “efficient Militia” were “incalculable.”80  This 
especially held true in a democratic republic, where the people were 
the means and ends of the Constitution, including its defense: 
In Peace as well as in War, every State has found it necessary to 
have a Military Establishment.  This is necessary not only to repel 
the Foe from without, but for the preservation and tranquility within 
the body politic.  In arbitrary States the Military Power is confided 
to a Standing Army; but in those that are free, the Citizens 
themselves form the bulwark of their own Liberty and 
Independence.  Thus it is in the United States, the Free Citizens of 
America are their own Guardians; they constitute the Military Force 
 
 76. See Hardy, supra note 34, at 330 (emphasis added); Kates, supra note 4, at 
1227–30. 
 77. William Donnison, General Orders, Head-Quarters, Boston (March 1, 1794) 
(emphasis added) (on file with author). 
 78. See Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15, passim. 
 79. See id. passim. 
 80. William Donnison, General Orders, Head-Quarters, Roxbury (May 1, 1798) 
(on file with author).  
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destined to preserve the Peace of the Community, and to guard 
against Foreign Invasion.  In a Nation thus situated, there can be no 
real cause of jealousy between the Civil and Military Powers.  The 
Citizens composing the Militia having the same interests in the 
welfare of the community, they will be the faithful guardians of the 
Commonwealth.  Hence it is reasonable for the Commander in 
Chief to expect, that every Individual will do his duty with alacrity, 
that the Laws for regulating the Militia will be punctually obeyed; 
that order and subordination will be maintained, and that regularity 
and discipline will be fully established throughout the Militia of this 
Commonwealth.81 
Donnison’s observations on the constitutional role of a well-
regulated militia is consistent with Article XVII of the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution: “The people have a right to keep and to 
bear arms for the common defence . . . and the military power shall 
always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority and be 
governed by it.”82  Article XVII makes no mention of a militia, yet 
eighteenth century contemporaries understood this right to be linked 
to militia service.83  Take for instance the following statement, which 
was drafted by the Massachusetts Assembly in the midst of Shays’ 
Rebellion: 
Whereas in a free government, where the people have a right to 
bear arms for the common defence, and the military power is held in 
subordination to the civil authority, it is necessary for the safety of 
the State that the virtuous citizens thereof should hold themselves in 
readiness, and when called upon, should exert their efforts to 
support the civil government, and oppose the attempts of factious 
and wicked men, who may wish to subvert the laws and Constitution 
of their country . . . .84 
The Assembly’s wording to “hold themselves in readiness . . . to 
support the civil government” was a direct reference to militia service.  
Furthermore, the statement denounced the actions of Shays’ 
insurgents as contrary to what Article XVII protects.  The same 
interpretation was conveyed in a series of editorials penned by Judge 
 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. XVII (emphasis added). 
 83. For a different view, see James A. Henretta, Collective Responsibilities, 
Private Arms, and State Regulation: Toward the Original Understanding, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 536 (2004) (showing that there were proposals for Article 
XVII to read “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for their own as the 
common defence”) (emphasis added). 
 84. Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 59, 1787 Mass. Acts 291 (emphasis added). 
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George Thatcher, a member of the First Congress.85  Thatcher agreed 
that the Bill of Rights imposes constitutional limits on the 
legislature.86  However, in the case of Article XVII, this meant that 
the “right to keep and bear arms for the common defence” was 
“prefixed to the [C]onstitution” and was “never to be infringed.”87  
Whereas all other uses of arms were “alienable right[s]” and could be 
“abridged by the legislature as they may think for the general good.”88 
To summarize the two case studies, both Jefferson and Donnison 
provide us with more evidence that calls into question the Standard 
Model as a viable theory moving forward.89  What is particularly 
troubling with the Model is its advancement of a general or universal 
militia divorced from government.90  Its supporters view “the people” 
as the individual keepers of public and private violence, yet the 
history of public arms regulation and what constituted a well-
regulated society runs counter to this very idea.91  Again, the purpose 
of these studies is not to question the holdings of Heller and 
McDonald.  But if the Supreme Court moves forward with the 
Standard Model in its entirety, the Court will be advancing false 
notions of history.  And rather than preserving or restoring the 
Founders’ Second Amendment, the Court will be rewriting history 
altogether. 
B. Excavating the Standard Model’s Poor Foundation 
Perhaps the largest dilemma facing the Supreme Court as it moves 
forward with Second Amendment jurisprudence is separating fact 
 
 85. See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-
Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 161 (2007). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Dec. 8, 1786, at 1. 
 88. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1826–27.  For more on Thatcher’s 
understanding of the right to arms and the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, see id. at 
1822–35. 
 89. For this author’s previous writings that call the Standard Model into question 
following the McDonald decision, see Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra 
note 25; Charles, Constitutional Significance, supra note 15; Charles, Scribble 
Scrabble, supra note 9. 
 90. See HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 181–83; Hardy, supra note 34, at 330; Hardy, 
Ducking the Bullet, supra note 41, at 67 n.32.  For a discussion on how any 
unorganized militia or independent militia association rights are historically 
unsupported, see Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 374–90.  
The Supreme Court has even held there are no independent militia rights. See 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 (2008); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252, 267–68 (1886). 
 91. See Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 11–41. 
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from fiction.  Again, for over thirty-five years Standard Model writers 
have succeeded in building a mythical construct that proves difficult 
to separate and deconstruct.  What makes this task particularly 
complicated is the number of layers the Model is built on.  One article 
is built upon another, and so on, even in cases where previous articles 
have been rebutted or shown to be historically unacceptable. 
What proves even more problematic is that many of the Model’s 
historical claims are unsupported.  Often, Standard Model works seek 
to deduce historical meaning through hypothetical word scenarios 
that they claim prove “public understanding,” or, if conducted 
properly, what historians would refer to as a combination of social 
and intellectual history.92  Certainly, the way in which the public 
understood the Constitution is important for any historical inquiry.93  
But conducting an objective social and intellectual history requires 
more than parsing text and finding a favorable interpretation.94  All 
historical inquiries, including that of social and intellectual history, 
require historical context.  This means the writer must take into 
account “beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices, and loyalties that 
are not those of our day.”95  A proper social and intellectual history 
also requires the conducting of the most basic methodologies, such as 
comprehensive research, reading and incorporating the seminal 
accepted works on the subject (or at least distinguishing one’s 
 
 92. See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L.& 
HUMAN. 295, 297–304 (2011) (discussing the problems with deducing eighteenth 
century public meaning for constitutional interpretation); Barry Friedman, Discipline 
and Method: The Making of the Will of the People, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 891 
(2010) (agreeing with historians that legal works need to adhere to reasonable 
historical “standards regarding how they search, what claims they make, on what 
evidence, and to what end”). 
 93. This author agrees that the text of the Second Amendment provides historians 
with an interpretational starting point.  However, we must understand those words in 
their legal context, and the place to start is an exhaustive examination of eighteenth 
century militia laws and treatises because of the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
language, “A well-regulated militia.” See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra 
note 3, at 15–34.   
 94. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 
HIST. & THEORY 3, 6–7 (1969) [hereinafter Skinner, Meaning] (discussing how a focus 
on text often brings to “bear some of one’s own expectations about what he must 
have been saying” and converting “scattered and quite incidental remarks” into 
doctrine); Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 
NEW LITERARY HIST. 393, 407–08 (1972) [hereinafter Skinner, Motives] (stating the 
importance of interpreting historical text is focusing on the “writer’s mental world” 
and any factors linked to the text’s creation). 
 95. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for 
Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 378 (1998). 
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conclusions from said works), separating historical realities from 
political propaganda, pinpointing what may have intellectually or 
ideologically influenced the writer, and weighing the credibility of the 
writer’s opinion with others of the same period.96  Most Standard 
Model works do not meet these standardized burdens, and it remains 
the reason why professional historians generally do not accept these 
works.97   
The repercussions that poor methodologies can have on historical 
objectivity and preserving our past are of particular concern to 
historians.98  A lack of professional and objective norms leads to 
myths.  As a result, history runs astray, and generations are socialized 
to believe historical fictions are realities.99  Some Founding Era myths 
that have matriculated as a result of poor methodologies include the 
likes of limited immigration powers,100 a natural rights interpretation 
of the Declaration of Independence,101 and a presumption of liberty 
when interpreting the Constitution and Bill of Rights.102  Each of 
 
 96. See id. at 389–96, 451 (discussing the importance of historical expertise in 
objectivity). 
 97. See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) 
(twenty-one scholars and historians disagreeing with the Standard Model); Shalhope, 
supra note 13, at 1442 (discussing how law review articles have polluted the history of 
the Second Amendment).  
 98. See Konig, Heller, Guns, and History, supra note 12, at 177–97. 
 99. Constitutional revisionism is nothing new in our Anglo-American legal 
tradition. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 
(1957) (discussing the use of history and contemporary understandings of the 
common law to mold constitutional interpretation); see also American Constitution 
in 1787 and 1866, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 604, 619 (New York, A.S. Barnes 
& Co. 1875) (discussing how, even in the late nineteenth century, constitutional 
interpretation is subjective). 
 100. Compare Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the 
Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusions, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 67 (2010) 
(addressing the international and Anglo origins of immigration and its imprint on 
American constitutionalism), with James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, 
Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of The Early Republic: Prospectivity, 
Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 369 (2010) (improperly claiming 
the immigration power was limited to norms of prospectivity). 
 101. See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International 
Law, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 39, 46–47, 62 (2002) (confirming the Declaration had 
nothing to do with individual natural rights, and everything to do with the law of 
nations). 
 102. See generally Charles, Restoring, supra note 62, at 477–78 (rebutting Randy 
Barnett’s claim that the founding generation prescribed to a legal “presumption of 
liberty” when interpreting the Constitution); see also Jack Rakove, Book Review, 1 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 660, 669 (2005) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) and arguing the 
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these myths, if ever taken seriously by the Supreme Court, will not 
only give false perceptions of history to future generations, but will 
affect jurisprudence drastically as to amend the Constitution itself. 
This historical burden is something that the Court bears on a day-
to-day basis when weighing arguments and writing opinions, whether 
each Justice knows it or not.103  Just one historical mistake by a 
majority can lead to countless others, especially given that the lower 
courts often are bound to restate the Supreme Court’s historical 
mistakes as historical facts.104  Thus, the Court’s duty to maintain a 
sense of historical consciousness is not something the Justices should 
take lightly.105  They must remain cognizant that any cherry-picking of 
historical events will have dire consequences on society at large, 
especially when it adopts unproven and mythical writings as historical 
authority.106 
A fitting example as to how far a myth can supersede historical 
reality is the story of George Washington’s teeth.  One will never find 
the subject litigated in a court of law, and its history will likely never 
impact the outcome of a case.  Still the subject as to whether 
Washington’s teeth were made of wood has latched itself onto the 
first President.  It is uncertain how the myth polluted American 
discourse, but numerous studies by historians and other scholars have 
all dismissed it as unsupported. 
The earliest study was a 1948 work entitled An Introduction to the 
History of Dentistry.  Written by Bernhard Wolf Weinberger, the 
two-volume work provided the first exhaustive examination of dental 
history and found no support for the Washington myth.107  Later 
 
main fault with Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” thesis is that “the Constitution . . . 
was much more about powers than rights”). 
 103. See Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, 
Creative Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91 (1998).  
 104. See Jeffery S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the 
Meaning of the Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1184–92 (1998) (discussing 
the risks of using history and how jurists may reduce that risk). 
 105. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, “In order to know what [the law] is, 
we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.  We must alternately 
consult history and existing theories of legislation.  But the most difficult labor will be 
to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage.” OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1963) (1881) (emphasis added). 
 106. See J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEORY 
AND METHOD 3–20, 189 (2009) (discussing the importance of historical consciousness 
in articulating the past divorced from one’s present social awareness). 
 107. See 2 BERNARD WOLF WEINBERGER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF 
DENTISTRY 291–334 (1948). 
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histories reinforced this point, including John Woodforde’s The 
Strange Story of False Teeth and Robert Darnton’s George 
Washington’s False Teeth.108  Yet the wooden teeth myth lives on.  As 
Edward G. Lengel astutely points out, this is because individuals 
make cognitive choices that “reveal more about us” than they do 
about what the historical record provides.109  It is natural for 
individuals to “define themselves” through their own knowledge and 
beliefs of history rather than seek truth or clarity.  This does not mean 
that historians will ever concede to accepting myth as historical fact. 
One of the historian’s primary roles is to educate the public about 
the past for the sake of understanding the past, whether the people 
choose to accept it or not.  This includes subjects that have no 
political or legal significance (such as Washington’s teeth).  The 
Mount Vernon Ladies Association has gone so far as to dedicate a 
portion of its museum to debunk the wooden teeth myth, which 
includes an informational video from the History Channel.110  The 
Association also lists the myth on the Association’s website as the 
first “falsehood” worth correcting.111  There is even a children’s book 
dedicated to the cause, its purpose being to educate children (and 
hopefully parents too) that “contrary to popular belief, [Washington] 
never had a set of wooden teeth.”112 
In one important aspect, the Standard Model account of the 
Second Amendment is akin to Washington’s wooden teeth.  Both will 
persist no matter how much historical evidence is unearthed or 
literature is published.  Despite historians’ best efforts, individuals, 
groups, political parties, and advocacy groups will hold onto the 
Standard Model or variations of the Model because it is what they 
heard or read somewhere, a personal belief they hold dear and agree 
with, or a political agenda from which to benefit.  Few, if any, will 
disagree that it is every person’s right to believe as they wish.  
 
 108. See ROBERT DARNTON, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S FALSE TEETH: AN 
UNCONVENTIONAL GUIDE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, at xv, 23–24 (2003); JOHN 
WOODFORDE, THE STRANGE STORY OF FALSE TEETH 98–108 (1968). 
 109. EDWARD G. LENGEL, INVENTING GEORGE WASHINGTON: AMERICA’S 
FOUNDER, IN MYTH & MEMORY, at xviii (2011). 
 110. Press Release, Mount Vernon, Mount Vernon Exhibits George Washington’s 
Presidential Dentures & His Last Tooth, Encased as a Souvenir by his Dentist (Oct. 
13, 2009), available at http://www.mountvernon.org/miscellaneous/news-
press/release-archive/mount-vernon-exhibits-george-washington’s-presidential-dent.  
 111. Facts & Falsehoods About George Washington, MOUNT VERNON (Jan. 18, 
2006), http://www.mountvernon.org/content/facts-falsehoods-about-george-
washington-0.  
 112. DEBORAH CHANDRA ET AL., GEORGE WASHINGTON’S TEETH (2007). 
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However, a person’s freedom to believe “X” as historical fact, does 
not make it a fact unless it is supported by the employment of proper 
historical methodologies and the gathering of substantiating historical 
evidence in context. 
At the same time, the Standard Model and Washington’s teeth 
differ in terms of public education through advocacy.  There are, of 
course, no public or private interest groups dedicated to Washington’s 
wooden teeth.  The opposite holds true of the Standard Model.  
Groups like the National Rifle Association and the Second 
Amendment Foundation emphasize that the Founders viewed guns as 
the centerpiece of republican liberty, and they endorse and finance 
works that only advance this baseline conclusion.113  There is even a 
children’s book that advances this controversial notion of history, 
which at no point emphasizes the significance that the founding 
generation placed on a “well-regulated militia,” its relationship to a 
republican government, or that the right of self-preservation and 
resistance is very narrowly tailored as the Declaration of 
Independence spells out.  Instead, the book simplifies the Second 
Amendment as a “privilege, responsibility, and right to own our own 
guns, and be ready to fight” against enemies foreign and domestic, i.e. 
an urban militia or armed rabble.114  It is by having “rifles by [our] 
sides” that we protect American liberty and honor our fallen.  This 
laissez-faire depiction of the right to arms is troubling to historians, 
and the book’s indexed quotations, which seek to teach “parents and 
grandparents” about the ideological importance of owning guns, is 
borderline historical propaganda. 
There is an important yet simple lesson from this comparison—
historical myths are difficult to remove from society at large, 
including the ridiculous and unfinanced myth of Washington’s 
wooden teeth.  Just pause to think—the Washington myth has been 
academically disproven for over sixty years, yet people still connect 
the first President with having wooden teeth, and it is a myth that 
 
 113. See Frequently Asked Questions, SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, 
http://www.saf.org/default.asp?p=saf_faq (last visited Nov. 29, 2012); Supported 
Research, NRA C.R. DEF. FUND, http://www.nradefensefund.org/supported-
research.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (showing $264,000 in research grants for a 
four month period to Standard Model writers that include David T. Hardy, Don B. 
Kates, David B. Kopel, and Kenneth Klukowski). 
 114. KIMBERLY JO SIMAC, WITH A RIFLE BY MY SIDE: A SECOND AMENDMENT 
LESSON (2010).  This book was financed by the author, and endorsed by the Gun 
Owners of America.  Although the book was personally financed, it does give readers 
information to contact gun advocacy groups like the Gun Owners of America and the 
National Rifle Association. 
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retains no political, philosophical, or ideological affiliation.  This last 
point is important because often an individual or group’s historical 
perception is influenced by these factors.  In other words, one’s 
historical view of a given constitutional provision is often not based 
upon the search for the truth, but by latching onto a textual 
interpretation for an ideal already maintained. 
This scenario particularly presents itself to most Standard Model 
analyses on the Second Amendment, and it is one of the reasons why 
it has been able to thrive by pandering myth and assumption as 
historical fact.  For the most part, historians have identified the 
Model’s fundamental problems and see it for what it truly is—a house 
of cards.  By removing any of the building blocks upon which the 
Model rests, the historian sees that it easily falls.  Even though 
historians have witnessed the Model collapse on numerous 
occasions,115 its supporters have managed to get around this by citing 
disproven or abandoned historical works as academic authority.116  
Other tactics include interpreting text out of context, ad hoc 
wordplay, claiming that circumstantial evidence is the best historical 
evidence, and filling in historical gaps with personal opinion because 
they fail to do the research. 
These are just some of the ways that Standard Model writers have 
rewritten the history of the Second Amendment to the point that it is 
 
 115. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History”: The Current 
Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657, 681–82 (2002).   
 116. One prominent example is the work of historian Robert E. Shalhope.  In 1982, 
he wrote an article in the Journal of American History on the ideological origins of 
the right to arms. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second 
Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982) [hereinafter Shalhope, The Ideological 
Origins].  Numerous Standard Model works then pawned and manipulated 
Shalhope’s article to support their conclusions, not realizing its purpose was to 
facilitate a discourse and establish a research agenda. See Robert E. Shalhope & 
Lawrence Delbert Cress, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An 
Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587 (1984).  In fact, by 1985 Shalhope criticized the 
Standard Model in a review of Stephen P. Halbrook’s book That Every Man Be 
Armed. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Right to Bear Arms: A View From the Past, 13 
REVS. AM. HIST. 347, 349-52 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Shalhope, The Right 
to Bear Arms].  In 2003, Shalhope then endorsed William G. Merkel and H. Richard 
Uviller’s book linking the Second Amendment to a militia right. See Shalhope, supra 
note 13 at 1442.  In 2008, Shalhope joined a number of prominent historians that 
sided against the Standard Model, thus showing further disagreement with Model 
writers that mischaracterized his work. See Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove, 
Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, William J. Novak, Lois G. Schwoerer et al. in Support 
of Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).  
Despite this fact, Standard Model writers still cite to Shalhope as supporting their 
argument and being in their camp. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 4, at 1213–14, 1217.  
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virtually unrecognizable to the founding generation.  There are 
indeed others, but the remainder of Part I will focus on illuminating 
the four most common deficiencies.  These include (1) a persisting 
lack of historical context, (2) the advancement of a poor research 
agenda, (3) the failure to adhere to objectivity norms, and (4) a 
failure to meet the historian’s evidentiary burden.  These deficiencies 
will be highlighted by focusing on the most frequently cited and 
relied-upon Standard Model works—what I refer to as the Standard 
Model pillars. 
1. History Lesson 101: Interpreting Text Without Historical 
Context Is Just a Con 
Any student who majors in history immediately learns the 
importance of historical context in writing an objective account.117  
Context is even more essential when deducing a writer’s intentions or 
written words—what is traditionally referred to as the “history of 
ideas” or “intellectual history.”118  Historians know that words are 
inert or that they must be placed in the time of their construction.119  
If the writer’s meaning changes it is only due to the “imaginative 
processes of their human inventors and users” that misinterpreted it, 
not the original author.120  Thus, the historian must remain cognizant 
to balance historical texts, images, and theories responsibly, with 
precision, and “connect them to a particular historical world.”121  A 
historian cannot simply assume meaning with a modern 
predisposition.122  The historian must import the language into the 
proper historical construct, “point out conventions and regularities 
that indicate what could and could not be spoken in the language, and 
 
 117. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 20–21 
(1931); id. at 16 (“Perhaps the greatest of all the lessons of history is the 
demonstration of the complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of 
the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men; and on the face of it 
this is a lesson that can only be learned in detail.”) (emphasis added). 
 118. See Skinner, The Limits of Historical Explanations, supra note 31, at 213–14 
(stating the importance of providing historical context to the “greatest detail” 
whenever possible). 
 119. See Joyce Appleby, One Good Turn Deserves Another: Moving Beyond the 
Linguistic; A Response to David Harlan, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 1326, 1328 (1989). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Anthony Grafton, The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950–2000 and 
Beyond, 67 J. HIST. IDEAS 1, 30 (2006). 
 122. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 22–23; see also J.G.A. POCOCK, 
POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 106 (1971) (discussing the methodological problems 
with assuming the relation of ideas to historical social reality). 
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in what ways the language qua paradigm encouraged, obliged, or 
forbade its users to speak and think.”123 
Perhaps a better way to summarize this placement of text into 
historical context is to follow Quentin Skinner’s three steps to 
conducting intellectual history: 
1.  [Historians] need to recover an author’s intentions in writing in 
order to understand the meaning of what he writes. 
2.  In order to recover such intentions, it is . . . essential to surround 
the given text with an appropriate context of assumptions and 
conventions from which the author’s exact intended meaning can 
then be decoded. 
3.  This yields the crucial conclusion that a knowledge of these 
assumptions and conventions must be essential to understanding the 
meaning of text.124 
To ignore these rules—that is, to interpret text loosely—is to 
commit what Herbert Butterfield termed a “pathetic fallacy” because 
it abstracts conclusions apart from the author’s purpose.125  Yet sadly 
this is the interpretative foundation upon which much of the Standard 
Model is built.  This dismissal of the most important of all historical 
methodologies has been accomplished by promoting dictionaries and 
the general usage of words above any contextual, intellectual, social, 
or ideological framework existing at that time.126  Perhaps the best 
way to summarize what is taking place in terms of methodology is 
through Randy Barnett’s “reasonable speaker” approach,127 and here 
is how it is packaged when inquiring into the scope of the Second 
Amendment: 
 
 123. J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 10 (1985); see also J.G.A. 
Pocock et al., The History of British Political Thought: A Field and its Futures, in 
BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT IN HISTORY, LITERATURE AND THEORY, 1500–1800, at 
10, 11 (David Armitage ed., 2006) [hereinafter Pocock et al., The History of British 
Political Thought] (“The historian is interested in what the author meant to say, 
succeeded in saying, and was understood to have said, in a succession of historical 
contexts now distant in time.”). 
 124. Quentin Skinner, Hermeneutics and the Role of History, 7 NEW LITERARY 
HIST. 209, 216 (1975). 
 125. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 20. 
 126. See Merkel, Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 12, at 379–80 
(objecting to the use of dictionaries for constitutional meaning); accord Charles & 
O’Neill, supra note 43, at 56. 
 127. See Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001) (noting that instead of searching for subjective meanings 
that the Framers personally adopted, one should seek the “meaning a reasonable 
speaker of English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences, etc. at the 
time the particular provision was adopted”). 
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What did “militia” mean in 1791?  Or “well-regulated” or “arms” or 
“bear” or “right” or “the people”? . . .  Discerning the original 
public meaning of the text requires an examination of linguistic 
usage among those who wrote and ratified the text as well as the 
general public to whom the Constitution was addressed.  Evidence 
of specialized meaning or intent by framers or ratifiers is only 
relevant if it is shown that such specialized meaning would have 
been known and assumed by a member of a general public.  Where 
more than one contemporary meaning is identified, it becomes 
necessary to establish which meaning was dominant.  Any such 
historical claim is an empirical one that requires actual evidence of 
usage of substantiate.128 
When one compares Barnett’s approach with that of intellectual 
historians, the difference is telling.129  The former, which is now a 
staple of New Originalism,130 finds it acceptable to parse text, define 
each part, and reassemble the whole, albeit often out of its intended 
context.131  Meanwhile, intellectual historians require substantially 
more, such as placing words in the writer’s context, applying it to the 
period, determining its intended application to society as a whole, and 
weighing it with prominent intellectual influences.132 
Another problem with Barnett’s approach is that it is difficult to 
determine, first, what constitutes a “reasonable speaker” in the 
eighteenth century and, second, which “contemporary meaning” was 
“dominant.”133  As historian Saul Cornell has pointed out, the 
 
 128. Barnett, supra note 40, at 239–40. 
 129. It should be noted that eight years earlier Barnett co-authored an article with 
Don B. Kates endorsing the Standard Model as historically supported. See Randy E. 
Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second 
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1143 (1996).  
 130. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
245 (2009) (explaining how the proper inquiry is how the words of the Constitution 
“would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed 
reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and 
within the political and linguistic community in which they were adopted”); Michael 
W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the idea that the words of the Constitution must be 
understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at the time of 
enactment.”). 
 131. This interpretational dilemma has been going on for quite some time. See 
Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. 
 132. See Skinner, supra note 124, at 216. 
 133. See Merkel, Heller as Hubris, supra note 12, at 1227 (discussing the problems 
with relying on “original public meaning” and how the historical burden should rest 
with “original public meaning adherents to show that their preferred 
understanding—while inconsistent with that of the text’s authors—is nonetheless in 
harmony with that of its ratifiers”). 
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varieties of interpretation that can be found in any historical era are 
numerous.134  Certainly they cannot all be reasonable, nor can 
historians accept each and every viewpoint as correct or 
“dominant.”135  The fact remains that the historical evidence, and the 
resulting conclusions, must be intimately related, and not merely be a 
twenty-first century reader’s plausible interpretation.  In other words, 
history requires something more than finding a few instances where 
the use of language is favorable to a particular interpretation.136 
A perfect historical example of the interpretational divide between 
the Standard Model method and that of intellectual historians can be 
found in an examination of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England.137  Since this journal’s publication of David I. 
Caplan’s 1976 article, the Standard Model has consistently pawned 
Blackstone as articulating a “strong and clear common law tradition” 
of the “citizen’s right to possess and carry arms for individual self-
 
 134. See, e.g., Cornell, Originalism on Trial, supra note 12, at 630–31.  
 135. For a discussion, see Cornell, The People’s Constitution, supra note 92, at 
295–304. See also Gordon Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 
23 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1966) (discussing the historian’s dilemma in separating political 
propaganda, changing arguments, and political realities).  For a working example of 
the interpretational divide that can result from a “reasonable speaker” approach 
versus a deeper historical inquiry, compare Clayton E. Cramer et al., “This Right is 
Not Allowed By Governments That Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning 
of the Second Amendment When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 823, 855–62 (2010) (claiming that by the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, the Second Amendment was understood as an individual 
right to resist tyranny and to protect against public violence), with Charles, Historical 
Guideposts, supra note 18, at 57–76 (showing there is evidence to suggest that John 
Bingham, members of the 39th Congress, and Freedman interpreted the Second 
Amendment as a right to take part in constitutional militias). 
 136. This is essentially what happened with the Second Amendment phrase “bear 
arms.” See Barnett, supra note 40, at 245–47 (relying on a failed hunting law and the 
Pennsylvania Minority proposals to determine meaning); Cramer & Olson, supra 
note 50 (locating sources that interpreted “bear arms” broadly).  For a historian’s 
dissent to this methodological approach see Kozuskanich, supra note 12.  For a 
historian’s view that the digitalizing of history can be partly at fault for poor historical 
interpretations by non-historians, see Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital 
Age: An Inquiry Into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 585 (2009). 
 137. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 56. Compare Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation, supra note 9, at 24–60 (showing the political and ideological restraints 
placed on the right of revolution), and Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the 
Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 253–55 (2000) (dissenting to the 
Standard Model view of Blackstone), with Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment 
and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMM. 87, 87–104 (1992) (claiming the 
founding generation saw no difference in individual armed self-defense and rebelling 
against tyranny). 
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preservation and collective defense.”138  This is a rather poor and 
cursory reading of Blackstone, for he eloquently articulated the right 
as follows: 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present 
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their 
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.  Which is also 
declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2. and is indeed a 
public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of 
resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and 
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.139 
Blackstone’s reference to “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation” does not refer to armed self-defense for private 
purposes.140  It is a public allowance (under due restrictions) of a 
“natural right”—and that allowance is made for a particular, public 
purpose: to “restrain the violence of oppression” from a tyrannical 
sovereign.141  This indeed is the only interpretation that comports with 
Blackstone’s definition of an “auxiliary right”: a means to ensure that 
rights “ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, 
[would remain in force] if the constitution had provided no other 
method to secure their actual enjoyment.”142  The first auxiliary right 
(the first means to protect primary rights) is Parliament’s exercise of 
its powers; the second is the sovereign; and the third is the courts of 
justice.143  When those fail, the people may resort to the fourth 
auxiliary right: the right to petition Parliament or the King for the 
“redress of grievances.”144  And only after that right is exhausted may 
the people resort to “having arms.”145  Thus, in Blackstone’s construct, 
the Declaration’s guarantees—the right to petition and the allowance 
of “having arms”—are means by which individuals preserve and 
protect their liberties if Parliament, the sovereign, and the courts fail 
them.146 
 
 138. Caplan, supra note 19, at 34.  For some other prominent and influential 
Standard Model examples misinterpreting Blackstone, see HALBROOK, THAT EVERY 
MAN BE ARMED, supra note 40, at 45, 54; MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 130, 142–43. 
 139. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 139. 
 140. See supra note 138 for Standard Model writers attempting to link Blackstone 
to a common law right of self-defense against public and private aggression.   
 141. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 139. 
 142. Id. at 136.  
 143. Id. at 136–38. 
 144. Id. at 138–39. 
 145. Id. at 139. 
 146. For a full discussion see Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, 
at 24–60.  Subsequent early nineteenth century treatises similarly understood 
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At no part did Blackstone link the right of personal security with 
the possession of arms, nor did he cite to the Declaration of Rights’ 
“having arms” provision in his discussion of personal security.147  The 
omission was deliberate, for Blackstone was referring to a rather 
distinct principle—lawful rebellion and resistance to restore the 
Constitution.148  Parliament controlled this right as a means to check a 
tyrannical sovereign, particularly one that maintained an oppressive 
or unlawful standing army.149  In such instances, Parliament 
maintained the authority to call forth the people as a militia—
“suitable to their condition and as allowed by law”—to restore the 
Constitution and the people’s liberties in the process.150 
Historians refer to this as history in context, yet somehow Standard 
Model scholars read Blackstone as advancing an individual right to 
carry arms to preserve the peace.  How so?  Easy—one just has to 
insert personal opinion or modern sentiment in lieu of historical 
context.151  Take, for instance, Don B. Kates.  In his mind, the right to 
arms “emerged from a tradition which viewed general possession of 
arms as a positive social good as well as an indispensible adjunct to 
the individual right of self-defense.”152  He comes to this conclusion by 
taking numerous commentators out of context, particularly 
Blackstone.  According to Kates, Blackstone “described the right to 
arms . . . emphasiz[ing] both the individual self-protection rationale 
and the criminological premises, which are so foreign to the terms of 
the modern debate over the Second Amendment.”153  History in 
context, however, does not support such a conclusion. 
 
Blackstone in this construct. See JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
ENGLAND, OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 316–17 (David 
Lieberman ed., Liberty Fund 2007) (1816); FRANCIS PLOWDEN, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN & IRELAND 158 (n.p., J. Ridgway 1802). 
 147. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 125–30.  Blackstone cites to the Declaration 
of Rights in other sections of his Commentaries including his discussions on excessive 
fines, unreasonable bail, and dispensing and suspending the laws. See id. at 131, 138; 
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 472. 
 148. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 26–40. 
 149. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 356–57. 
 150. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 42, 45. 
 151. The intellectual historian would describe such persons as theorists.  The 
theorist only reconstitutes history “in terms set by the theoretical enterprise,” which 
is not a method “the historian of political thought will use in reconstituting a history 
of language and discourse.” Pocock et al., The History of British Political Thought, 
supra note 123, at 11. 
 152. Kates, supra note 137, at 93. 
 153. Id.  
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This leads us to an important empirical question: what is the harm 
in stretching text beyond its intended context—or what one may refer 
to as breaking the bounds of historical elasticity?  The answer is that 
one false interpretation can lead to a domino effect that creates a web 
of false historical and legal paradigms.154  This is exactly what has 
happened to Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right as Standard Model 
writers then applied this poor construct to the founding generation.155  
In such instances, historical context is replaced with modern 
misconceptions of text or the importation of personal opinion as 
historical fact.  Some lawyers have even selectively quoted 
Blackstone—completely out of context—to argue that the Second 
Amendment was naturally understood to protect a right to carry arms 
for “protection against violence in public.”156  This ahistorical 
conclusion is reached by classifying the 1689 Declaration of Rights 
“having arms” provision as a libertarian auxiliary right, which serves 
principally as a barrier “to protect and maintain inviolate the three 
great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property.”157  To be precise, lawyers are misconstruing history 
 
 154. In the case of Kates’ understanding of the right to arms against public and 
private violence, a number of Standard Model writers have cited to his article as 
historical authority. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
187, 189, 192 (2006); David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, 
Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. 
REV. 438, 481 (1997); Kopel, supra note 50, at 1364, 1401, 1454; Kopel, supra note 17, 
at 137; Lund, supra note 40, at 248; Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the 
Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 14, 61 (1996); Michael P. O’Shea, The 
Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 
349, 379 (2009); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 465, 467.  For more on the “domino effect” 
see infra Part II.B. 
 155. See HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 40, at 58; 
HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 20–21; Hardy, supra note 34, at 318–19; Hardy, supra 
note 41, at 74, 81; Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment 
Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1345–46 
(2009). 
 156. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
and/or Permanent Injunction at 5, Shepard v. Madigan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 774 (S.D. Ill. 
2011) (No. 11-cv-00405). 
 157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
56, at 136); see also Presentation by Alan Gura, Esq., Partner, Gura and Possessky, 
P.L.L.C. to The City Club of Cleveland, The City Club of Cleveland (July 7, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.cityclub.org/mediacenter/cityclubpodcast/podcastpsting/tabid/194/default.
aspx (“The right to arms was well established . . . from Blackstone’s conception of a 
right of self-preservation.  If you have the right to preserve your own life, Blackstone 
reasoned, you have an auxiliary right to arms with which you would do so, and that is 
what the English law protected, and that is the right the English king started to 
encroach upon . . . and it is very well documented.”). 
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to argue that, by the late eighteenth century, arms were seen as the 
means and ends to preserve a person’s security, liberty, and property 
on a day-to-day basis in both public and private spheres, that is to say 
a Wild West version of history. 
This cannot even be remotely classified as history in context, and 
the fault can be attributed to incomplete and inadequate research 
methodologies.  As I have shown in previous articles, the founding 
generation properly restated and applied what Blackstone meant by 
the fifth auxiliary right many times over—the right of lawful 
revolution and resistance to restore the Constitution.158  Numerous 
sources support this proposition, including the writings of Samuel 
Adams in conjunction with the 1768 Boston Town Council affair,159 
James Otis’s pamphlet entitled A Vindication of the British 
Colonies,160 the legal works of St. George Tucker,161 and even more 
generalized writings in the popular print culture.162  All confirm the 
Standard Model approach to interpreting Blackstone is without 
context and must be discarded as embarrassing. 
2. History Lesson 102: Answering Any Historical Query First 
Requires Substantiated Evidence to Support It 
The second lesson that any student of history learns is that a thesis 
conclusion requires substantiated evidence to prove and support it.  
When assembling evidence, this not only requires applying the 
 
 158. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 37–38, 60. 
 159. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 421–34. 
 160. See id. at 441. 
 161. See id. at 419; Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second 
Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 406, 411 (2009). 
 162. See Extract of a Letter from a Worthy Member of the Committee of 
Correspondence in Boston, THE ESSEX GAZETTE (Salem, Mass.), Apr. 6, 1773, at 143 
(“The Law of Nature with respect to communities, is the same that it is with respect 
to individuals; it gives the collective body a right to preserve themselves; to employ 
undisturbed the means of life . . . and the power to defend themselves, the surest 
pledge of their safety.  This affords us the strongest encouragement that our 
countrymen are by no means fallen into that state of pusillanimous indifference 
about their Rights and submission to the invasion of them, which Judge Blackstone 
holds so criminal and degradatory to an Englishman.—These invaluable and 
unalienable birthrights, this same great jurist tells us, are to be vindicated first by 
petition, and failure of this, by ARMS.”); Defence of Machiavel, LITERARY MAG. & 
AM. REG., Jan. 1807, at 33 (tracing the right of self-preservation of government back 
to Machiavelli, including Blackstone’s recognition of “resistance on the part of the 
people in defence of their invaded liberties; he acknowledges both the right and 
necessity of such resistance in extreme cases, however, in very unequivocal terms.”); 
see also supra note 146. 
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evidence in its proper context, but also that the evidentiary links 
between sources be intimately related.  History that applies a “choice 
of means” approach—i.e. to reasonably adapt the evidentiary means 
to support a desired historical end—is completely unacceptable.  
Indeed, a historian may try to piecemeal the evidence to advance an 
interpretative theory.  However, this is a historical theory, not a 
proven or supported historical thesis. 
What differentiates the two?  The answer is that a historical theory 
provides a research agenda for other historians to prove or disprove.  
It is a history in progress so to speak.  Meanwhile, a verified historical 
thesis incorporates substantial and intimately woven evidence that 
speaks for itself.  Initially its findings may not be accepted outright 
should it not comport with the historical consensus, but this can 
change with time and subsequent historical exchanges. 
Herein enters the Standard Model Second Amendment, which its 
writers claim is an incontestable thesis based upon hard historical 
evidence.163  In the words of Kates, the Standard Model makes sense 
because the Second Amendment must “mean something.”164  He then 
asserts that any other interpretation is either “historically false,” 
“patently nonsensical,” “gibberish,” or “nonsense on stilts.”165  If this 
is true, then why have the overwhelming majority of professional 
historians steered away from endorsing the Model?  Much of the 
answer lies with the research agenda, and the conclusions reached 
upon that construct.  To put it another way, the Standard Model fails 
the historian’s “smell test.” 
To begin, historians are in general agreement that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right in one form or another.166  
Where there remains disagreement among historians and Standard 
Model writers are the purpose, scope, and limits of the individual 
right to keep and bear arms.167  The reasons for this divide are the 
 
 163. See, e.g., Barnett & Kates, supra note 129, at 1141 (“Research conducted 
through the 1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes 
reluctantly, but with virtual unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical 
argument against a broad individual right view of the Second Amendment.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 164. Kates, supra note 4, at 1226. 
 165. Id. at 1226–29. 
 166. See supra notes 8–9, 12 and accompanying text (historian views). 
 167. Take for instance Stephen B. Halbrook’s most recent book on the subject, 
which was funded by a $60,000 grant from the National Rifle Association. See 
Supported Research, NRA C.R. DEF. FUND, http://www.nradefensefund.org/ 
previous-years-research.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).  It asserts the Second 
Amendment individually protects against public and private violence, but provides 
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methodologies employed.  Take for instance Kates’s seminal 1983 
Michigan Law Review article, Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment.168  The article begins its inquiry 
by parsing the Second Amendment’s language, particularly what 
constituted the Founders’ militia: 
The Founders stated what they meant by “militia” on various 
occasions.  Invariably they defined it in some phrase like “the whole 
body of people,” while their references to the organized-military-
unit usage of militia, which they called a “select militia,” were 
strongly pejorative. 
In short, one purpose of the Founders having been to guarantee the 
arms of the militia, they accomplished that purpose by guaranteeing 
the arms of the individuals who made up the militia.  In this respect 
it would never have occurred to the Founders to differentiate 
between the arms of the two groups in the context of the 
amendment’s language.  The personally owned arms of the 
individual were the arms of the militia.  Thus, the amendment’s 
wording, so opaque to us, made perfect sense to the Framers: 
believing that a militia (composed of the entire people possessed of 
their individually owned arms) was necessary for the protection of a 
free state, they guaranteed the people’s right to possess those 
arms.169 
Here, Kates reaches a number of conclusions based upon one 
historical truth—early state and colonial militias generally consisted 
of all persons capable of bearing arms.170  However, three of these 
conclusions are unsupported by the historical record.  First, Kates 
 
virtually no research on eighteenth century arms restrictions, nor does it provide any 
of the ideological or philosophical limits on the right. See HALBROOK, supra note 22, 
at 328–30 (stating that even “subtle interferences” would violate the Second 
Amendment under its “shall not be infringed” language).  What Halbrook leaves out 
is there were numerous eighteenth century arms restrictions. See Charles, Historical 
Guideposts, supra note 18, at 23–25; Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation 
and the Second Amendment: A Closer Look at the Evidence, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 197 
(2007); David Thomas Konig, Arms and the Man: What Did the Right to “Keep” 
Arms Mean in the Early Republic?, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 177 (2007).  
 168. Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983). 
 169. Id. at 216–17. 
 170. Id. at 215–16.  David T. Hardy and John Stompoly arguably wrote the first 
Standard Model article to make this connection with similar evidence. See Hardy & 
Stompoly, supra note 40, at 70 (“First, as used by the framers, the term ‘Militia’ 
referred to all citizens capable of bearing arms, and not merely to those persons 
enrolled in formal state military units.  Thus, even should the second amendment be 
construed to protect only members of the ‘Militia’ its protections would extend to all 
persons capable of bearing arms.”). 
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improperly distinguishes between a general militia and a select-
militia.171  Indeed, the former consisted of all persons capable (an 
important qualifier) of bearing arms (generally males between 
eighteen and forty-five years of age), but it too was a state or 
government-controlled force under strict discipline and orders.172  The 
only distinguishing factor between a militia and select-militia rested 
on class structure.173  As was seen with the example of Thomas 
Jefferson, a select-militia merely burdened one age group over others 
for the common defense.174 
The second error is Kates’s assumption that every colony or state’s 
militia arms were comprised of the people’s “personally owned 
arms.”175  In some instances, the colony or state provided the arms to 
enrolled militia members upon being mustered,176 and in other cases 
those persons deemed capable were taxed with providing the 
required arms and accoutrements.177  Even after the adoption of the 
1792 National Militia Act, the states prescribed different rules for 
arming the militia.178  This led to a number of attempts to amend the 
Act, but Congress deferred to the states every time.  Why?  The 
answer rests with the fact that Congress conceived its arming powers 
to be limited to prescribing the type of arms.179  Meanwhile, any 
powers associated with individual armament were considered a state 
matter.180 
Kates’s third and last error is the most problematic given the 
potential legal repercussions.  With but one historical truth 
(eighteenth century militias consist of all persons capable of bearing 
arms), Kates informs us what the Second Amendment protected 
wholesale.181  He even goes so far as to claim that “the people 
 
 171. Kates, supra note 168, at 216; see also MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 148, 150, 163 
(equating a select-militia with a standing army). 
 172. This is confirmed by nearly a century of militia law preambles. See Charles, 
“Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 450–52 and accompanying footnotes.  
Furthermore, there is no substantiated evidence to suggest the people could form 
their own militias without government approval. See Charles, The 1792 National 
Militia Act, supra note 25, at 374–90. 
 173. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 367–70.  
 174. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
 175. Kates, supra note 168, at 217. 
 176. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 31–33. 
 177. See id. at 28–29. 
 178. See id. at 71–79. 
 179. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 346–50. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Kates, supra note 168, at 217. 
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possessed of their individually owned arms” is what was “necessary to 
the security of a free state,” not training, discipline, or organization.182  
This conclusion is nothing short of premature, especially given the 
Second Amendment does not stipulate that an “armed citizenry,” 
“armed populace,” or even a general “militia” is “necessary to the 
security of a free state.”183  The Second Amendment expressly states it 
is a “well regulated militia,” a rather distinct constitutional military 
body of citizen-soldiers.184  To be clear, Kates never addresses the 
“well regulated” language of the Second Amendment before 
providing his conclusions.  But more importantly, Kates does not 
even inquire about the constitutional significance of a “well regulated 
militia” in republican thought at any point within the article. 
The rest of Kates’s article presents similar problems in that it 
applies fragments of evidence to make conclusions—all of which have 
proven to be historically unsupported or untenable.185  The total 
number of historical errors is rather striking for anyone who has 
studied the right to arms, but correcting Kates’s article wholesale is 
not the purpose or scope of this Article.186  The point worth making is 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Furthermore, the intellectual history of what constituted a constitutional 
“well-regulated” militia disproves the “armed citizenry” or “armed populace” 
construct. See generally Charles, supra note 15. 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see Charles, supra note 15, at 9–86. 
 185. In the words of Herbert Butterfield: “[T]he more [historians] are making 
inferences instead of researches, then the more whig our history becomes if we have 
not severely repressed our original error . . . .” BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 6. 
 186. For some of Kates’s unsupported or disproven historical claims, compare 
Kates, supra note 168, at 221–22 (claiming arms in the hands of the people is what 
preserved liberty), with Charles, supra note 15, at 8–9, 21, 51–86 (showing the 
founding generation viewed an untrained and undisciplined populace as dangerous to 
liberty). Compare Kates, supra note 168, at 225 (claiming the Second Amendment 
had nothing to do with Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution), with Charles, supra 
note 15, at 62–68 (showing an affirmative link between Article I Section 8 of the 
Constitution and the Second Amendment), and Higginbotham, supra note 69, at 40. 
Compare Kates, note 168, at 228–29 (claiming the Second Amendment was drafted in 
response to British disarmament during the American Revolution), with Charles, 
“Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 435–40 (showing that Standard Model 
writers have not produced one document linking the two events, and that the 
founding generation similarly disarmed loyalists). Compare Kates, supra note 168, at 
238–39 (claiming the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision had nothing 
to do with the employment of Catholic officers), with Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation, supra note 9, at 44–52 (showing the “have arms” provision had 
everything to do with the employment of Catholic Lieutenants in the militia). 
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that this ad hoc approach to constitutional meaning is one of the 
pillars supporting the Standard Model.187 
This is both embarrassing and problematic in terms of preserving 
the historical record, and some might be surprised that such 
methodologies have passed as “history” in closed circles for so long.  
This can be attributed to a number of factors, but the most important 
being that there existed only one scholarly alternative at the time—
the pure collective rights approach.188  The collective rights 
understanding of the Second Amendment contained no individual 
component and viewed the right to “keep and bear arms” as solely a 
state matter.189  In fact, until Heller, the collective rights interpretation 
had grown to dominate Second Amendment jurisprudence to a point 
that many federal Courts of Appeals adopted it wholesale.190  
However, there remained a problem with a pure collective rights 
view—the Second Amendment was a right of “the people” in one 
form or another.191  It is for this reason that the Standard Model 
gained sway in the 1990s, and even received a nod from noted legal 
academics like Sanford Levinson and William Van Alstyne.192  But 
 
 187. See Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, supra note 
4, at 1219 (showing Kates himself claims it to be the “single most influential and 
comprehensive law review” on the Second Amendment today); David Hardy, Next 
Generation RKBA Scholars Conference, OF ARMS & THE LAW (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:06 
AM), http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/2012/01/next_generatin.php (stating the 
“critical role” Kates played “in developing the modern (and correct) view of the right 
to arms”). 
 188. In the 1990s, the Standard Model was packaged and sold as if it was the only 
interpretation consistent with Federalist and Anti-Federalist concerns. See Barnett & 
Kates, supra note 129, at 1213–14. 
 189. See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in 
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
5, 7 (1989).   
 190. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted the pure collective 
rights interpretation. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 
1999); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976).  
The First, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits recognized the Second Amendment 
protected an individual right, but linked it to service in a well-regulated militia. See 
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale, 978 
F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 1977); Cases v. United 
States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942).  Meanwhile, before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Heller, only the Fifth and D.C. Circuits adopted the Standard Model. See 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 192. See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to 
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1249 n.45 (1994) [hereinafter Alstyne, The Second 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
1766 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
neither Levinson nor Alstyne tested the Standard Model’s historical 
theory or its methodological approach.193  Both authors merely 
assumed that the Model’s foundation was sound, and even fell victim 
themselves to placing eighteenth century words outside the limits of 
their intended context.194 
In sum, when examining the Second Amendment’s historiography, 
the rise of the Standard Model can be attributed to a doctrinal 
deficiency—the need to decode “the people” and its relation to the 
prefatory “well regulated militia” language—not superior historical 
methods or well researched conclusions.195  The deficiency, in turn, 
aided in the erection of other Standard Model pillars196 such as Joyce 
Lee Malcolm’s research on the English right,197 Eugene Volokh’s 
analysis on the Second Amendment’s prefatory language,198 Kates’s 
analysis on the right to arms in both a public and private violence 
ideological construct,199 three decades of research by Stephen P. 
Halbrook,200 and Glenn Harlan Reynolds’s critical legal analysis.201 
In some ways the pillars stand on their own in that each takes on 
different Second Amendment questions and issues.  At the same 
time, a close look at the footnotes and methodology reveals that each 
pillar relies heavily on the foundation of the one previously erected, 
 
Amendment]; Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 637, 645–46 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, Embarrassing].  Both Levinson and 
Alstyne would each write another article on the Second Amendment. See William 
Van Alstyne, A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas, 10 
GREEN BAG 469 (2007) [hereinafter Alstyne, A Conundrum]; Sanford Levinson, 
Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory: Comments on Uviller 
and Merkel, the Militia Right to Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315 (2004) 
[hereinafter Levinson, Superb History]. 
 193. See Alstyne, The Second Amendment, supra note 192, at 1244–49; Levinson, 
Embarrassing, supra note 192, at 645–51. 
 194. See sources cited supra note 193. 
 195. Standard Model writers naturally believe otherwise. See, e.g., George A. 
Mocsary, Monopoly of Violence, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS, Summer 2010, at 46 
(reviewing ROBERT H. CHURCHILL, TO SHAKE THEIR GUNS IN THE TYRANT’S: 
LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITIA MOVEMENT 
(2009)) (“To date, the best research on the Second Amendment has been done by 
legal scholars.  Historians have largely been funded by organizations that favor gun 
control, with predicable results.”).   
 196. See Kates, supra note 4, at 1219–26. 
 197. See MALCOLM, supra note 9. 
 198. See Volokh, supra note 42. 
 199. See Kates, supra note 137. 
 200. The entirety of Stephen P. Halbrook’s publications will not be cited here.  
However, one can find a compilation of Halbrook’s research in his 2008 book. See 
HALBROOK, supra note 22. 
 201. See Reynolds, supra note 4. 
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making it reasonable to state that, as a result, each pillar suffers from 
the same historical deficiency and falls accordingly.202 
3. History Lesson 103: Lawyering Historical Sources Is Not an 
Objective History 
Perhaps what makes history such a controversial and 
misunderstood social science is that every person maintains ideals, 
beliefs, attitudes, and hopes as to what the future will bring.  When a 
typical person looks back at history or reads through primary sources, 
they look for ideas, events, and figures that they can either relate to 
or that are so polarizing that they desire to understand the past on 
their own terms.  While this desire and curiosity is a noble individual 
pursuit, it does not represent the totality of what history is—the 
objective recreation of the past in context. 
Indeed, modern events, issues, and problems often motivate a 
historian to research a topic under a different paradigm or construct, 
but the historian should resist letting these modern variables impact 
or influence analysis.  The end goal is not to understand the past for 
the sake of the present, but to answer questions of the past for the 
sake of understanding the past.  This means the historian must never 
overlook the “first condition of historical enquiry, which is to 
recognize how much other ages differed from our own.”203  Also, 
historians must keep this condition in mind as they acquire evidence, 
for “the more we examine the way in which things happen, the more 
we are driven from the simple to the complex.”204 
Herbert Butterfield provides an adequate summary on the role of 
the historian in this regard, writing: 
[When a historian is engaged upon a piece of research] he comes to 
his labours conscious of the fact that he is trying to understand the 
past for the sake of the past, and though it is true that he can never 
entirely abstract himself from his own age, it is none the less certain 
that this consciousness of his purpose is [a] very different one from 
that of the whig historian, who tells himself that he is studying the 
past for the sake of the present.  Real historical understanding is not 
achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather 
 
 202. This Article later refers to this phenomenon as the “domino effect” and 
“domino defect.” See infra Part II.B.  
 203. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 23. 
 204. Id. at 15. 
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by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with 
the eyes of another century than our own.205 
Lawyers and legal academics consistently take the opposite 
approach to claiming history supports “X” or “Y.”  For lawyers and 
legal academics history is viewed as subordinate to the present.  In 
other words, the past is not accepted on its own terms and almost 
never in complete context.  In its place, pieces of historical text are 
taken piecemeal and explained away.  Lawyers and legal academics 
either simplify complex issues or seize upon those persons and parties 
from the past whose ideas are more analogous to their own.206 
This is not history, but a fleeting attempt to justify one’s present 
actions or recourse under the guise of history.  As Butterfield aptly 
characterizes it: 
[The historian] who studies the past with too direct reference to the 
present day, it may be said that his method of procedure actually 
defeats his original confessed purpose which was to use the past for 
the elucidation of the present.  If we look for things in the course of 
history only because we have found them already in the world of 
today, if we seize upon those things in the sixteenth century which 
are most analogous to what we know in the twentieth, the upshot of 
all our history is only to send us back finally to the place where we 
began, and to ratify whatever conceptions we originally had in 
regard to our own times.207 
Therein lies an objective dilemma for jurists—much of our 
constitutional system is built upon layers of history or precedent that 
becomes history.  Thus, although relying on the past to answer the 
present is objectively problematic in most instances, it remains 
essential that jurists use history—in some form or fashion—as an 
adjudicative tool.208  In doing so, however, jurists need to be mindful 
as to what is and what is not historically viable, and understand that 
scholarship which seeks to explain away history does not qualify. 
 
 205. Id. at 16; see also J.G.A. Pocock, The Origins of Study of the Past: A 
Comparative Approach, 4 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 209, 211–14 (1962) (discussing 
the importance of a historian’s “social awareness” of the past before one can ever 
relate history to the present). 
 206. For a more in depth discussion on the problems indentified in this paragraph, 
see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to 
History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, 
When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003). 
 207. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 62–63 (emphasis added). 
 208. See Sutton, supra note 104, at 1181–84. 
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Historical conclusions are something that must be proven through 
acquiring evidence and weighing that evidence in the construct of the 
era.  It cannot be emphasized enough that it remains the burden of 
the historian to support his conclusions; a burden that most Standard 
Model writings cannot even remotely satisfy.  What Model writers 
view as methodologically acceptable is nothing more than an illusion 
masking itself as an objective history.  It is easy for any writer to pay 
lip service to history, but to replace accepted methodologies with an 
unsupported opinion is historical fiction, not fact.  It is what this 
Article refers to as explaining away history.209 
For a working example, let’s return to one of the pillars upon which 
the Standard Model rests—Eugene Volokh’s work on the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory language.210  According to Kates, Volokh 
proves to us that the founding generation “understood that if a rights 
clause was more sweeping, a prefatory clause did not limit it.”211  This 
is simply not true.  As historian David Thomas Konig has detailed, 
“preambles were explicit statements of purpose” and often viewed as 
“necessary to restrain the operative clauses that followed because the 
broad grant of state powers required the express definition and 
delimitation of those powers being conferred.”212 
One historical deficiency with Volokh’s thesis is his reliance on 
mid-to-late nineteenth century treatises to claim “statutory 
construction used in the late 1700s” proves the “justification clause 
can’t take away what the operative clause provides.”213  Yet Volokh’s 
greatest fault is he seeks to explain away the right to arms by 
comparing the Second Amendment’s structure with contemporary 
state constitutional provisions, rationalizing those findings in 
twentieth century terms, and then parsing the Amendment’s text only 
 
 209. See, e.g., BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 54 (“It might be said that out of the 
dissemination of historical studies there has been born into the world a new form of 
nonsense, a new realm of specious generalizations and vague plausibilities, built up 
out of confusions of thought that were not known before, characterized by the bold 
handling of concepts that do not represent anything capable of genuine concrete 
visualization . . . .”). 
 210. See Kates, supra note 4, at 1220–21 (confirming its importance to the 
Standard Model); Volokh, supra note 42. 
 211. Kates, supra note 4, at 1221. 
 212. Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble, supra note 12, at 1327–
28; see also David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic 
Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep and Bear 
Arms,” 22 L. & HIST. REV. 119 (2004) [hereinafter Konig, A Missing Transatlantic 
Context]. 
 213. Volokh, supra note 42, at 807. 
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to reassemble the whole as to what it might mean.214  This is legal 
advocacy, not history, and it leads to a historically perplexing 
conclusion for any historian specializing in late eighteenth century 
American political thought: 
Those who enacted the Bill of Rights . . . meant to constrain courts, 
not to leave them with complete discretion to do justice any way 
they think best.  The enactors had broad ends in mind, but they 
chose to serve those ends by enacting into law some particular 
means. 
So it is with the Second Amendment.  The Framers may have 
intended the right to keep and bear arms as a means towards the 
end of maintaining a well-regulated militia—a well-trained armed 
citizenry—which in turn would have been a means towards the end 
of ensuring the security of a free state.  But they didn’t merely say 
that “a well-regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free 
State” (as some state constitutions said), or “Congress shall ensure 
that the Militia is well-regulated,” or even “Congress shall make no 
law interfering with the security of a free State.”  Rather, they 
sought to further their purposes through a very specific means. 
Congress thus may not deprive people of the right to keep and bear 
arms, even if their keeping and bearing arms in a particular instance 
doesn’t further the Amendment’s purposes . . . .215 
No one disputes that in terms of legal advocacy, Volokh’s analysis 
is extremely clever and arguably brilliant.216  However, in terms of a 
history that objectively lays out the concept of a well-regulated militia 
in eighteenth century society, it proves rather problematic.217  What 
Volokh leaves out is that the phrases “well-regulated militia,” “well 
organized militia,” “well-ordered militia,” “well-disciplined militia,” 
and other variations were never associated with a mere armed 
citizenry.218  The “armed citizenry” conclusion is something that 
 
 214. See id. at 799–806. 
 215. Id. at 805–06 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 216. See Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble, supra note 12, at 
1326–27; see also Cornell, Originalism on Trial, supra note 12, at 632–34 (discussing 
how Associate Justice Antonin Scalia essentially adopted Volokh’s approach, but 
that the approach is inconsistent with eighteenth century understanding); Merkel, 
Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 12, at 365–66 (criticizing both 
Scalia and Volokh’s approach to the Second Amendment’s prefatory language). 
 217. Compare Volokh, supra note 42, at 797–812, with Charles, supra note 15, at 1–
101. 
 218. As stated elsewhere in this Article, such a concept was dangerous to 
republican liberty. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Standard Model writers have created virtually out of thin air,219 with 
one writer going so far as to mislead us that the “Framers never 
defined a ‘well regulated’ militia.”220  Not true, especially given the 
fact that the above stated “militia” variations are regularly found in 
eighteenth century militia laws.221  This fact alone debunks Volokh 
and other Standard Model writers’ simplistic understanding of the 
Founders’ well-regulated militia and its constitutional pieces. 
The Second Amendment’s prefatory clause was not intended to be 
an interpretative option as Volokh claims,222 but rather the paradigm 
by which the right was understood.  For some working examples to 
illustrate this point, this section will provide two mid-eighteenth 
century debates relating to militia law preambles.  The first is Lord 
Harwicke’s disfavor with England’s 1757 Militia Act on the grounds 
that it did not live up to the preamble stipulating: “Whereas a well-
ordered and well-disciplined Militia is essentially necessary to the 
Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this Kingdom.”223  Harwicke stated 
that such preambles were constitutionally significant because they 
referenced “known established law, and declared . . . express acts of 
parliament still in force.”224  He even hoped that such preambles 
would be “always repeated by way of continual claim,” for “[i]t is 
right in such fundamental points.”225 
Another notable example is a 1744 address by Pennsylvania 
Governor Lewis Morris.  Upset with the Pennsylvania Assembly’s 
inability to draft a suitable militia law, the following was delivered by 
His Majesty’s Council: 
 
 219. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 4, at 474 (“A well regulated militia was thus 
one that was well-trained and equipped; not one that was well-regulated in the 
modern sense of being subjected to numerous government prohibitions and 
restrictions.”). 
 220. Hardy, supra note 41, at 67 n.32. 
 221. For a list of terms being used in eighteenth century militia laws and 
constitutions, see Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 450–52 and 
accompanying footnotes. 
 222. Volokh, supra note 42, at 805–06. 
 223. 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 1 (1757) (Eng.). 
 224. 15 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 727 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813) [hereinafter 15 THE 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND]; see also 2 JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL 
DISQUISITIONS, bk. III, ch. I, at 419–20 (London, 1775) (“Let us no longer 
acknowledge the importance of a militia in the preamble in many of our statutes, yet 
render this very militia ineffectual by suffering such destructive clauses to remain, as 
will reduce the statute itself to a mere form of words . . . .”). 
 225. 15 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, supra note 224, at 727–28. 
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The People of this Colony . . . have no other way of defending 
themselves than by a well regulated Militia; yet such has been the 
Conduct of the House of Assembly at this Time, that they have 
denied the People the only Means in their Power of preserving 
themselves, their Wives, their Children, and their Fortunes from 
becoming an easy Prey to the first Invader.  That the Law for the 
better Regulation of the Militia of this Province as this Time is 
absolutely necessary, stands confessed by the Title and Preamble to 
their own Bill. . . .  Some People, perhaps, may imagine, that by the 
Method proposed by the Council, the Militia would be put under a 
stricter Discipline that is necessary . . . but if such People would 
consider, that unless a Militia be well disciplined, and under good 
Regulation, they never will be able to make any tolerable 
Defence . . . since it is for the Peoples own sakes that such are 
proposed; since such Discipline can only be designed for the 
Preservation of the People, their Liberties and Estates . . . such a 
Discipline, must be looked upon as absolutely necessary at this 
Time.226 
In many respects, this address is important to understand the larger 
ideological construct of a “well-regulated militia,” but given that I 
have addressed that elsewhere it will not be restated here.227  Instead, 
the point is that explaining away constitutional text is not a substitute 
for history,228 for the former is frequently at odds with what the 
historical record actually provides us.229  Explaining away history is 
nothing more than a guessing game.  Certainly Volokh may argue 
that his approach to constitutional meaning is an objective 
endeavor,230 but in the case of the Second Amendment it ends up 
 
 226. 13 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL, REVOLUTIONARY AND POST-
REVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 390–91 (N.J. Historical 
Soc’y 1890) (emphasis added). 
 227. See Charles, supra note 15, at 47–51. 
 228. See POCOCK, supra note 122, at 7 (“The non-historical practitioner is not 
concerned with what the author of the statement made in a remote past meant by it 
so much as with what he in his present can make it mean.”). 
 229. For perhaps the first Standard Modern textualist or linguistic attempt to 
define the Second Amendment, see Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers 
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 151 (1986). 
 230. See Volokh, supra note 42, at 812–13 (“For better or worse, interpreting legal 
texts is a mushy business.  Lawyers who support a particular result on policy grounds 
can often come up with an interpretation that reaches this result, and even persuade 
themselves that it’s the best interpretation . . . .  One way of testing one’s 
interpretative approach—of distinguishing honest interpretation from mere 
inscription of one’s own policy preferences on the text—is applying it to a wide array 
of texts of different political valences.  It’s easy enough to craft an interpretative trick 
that reaches the result one wants in the case for which it was crafted.  But when one 
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muddling, rather than clarifying, the intellectual and constitutional 
origins of the right to arms.  It is one thing to state that the prefatory 
language of a right may not always constrain the operative clause.231  
However, it is another to use something that is not historically 
certain, jumble constitutional text, and issue broad historical 
conclusions, all of which turn out to be contradicted by an actual 
historical inquiry. 
Naturally, Volokh is not the first or the last writer to explain away 
history as a means to prop up the Standard Model.  Throughout the 
1990s Glenn Harlan Reynolds authored or co-authored a number of 
articles endorsing the Model.232  At first, he merely agreed with other 
Standard Model works, writing a historiography of sorts that outlined 
a research agenda to further understand the Second Amendment.233  
In later writings, however, Reynolds took the rather bold step of 
explaining away history.  One of the more influential of these articles 
was coauthored with Don B. Kates and entitled The Second 
Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment.234  By 
characterizing the article as a “thought experiment,” the title itself 
gives the impression that the article is not a history.  Still, many of its 
conclusions apply Standard Model constructs to assert the right to 
keep and bear arms cannot be limited in any way by its prefatory 
language.  According to Reynolds and Kates, to do so must lead us to 
conclude that the National Guard and many federal gun laws are 
unconstitutional.235 
 
tests it against other provisions, one sees more clearly whether it’s a sound 
interpretative method.”). 
 231. This proved to not be the case as David Thomas Konig shows us. See Konig, 
Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble, supra note 12.  However, if Volokh 
would have limited his thesis to this conclusion it would have correctly set a research 
agenda for future researchers. 
 232. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, It Takes a Militia: A 
Communitarian Case for Compulsory Arms Bearing, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 185 
(1996); Reynolds, supra note 4; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican 
Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The 
Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1737 (1995) [hereinafter Reynolds & Kates, The Second Amendment]. 
 233. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 505–07 (discussing the need to look further into 
the idea of armed rebellion and its connection with the Declaration of 
Independence).  For an answer to Reynolds’s inquiry on the right to arms, see 
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 24–60; see also Charles, 
supra note 62, at 477–502 (discussing the political philosophy behind the Declaration 
of Independence’s preamble). 
 234. Reynolds & Kates, The Second Amendment, supra note 232. 
 235. Id. at 1749–64. 
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The fatal flaw with Reynolds and Kates’s methodology is that it 
“studies the past with too direct reference to the present day,” which 
“actually defeats [the] original confessed purpose which was to use 
the past for the elucidation of the present.”236  This holds particularly 
true where Reynolds and Kates compare and contrast the National 
Guard with eighteenth century militias.237  They ahistorically 
characterize the National Guard as a “select-militia” because it does 
not consist of every person.238  First, the Founders’ definition of a 
select-militia was not a band of semiprofessional part-time 
volunteers.239  This is a Standard Model myth, and as addressed earlier 
in this Article, the distinguishing factor between a militia and select-
militia rested on a class structure.  The latter merely burdened one 
age group over others for the common defense, yet both required its 
members to be physically capable and in support of just government, 
and both were supposed to be professionally trained.240 
Second, the National Guard falls within the Founders’ intent in 
ratifying the Constitution.  It is a well-regulated militia—a 
professionally disciplined, organized, and trained military body 
instructed by state officers—that provides for the common defense 
and serves as a constitutional counterpoise to standing armies.241  The 
current National Guard may not consist of every person capable of 
bearing arms as the 1792 National Militia Act prescribed, but it does 
not arbitrarily exclude persons based upon class or age.242  It is a 
 
 236. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 35. 
 237. Reynolds & Kates, The Second Amendment, supra note 232, at 1758–62. 
 238. Id. at 1760–61. 
 239. See id. at 1760 n.77. 
 240. See supra notes 64–71, 170–74 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 339, 346–58 
(showing that this was the purpose and intent of the 1792 National Militia Act and a 
constitutional militia as a whole); Charles, supra note 15, passim (tracing the 
constitutional significance of a well-regulated militia as a counterpoise to tyrannical 
armies and government). 
 242. Compare 1 Stat. 271 (1792), with 32 Stat. 775 (1903).  For a call for militia 
reform just prior to the 1903 Militia Act, see J.D. Whelpley, The Militia Force of the 
United States, 174 N. AM. REV. 275 (1902).  For a contemporary endorsement and 
critique of the 1903 Militia Act, see James Parker, The Militia Act of 1903, 177 N. 
AM. REV. 278 (1903). For further discussion, see Charles, The 1792 National Militia 
Act, supra note 25, at 338–40, 367–74 (discussing the rationale behind enrolling 
persons between 18 and 45 years of age, and congressional power to define which 
classes were deemed capable).  At least one military judge advocate foresaw a 
constitutional problem with the 1916 Militia Act. See S.T. Ansell, Legal and 
Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471 (1917) (stating the National 
Guard’s assumption of “new and onerous obligations to render military service to the 
Federal Government” may cause constitutional problems). 
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volunteer militia, which was not uncommon while the 1792 National 
Militia Act was in force.243 
These historical facts are important, yet they are missing from 
Reynolds and Kates’s analysis.  The moral of the story is a simple 
one.  Before one can ever compare and contrast history with the 
present, one must have a complete and total understanding of the 
past.  Otherwise historical conclusions not only turn out be wrong, 
but can matriculate into other works, thus morphing into or propping 
up other ahistorical conclusions. 
Volokh’s The Commonplace Second Amendment again provides 
us a case in point.244  As discussed earlier, Volokh explained away 
history in order to negate the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
language.245  In his conclusion, Volokh then relies on Reynolds and 
Kates’s problematic analysis to support his overarching thesis, 
writing: 
What’s more, under the Militia Clauses, the federal government 
could at any time take direct command of the militia away from the 
states.  If the right was only a right to possess arms under the 
supervision of one’s militia superiors—who might well be under 
federal command—then the right would impose little constraint 
upon the federal government.246 
Volokh’s is just one of many Standard Model works that rely on 
Reynolds and Kates in this regard.  Other Standard Model works 
include the likes of Randy Barnett, Brannon P. Denning, David B. 
Kopel, George Mocsary, and Nelson Lund, just to name a few.247  This 
literature then manifested itself into the myth that the Second 
 
 243. See Lena London, The Militia Fine 1830–1860, 15 MIL. AFF. 133, 141–42 
(1951); Frederick P. Todd, The Militia and Volunteers of the District of Columbia 
1783–1820, 50 RECS. COLUM. HIST. SOC’Y 379, 385 (1950); Jean Martin Flynn, South 
Carolina’s Compliance with the Militia Act of 1792, 69 S.C. HIST. MAG., Jan. 1968, at 
26, 39–40; Paul Tincher Smith, Militia of the United States from 1840–1860, 15 IND. 
MAG. HIST., Mar. 1919, at 20, 25; see also Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia 
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 190–96 (1940) (discussing how the 
“National Guards” from the mid-nineteenth century developed and the 1903 Militia 
Act was adopted). 
 244. Volokh, supra note 42. 
 245. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 246. Volokh, supra note 42, at 812. 
 247. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 129, at 1225–26; Brannon P. Denning, Gun 
Shy: The Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Norm,” 21 HAR. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 719, 747 (1998); Kopel & Little, supra note 154, at 476; Lund, supra note 154, 
at 28–29; George Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of 
Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Non-Individual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2113, 2144–45, 2169 (2008). 
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Amendment would be moot if interpreted as a militia-focused 
constitutional right because the federal government could preempt 
any state militia laws.248  This is not true, not true at all.  Such a 
conclusion runs afoul of how the founding generation viewed federal-
state militia powers.249  It is also inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent.250 
4. History Lesson 104: Be True to What the Historical Record 
Provides 
In the preceding sections this Article gave working examples as to 
how the history of the Second Amendment has gone astray and 
become a historical embarrassment.  Whether it is taking words 
outside their intended context,251 coming to unsupported conclusions 
based upon a few shards of historical evidence,252 or failing to 
understand the past on its own terms,253 the Standard Model has 
consistently failed to meet the requisite burden.  If there is one rule of 
thumb that combines the Standard Model’s failure to adhere to even 
these most basic methodologies, it is that the historical record should 
speak for itself in context.  Researching, analyzing, and writing an 
objective history is a difficult endeavor for even the most seasoned 
historian.  It not only requires asking the right questions, but knowing 
how to answer those questions through extensive research and 
reassembling the whole.  Indeed, part of the historian’s task is to 
recreate the past, but the historian should be true to what the 
historical record provides and not infer or create history that is not 
there.254 
 
 248. See Hardy, supra note 41, at 72; David T. Hardy, The Lecture Notes of St. 
George Tucker: A Framing Era View of the Bill of Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 272, 273 n.12 (2008); J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second 
Amendment: Federal Preemption of State Militia Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 39, 71–72 (2001); Kates & Cramer, supra note 155, at 1348. 
 249. See sources cited infra notes 277 and 370. 
 250. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1886); accord Charles, The 1792 
National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 358–66; see also Merkel, Scalia’s Perverse 
Sense of Originalism, supra note 12, at 362.  
 251. See supra notes 151–65 and accompanying text 
 252. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text. 
 254. See generally BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 100–02; WILLIAM KELLEHER 
STOREY, WRITING HISTORY: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 44 (1999) (“Real historical 
writers probe factual uncertainties but they do not invent convenient facts and they 
do not ignore inconvenient facts.  People are entitled to their own opinions, but not 
to their own facts.”). 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
2012] HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CRISIS 1777 
From the outset, Standard Model writers seemed to ask all the 
right questions.255  They read the text of the Second Amendment and 
recognized an interpretative conundrum.  What is a well-regulated 
militia?  Is the right to keep and bear arms related to a well-regulated 
militia or separate?  Who are “the people” that may exercise this 
right?  What arms does the Second Amendment protect?  
Unfortunately, when answering these questions, Standard Model 
writers took words out of context, did not conduct sufficiently 
extensive research, explained away history to fill the evidentiary gaps, 
and used dictionaries to supplant the ideological, intellectual, and 
practical origins of the right.256  Furthermore, they did not ask 
subsequent questions as they compiled evidence.257  Instead, they 
reached conclusions without establishing even a modest link between 
pieces of historical evidence, and in many cases they asked the wrong 
follow-up questions. 
This process and its results do not qualify as history.  An 
illustration of the problem presents itself when Standard Model 
writers claim that the Second Amendment was drafted, in part, as a 
response to the British disarming the colonists during the American 
Revolution.  This is another myth that arguably originated with David 
I. Caplan’s 1976 article.  Based upon rather scant evidence, Caplan 
claimed that “the colonists complained of deprivations of [the right to 
possess arms] and of the repeated efforts of the British Governor, 
General Gage, to prevent the formation of a militia by the tactic of 
 
 255. See Barnett, supra note 40, at 248–60 (asking whether the framers sought to 
limit the operative clause); Hardy & Stompoly, supra note 40, at 68 (stating that the 
language of the Second Amendment must guide us in some form); Kates, supra note 
168, at 211 (stating that the language and philosophical origins much guide 
interpretation); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 464 (asking what each of the words in the 
Second Amendment means); Reynolds & Kates, The Second Amendment, supra 
note 232, at 1741 (asking what are the states’ interests in the Second Amendment); 
Volokh, supra note 42, at 796–97 (asking whether the prefatory language limits the 
operative language); see also Levinson, Embarrassing, supra note 192, at 643–51 
(correctly noting the importance of text and history). 
 256. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 57 (discussing that the “sin” in historical 
composition is not “bias,” but when the writer seeks “to abstract events from their 
context and set them up in implied comparison with the present day, and then to 
pretend that by this ‘the facts’ are being allowed to ‘speak for themselves’”). 
 257. Id. at 6 (“[T]he more we are discussing and not merely enquiring, the more we 
are making inferences instead of researches, then the more whig our history becomes 
if we have not severely repressed our original error [being honest and self-critical].”).  
In some cases, follow up questions were asked, but they were the wrong questions. 
See, e.g., Kates, supra note 137, at 94 (inferring that Blackstone may have grouped 
the right to arms with political rights, and that this can be explained away). 
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disarming the colonists and confiscating their stores of arms.”258  From 
this point forward, the myth grew as Standard Model writers 
continued to rewrite the historical record.259  As of today, it is 
audaciously claimed that it was the British disarming of the colonists 
that sparked the American Revolution, and the militia that assembled 
at Lexington and Concord did so to defend their right to keep and 
bear arms.260  Both of these conclusions are blatantly false.261 
For a historian to even advance this conclusion, a few basic 
methodological ground rules must be followed.  First, the historian 
needs to break down the events of Lexington and Concord to the 
minutest detail—prior to, during, and after the event.262  This is what 
Quentin Skinner refers to as “total historical context” or eliciting 
context to the “greatest detail.”263  Second, the historian must 
determine the causes and effects of Lexington and Concord, including 
the motivations and perceptions of both sides of the conflict, before 
and after the event.  It is only upon conducting these steps that one 
can draw any historical conclusions, let alone the conclusion that the 
American Revolution was sparked by the British violating the right to 
keep and bear arms.264 
 
 258. Caplan, supra note 19, at 35. 
 259. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1–17 (1989); STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT 7 (1984); Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of 
the Subject: Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 91, 112 (1989); Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 347, 356–57 (1999); David 
T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second 
Amendment, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 591–92 (1986); Kates, supra note 137, 
at 101; Kopel & Little, supra note 154, at 520. 
 260. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 75–108, 328–30. 
 261. This myth has been addressed by historians. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, The 
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 
104 (2000); see also Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 435–49; 
Charles, supra note 15, at 55–60. 
 262. See Skinner, supra note 31, at 202 (“[A historian states results] in the form of 
‘inner connections’ traced between ideas or events, to suggest not a casual relation 
but just that they ‘belong together in a specially intimate way’.”); id. at 203 (“The 
historian’s typical ‘significant narrative’ is thus said to be built up as the description 
of a pattern of influences bearing on an idea or event and constituting of itself an 
explanation.”). 
 263. Id. at 214. 
 264. See id. at 204 (“The inner connection between two ideas or events, such that 
one is said to have influenced the other, has to be shown on the one hand to be 
sufficiently close to be separable from chance . . . [,] not merely to present random 
collections of facts which might seem to bear on it.”). 
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Therein lies an evidentiary problem for Standard Model writers.  
There is not one piece of historical evidence that speaks to their 
claim.  Not one participant, observer, or subsequent contemporary 
account of the battle ever claimed the right to arms was violated or 
ever perceived that it could have been violated if Gage proved 
successful.  Certainly the colonists thought it important to protect 
their military stores from government seizure.265  Similar situations 
presented themselves in Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, and 
appropriate measures were taken in each case.266  Yet for Standard 
Model writers, it does not matter whether it is the events of 
Lexington and Concord, Maryland, North Carolina, or Virginia 
because there is not one letter, pamphlet, newspaper account, and so 
forth, that stated that the British government was violating their right 
to have, keep, or bear arms through such seizures.267 
Hypothetically speaking, could there be one or two pieces of 
historical evidence that give any weight to the Standard Model’s view 
of the American Revolution?  Perhaps, but in over thirty-five years of 
searching, Standard Model writers are still missing even one account 
linking the event to the conclusion they cling to.  Still, for argument’s 
sake, even if one or two pieces of actual evidence can be produced 
through future efforts, what is a professional historian to do with the 
hundreds or thousands of pieces of evidence that view the American 
Revolution differently?  The historian’s reply would be that those one 
to two pieces of evidence are the outliers and the views of an insular 
minority, not the majority.268 
Historians understand that history must be substantially supported 
by the record.  It is when writers pawn personal inferences as fact that 
“history” becomes more of a myth or fairytale.  To put it another 
 
 265. See Konig, A Missing Transatlantic Context, supra note 212, at 152; Rakove, 
supra note 266, at 104. 
 266. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 435 n.602, 435–49.  
For a background of what took place in North Carolina and Maryland, see PATRICK 
J. CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 94–95 (2008). 
 267. Stephen P. Halbrook’s most recent work goes to great lengths to claim the 
founding generation viewed these seizures as a violation of their right to keep and 
bear arms. See HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 75–108.  However, he does not produce 
one piece of historical evidence connecting the two.  He merely explains away that 
this is what was taking place.  This is not history because historians require something 
substantially more. See William G. Merkel, Book Review, 114 AM. HIST. REV. 1074 
(2009) (reviewing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: 
ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2008)) (discussing how Halbrook has not met 
the historian’s burden).   
 268. See Cornell, supra note 92, at 301.  
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way, the deciding factor as to whether an account is a “history” or a 
“fairytale” depends on whether the historian is honest about his 
findings.  We must ask ourselves whether the historian is stating that 
the conclusion is theoretical or proven.  The former is without the 
essential pieces of historical evidence to solidify the thesis, while the 
latter is clear through the evidentiary record. 
There is nothing wrong when a historian theorizes conclusion “X” 
or “Y” as possibilities.  However, when doing so, the historian must 
be honest and forthright as to what the record does or does not 
provide, and answer why they proceeded down path “X” or “Y.”  
Herein enters the Standard Model myth that the cause and effect of 
the American Revolution was the right to keep and bear arms.  The 
claim is unproven, yet Standard Model writers somehow link the 
drafting of the Second Amendment to Revolutionary War disarming 
and British embargoes.269  How can this be if we do not have one 
piece of historical evidence that expressly links the two?270  Neither 
the debates, state ratifying conventions, letters, pamphlets, nor 
newspaper editorials on the Constitution support this conclusion.  It is 
a figment of the popular imagination that the Model writers created.  
The interpretation is also problematic in that it conflicts with the fact 
that Congress, colonial governments, and the local committees of 
public safety frequently disarmed suspected loyalists or persons who 
did not take an oath of allegiance.271  If this disarmament too was 
never claimed to be a violation of the right to keep and bear arms by 
either the disarmers or the disarmed, how can anyone assert there is a 
historical connection?272 
To counter this scathing critique, one could argue that the New 
Hampshire State Ratifying Convention proposed an amendment 
 
 269. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 75–108. 
 270. Nevertheless, the Heller majority agreed with this interpretation. See District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008) (“And, of course, what the Stuarts 
had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists.  
In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the 
inhabitants of the most rebellious areas.  That provoked polemical reactions by 
Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms.”).  Indeed, the Heller 
majority cited to two sources in support of its conclusion, but both are taken out of 
historical context.  For the history and context behind the two sources relied upon, 
see Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 421–35. 
 271. See Charles, supra note 15, at 59–61. 
 272. This historical deficiency is rather important, for the same cannot be said 
when either loyalists or rebels interfered with the press.  In such instances, violations 
of a “free press,” “liberty of the press,” or the “freedom of the press” were openly 
claimed by both sides. See Charles & O’Neill, supra note 43, at 34–47.  
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stating, “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as or 
have been in actual rebellion.”273  Thus, one would assert that this 
proves the Framers remained cognizant of the events of the American 
Revolution and sought to prevent it.274  However, when one places the 
New Hampshire proposal in context, one learns that it was a response 
to the events of Shays’ Rebellion, not the American Revolution. 
Shays’ Rebellion is a rather important event for anyone examining 
the origins of the Constitution.275  It proved to be a significant factor 
as to why the Framers dispensed with the Articles of Confederation276 
and adopted a more resolute system of government specifying the 
federal-state division over war and militia powers.277  Shays’ Rebellion 
was not quelled by an existing federal or state military force, but 
rather by an independent military force authorized and raised by the 
Massachusetts Assembly, and led by Revolutionary War veteran 
 
 273. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 359 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, Johnathan Elliot 
1836). 
 274. Numerous Standard Model works, in fact, have taken the New Hampshire 
recommendation beyond its historical context.  For some examples, see Hardy, supra 
note 34, at 325 (inferring the recommendation showed the Second Amendment had 
“dual roots” of “individual self defense” and “social self defense”); Kates, supra note 
168, at 221–22 (inferring the recommendation was to ensure the people always posses 
arms); Kopel, supra note 50, at 1517–21 (using the recommendation to support the 
Standard Model interpretation and not linking it to Shays’ Rebellion).  In an earlier 
work, Stephen P. Halbrook made no reference to Shays’ Rebellion when discussing 
the importance of the New Hampshire recommendation. See HALBROOK, supra note 
40, at 75.  In Halbrook’s most recent book this deficiency is fixed. See HALBROOK, 
supra note 22, at 213.  However, in doing so, he goes beyond the New Hampshire 
amendment’s intended purpose.  He improperly infers that the Second Amendment 
and the New Hampshire recommendation are one and the same. Id.  This conclusion 
also omits that the Massachusetts Assembly affirmed the right to keep and bear arms 
was intimately linked to the common defense. See supra notes 82–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 275. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1822–29.  For a 
comprehensive account of Shays’ Rebellion, see IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE 
BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter IN DEBT TO SHAYS]; LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE (2002).  For the useful contemporary 
account of Reverend Bezaleel Howard, see Richard D. Brown, Shays’s Rebellion and 
Its Aftermath: A View from Springfield, Massachusetts, 1787, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 
598 (1983); see also Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second 
Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 209–12 (2000) 
(discussing the importance of the federal government being able to call forth the 
militia). 
 276. For a historian’s dissent that the impact of Shays’ Rebellion is often 
overstated, see Robert A. Feer, Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in 
Causation, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388 (1969). 
 277. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 123–24. 
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Benjamin Lincoln.278  To prevent this embarrassing situation from 
ever presenting itself again, the Constitution ensured that Congress 
was vested with the authority to “provide for calling forth the Militia 
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions.”279  As John Wheelock, President of Dartmouth College, 
conveyed to Lincoln in the midst of ratifying the Constitution, “The 
issue of the rebellion in the [sic] Massachusetts has been no small 
cause, that has given credit to those principles of permanent 
government, which are gaining ground in America, and on which the 
intelligent and good conceive the future renown and wealth of the 
confederacy depends.”280 
Where the disarming provision comes into the fold is that New 
Hampshire was rather sympathetic to the plight of the insurgents,281 
many of whom were losing their farms after failing to pay their 
debts.282  One must understand that both Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire’s courthouses had been closed for most of seventeen 
years, a period where creditors were unable to collect their debts.  
Thus, when the courts reopened, numerous farmers were faced with 
foreclosure.283  This led to the armed revolt that was Shays’ Rebellion, 
and upon it being quashed, many of the insurgents fled to New 
Hampshire, where there was similar sentiment against creditors.284  
The rebels that remained were subjected to the stiff penalty of 
disarmament, disqualification from office, and stripped of the right to 
vote for a period of three years.285 
Regarding disqualification from office and the right to vote, 
George Washington, James Madison, Benjamin Lincoln, and the New 
 
 278. See id. at 83. 
 279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (emphasis added). 
 280. Letter from John Wheelock to Benjamin Lincoln (May 17, 1788) (on file with 
Mass. Hist. Soc’y and author). 
 281. It should be noted that New Hampshire was in the minority in terms of its 
sympathy for Shays’ insurgents.  Most states viewed Shays’ Rebellion as dangerous to 
the New Republic. See Joseph Parker Warren, The Confederation and the Shays 
Rebellion, 11 AM. HIST. REV. 42, 43 (1905).  This included the likes of Samuel Adams. 
See William Pencak, Samuel Adams and Shays’s Rebellion, 62 NEW ENG. Q. 63 
(1989). 
 282. For an analysis of the debt litigation during this period, see Claire Priest, 
Note, Colonial Courts and Secured Credit: Early American Commercial Litigation 
and Shays’ Rebellion, 108 YALE L.J. 2413 (1999). 
 283. See Walter A. Dyer, Embattled Farmers, 4 NEW ENG. Q. 460, 463 (1931). 
 284. See Michael Lienesch, Reinterpreting Rebellion: The Influence of Shays’s 
Rebellion on American Political Thought, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS, supra note 275, at 
161, 163. 
 285. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 84.   
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Hampshire Ratifying Convention all expressed displeasure with the 
stiff penalties imposed.286  Yet not one of them stated, inferred, or 
implied that the disarmament provision was a violation of the right to 
keep and bear arms.287  Only the New Hampshire Ratifying 
Convention chimed in on the subject by requesting it be shown that 
the person was in “Actual Rebellion” before being disarmed.288  This 
request was likely in response to the reports of injustice and poor due 
process bestowed upon the insurgents,289 but there may have been a 
larger dissatisfaction with the handling of Shays’ Rebellion 
altogether.290  Whatever the reason, the New Hampshire language was 
never included in any draft of the Bill of Rights.  Instead, the 
importance of a state sponsored well-regulated militia was reaffirmed 
in conjunction with the right to keep and bear arms,291 with one of the 
militia’s chief functions being to quell rebellions.292 
The lesson lawyers, legal scholars, and jurists need to take from this 
example is that history can be misinterpreted if it is not fully 
 
 286. See id. at 86–87 
 287. See id.  At that time the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution protected the right 
to “keep and bear arms for the common defence.” MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. XVII. 
Contemporary historical evidence confirms the “core” of this right was limited to 
government controlled militia service. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 
1824–29. 
 288. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 87. 
 289. See Brown, supra note 275, at 609–10 (describing the process by which many 
insurgents were examined, generally by “Gun and Bayonet”); Alan Taylor, 
Regulators and White Indians: Forms of Agrarian Resistance in Post–Revolutionary 
New England, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS, supra note 275, at 145, 148 (discussing the 
disarming that took place in New Hampshire).  This was not the case for everyone, 
and there is evidence that proper grand jury indictments were issued in some cases. 
See Sidney Kaplan, A Negro Veteran in Shays’ Rebellion, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 123, 
124–25 (1948). 
 290. See James Leamon, In Shays’s Shadow: Separation and Ratification of the 
Constitution in Maine, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS, supra note 275, at 281, 281–96. 
 291. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 292. For some examples supporting this point, see THE MILITIA LAW, BEING ALL 
THE ACTS OF PARLIAMENT THEREOF, METHODICALLY DIGESTED, at vii (London, 
Eliz. Natt & R. Gosling 1718) (“The Militia of England is the natural Strength, and in 
its Original Constitution the great standing Army, and Safeguard of the Nation in 
Case of Insurrection, or Rebellion at home, or Invasion from abroad.”); THE VOTES 
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY, 
HELD AT BURLINGTON ON FRIDAY THE TWENTY-SECOND OF JUNE 1744, at 16 
(Philadelphia, Bradford 1744) (“Whereas a due Regulation of the Militia and making 
Provision in Cases of Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion, is absolutely necessary for 
the Security, Preservation and Defence of this Province at this time when His 
Majesty is engaged in a most just War with France and Spain.”). 
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unpacked and understood.293  It is easy to abridge the historical 
record, take those portions we like, and repackage it to support a 
legal conclusion.  However, when one does so, as is the case with 
many Standard Model accounts, one writes historical fiction.294  There 
is no doubt that history has an important part to play in constitutional 
jurisprudence, but jurists should tread lightly and carefully in 
accepting historical advocacy as historical fact.295  To proceed 
otherwise will ultimately lead to layers of myths. 
Take, for instance, a recent article published by David B. Kopel in 
the Charleston Law Review.296  Not only does Kopel continue to 
pawn the myth that British disarmament is linked to the Second 
Amendment, but he takes it a step further by arguing the judiciary 
should apply a presumption of liberty, so to speak, when adjudicating 
the constitutionality of certain gun control laws: 
From the events of 1774-75, we can discern that import restrictions 
or bans on firearms or ammunition are constitutionally suspect—at 
least if their purpose is to disarm the public, rather than for the 
normal purposes of import controls . . . .  We can discern that broad 
attempts to disarm the people of a town, or to render them 
defenseless, are anathema to the Second Amendment; such 
disarmament is what the British tried to impose, and what the 
Americans fought a war to ensure could never again happen in 
America.  Similarly, gun licensing laws that have the purpose or 
 
 293. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 15–16 (discussing the difference in a 
“microscopic” interpretation versus a “bird’s-eye view”); id. at 20–21 (discussing how 
a microscopic view drives a “simple” interpretation of history to a “complex” one). 
 294. Take for instance an article by Kevin C. Marshall, which discusses the history 
of disarming criminals. Kevin C. Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009).  Marshall dismisses the disarming of 
suspected loyalists during the American Revolution in defining the scope of the 
Second Amendment because there were no “civil liberties” during the American 
Revolution. Id. at 725.  Such disarming, however, cannot be dismissed for two 
reasons.  First, such disarming was never claimed to be a violation of the right to 
have, bear, or keep arms in private correspondence or the popular print culture.  
Meanwhile, violations concerning the freedom of the press were stated both privately 
and publicly. See Charles & O’Neill, supra note 43, at 37, 43.  Second, Marshall never 
looks into the events of Shays’ Rebellion, and the importance of the person being in 
support of just government. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, 
at 83–87, 95–130.  For purposes of historiography, Marshall served as counsel of 
record for the Cato Institute and Joyce Lee Malcolm in District of Columbia v. 
Heller. See Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent [The Right Inherited from England], District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).   
 295. See supra notes 206–21 and accompanying text. 
 296. David B. Kopel, How the British Gun Control Program Precipitated the 
American Revolution, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 283 (2012). 
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effect of allowing only a minority of the people to keep and bear 
arms would be unconstitutional.297 
What substantiated historical evidence does Kopel provide to 
support such a “liberal” and “law-centered” interpretation of the 
Second Amendment?298  For the majority of the article, Kopel 
advances nothing more than the same Standard Model myths that 
historians have already disproven as unsupported, out of context, or 
poorly researched.  These include such myths as the Second 
Amendment is intimately linked to the confiscation of arms, the 
import ban,299 the Battle of Lexington and Concord,300 the Declaration 
of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms,301 and militias 
independent of government control.302  Like that of so many Standard 
Model writers before him, Kopel’s work lacks those direct pieces of 
evidence that prove that the British violated an Anglo-American 
right to arms, and that the Second Amendment was drafted as a result 
of these alleged violations. 
In addition to these rebutted claims, Kopel attempts to provide a 
new example.  He writes that it was the “Americans’ refusal to 
surrender their firearms” that prompted Admiral Samuel Graves to 
 
 297. Id. at 285–86 (emphasis added). 
 298. See Pocock, supra note 33, at 362–64 (discussing how lawyers liberally 
construe history to support a desired end). 
 299. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 435–49.  It is also 
worth noting that the colonists used the import ban to their advantage in recruiting 
the indigenous tribes.  They never stated to the tribes that the British were violating a 
right to arms. See Letter to the Reverend Mr. Kirkland, with an Address to the 
Mohawks (Apr. 4, 1775), in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1774–1776, at 1350 (Peter Force ed., Ser. No. 4, 1837) (“Brothers . . . 
they have told us we shall have no more Guns, no Powder to use and kill our Wolves 
and other game, nor to send to you, for you to kill your victuals with, and to get Skins 
to trade with us to buy you Blankets, and what you want. How can you live without 
Powder and Guns?  But we hope to supply you soon with both, of our own 
making.”); Letter to the Eastern Indians (May 15, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: 
DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774–1776, at 610 (Peter Force, Ser. 
No. 4, 1839) (“[The British] prevent us from having guns and powder to use and kill 
our deer and wolves, and other game, or to send to you for you to kill your game 
with, and to get skins and furs to trade with us for what you want.  But we hope soon 
to be able to supply you with both guns and powder of our own making.”).  For 
history on the recruitment of Indians by both sides, see CHARLES, supra note 266, at 
213–70. 
 300. See supra notes 258–67 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 443–47 (placing 
Gage’s seizure of arms in historical context). 
 302. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 374–90 (placing 
the history of independent militias in historical context). 
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order “all seaports north of Boston be burned.”303  The working 
example Kopel provides is Captain Henry Mowat’s shelling of 
Falmouth, Massachusetts (today’s Portland, Maine).304  Kopel informs 
us that Mowat acted as he did solely because the inhabitants failed to 
deliver up their arms and ammunition.305  This in turn led to the 
grievance in the Declaration of Independence, which proclaimed: 
“[King George III] has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt 
our Towns, and destroyed the Lives of our people.”306 
It would be easy for a casual reader unfamiliar with the history of 
the American Revolution to fall prey to Kopel’s narrative.  After 
recasting the Revolution as an arms-centric quarrel where 
independent militias ensured that rights would be protected, why not 
link the burning of Falmouth with the right to arms as well?  Kopel is 
indeed correct in stating that Falmouth was burned and that this 
event in turn led to a grievance in the Declaration.307  But these are 
the only two historical facts that Kopel gets right. 
There are a number of problems with Kopel’s “history,” 
particularly with what prompted Graves to push for coastal 
bombardment and the unfolding of events at Falmouth.  Neither is 
placed in total historical context.308  To begin, Kopel is correct that 
Mowat ordered the Falmouth Committee to deliver up their arms or 
he would set fire to the town.309  However, Kopel fails to mention the 
complex series of events that led to the order.  Prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities at Lexington and Concord, Mowat was seized and held 
hostage by Colonel Samuel Thompson’s militia company.310  This was 
just the beginning of tensions, for Thompson’s company also placed 
Falmouth’s inhabitants in a rather precarious situation by seizing and 
harassing suspected loyalists, vandalizing homes, and even firing upon 
the British ship Canceaux without provocation.311 
 
 303. Kopel, supra note 296, at 323. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 323–24 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 26 (U.S. 
1776)). 
 307. See CHARLES, supra note 266, at 135–71. 
 308. See Skinner, supra note 31, at 214. 
 309. See Kopel, supra note 296, at 323; see also CHARLES, supra note 266, at 161–
63. 
 310. Id. at 156–57. 
 311. See id. at 157–58. 
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Despite all of this, Mowat showed great restraint and left Falmouth 
unscathed.312  By October 1775 Mowat received new orders.  Admiral 
Graves obtained approval to retaliate against port towns known to 
have been conspiring against the British government.  After months 
of frustrating events and disappointments, it was the order Graves 
had been waiting for.  There were no orders given related to arms 
confiscation.313 
It is here that the story takes an interesting turn, for Mowat 
deviated from Graves’ orders and offered Falmouth leniency on the 
condition that the inhabitants deliver up all arms and ammunition.314  
In good faith, the inhabitants complied by delivering ten stands of 
arms that very evening.315  This extended the inhabitants’ timetable to 
deliver the rest by 9:00 the next morning.  Failure to comply would 
mean the devastation of the town.  However, by 9:00, the remaining 
arms were undelivered and the town was not evacuated.316  One 
patriot account claims the inaction was to illustrate the colonists’ 
solidarity to advance the cause of liberty.317  This account makes little 
sense, especially seeing that Falmouth’s inhabitants initially complied 
with Mowat’s orders.  This brings us to the historically accepted 
account, which is that the Sons of Liberty threatened to burn 
Falmouth if the inhabitants complied.318  This would have placed the 
town in a dangerous dilemma:  Should the town comply with Mowat’s 
orders and risk being torched by rebel militia or hope Mowat would 
show further leniency as exhibited earlier that year?  The historical 
evidence suggests that Falmouth’s inhabitants chose the latter, and 
after meeting with Mowat, the inhabitants were given an additional 
forty minutes to evacuate.319 
As this historical example and others illuminate, Standard Model 
writers are continually leaving important facts out, implying others, 
and thus writing history completely out of context.  Kopel once even 
defended the Standard Model against historian dissents, writing: 
 
 312. See id. at 158–59. 
 313. Id. at 161–62. 
 314. Id. at 162. 
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
 317. Id. at 163. 
 318. Id.  
 319. See id. at 163–64; see also Leamon, supra note 290, at 283–84 (discussing how 
Thompson endangered Falmouth and the inhabitants blamed him for the destruction 
of the town). 
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“Facts are facts, no matter who writes about them.”320  Historians 
undoubtedly agree with this statement.  However, if one does not 
have all the facts, and fails to make an honest effort to place those 
facts in historical context, what is the point of conjuring the past for 
use in the present? 
Let us return to Kopel’s rather tenuous connection with the Second 
Amendment, Falmouth, and the Declaration of Independence.  Here 
is how Kopel recasts the historical record in a recent interview on the 
topic: 
Interviewer: I want to . . . talk about the Declaration of 
Independence, because I thought this was a real fascinating 
question, and something that could be easy to overlook.  The 
Declaration as we know lists many . . . grievances against the king, 
but one of the [grievances] is conspicuously absent.  Why is gun 
confiscation not one of the grievances against the king cited in the 
Declaration? 
David B. Kopel: The manner in which the gun confiscation was 
carried out was one of the grievances.  As things escalated, by the 
fall of 1775, the British admiral says, “Let’s burn down the towns on 
the New England coast.”  So the British go up to . . . Portland 
Maine, which at the time was Falmouth, Massachusetts. 
Interviewer: The direct order is all sea ports north of Boston must 
be burned. 
David B. Kopel: Yes.  The British Navy shows up at Falmouth and 
says, “Give us all your guns or we will burn you down.”  The people 
of Falmouth say, “Ok,” and turn over eight muskets and [one] 
cannon.  The British say, “That is not enough.”  So they huff and 
they puff, and they burn the town down.  That is not the only time 
they do that.321  This is mentioned in the Declaration of 
Independence.  It says they have ravaged our sea coasts and 
destroyed our towns.  You can find plenty of things the Americans 
objected to, which later appear in the Bill of Rights or the rest of the 
Constitution as responses to the British abuses that are not in the 
 
 320. David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Credentials Are No Substitute for 
Accuracy: Nathan Kozuskanich, Stephen Halbrook, and the Role of the Historian, 19 
WIDENER L.J. 343, 378 (2010). 
 321. It is unclear whether Kopel is claiming that this is “not the only time” the 
British bombarded a coastal town or whether he is inferring the British burned a 
number of towns after the colonists failed to deliver arms.  If it is the former, Kopel is 
correct, but this history is not as black and white as some may think. See CHARLES, 
supra note 266, at 135–71.  If it is the latter—i.e. that the British confiscated arms and 
burned towns after failing to comply—there is no other example that this author has 
found or that Kopel can produce.   
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Declaration of Independence. . . .  It is certainly an indictment, but if 
you look at the Bill of Rights and see where are the antecedents of 
that in the Declaration of Independence, there are actually only a 
few things in the Bill of Rights that you can directly tie to a clause in 
the Declaration of Independence.322 
This account leaves historians scratching their heads in disbelief.  
An uninformed lawyer, scholar, or jurist is led to believe the 
American Revolution was fought, and independence was later 
declared over arms confiscation.  History in context, however, dispels 
Kopel’s account as nothing short of an ideological fairytale.323  In fact, 
the grievance Kopel touts as a Second Amendment antecedent was 
actually in reference to multiple coastal towns being destroyed, 
including the likes of Bristol, Rhode Island, Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, and Norfolk, Virginia.324 
Each instance retains a unique background story and a close 
examination of the grievance, as a whole, does not support the 
pageant of gun freedom as Kopel describes it.  One must remember 
the Revolutionary War was a British civil war325 where its participants 
frequently changed allegiances and both sides committed injustices.326  
The burning of Falmouth provides us with a case in point, but it was 
not the only town to have been destroyed under rather difficult 
circumstances.  The case of Norfolk, Virginia is another that was 
victimized by an overzealous militia.  At one point, the militia’s 
commander even requested permission to burn the town because of 
its suspected loyalist element.  The Virginia Assembly denied the 
request outright, but this did not prevent the militia from provoking 
 
 322. Firearms Law and the Second Amendment: Chapter 3, IVOICES (May 9, 
2012), http://www.ivoices.org/category.php?subject=Second%20Amendment.  
 323. Kopel’s discussion on the Declaration of Independence, its grievances, and 
the Bill of Rights is equally problematic.  For historian accounts of the Declaration 
and its intended purpose, see CHARLES, supra note 266 (addressing the social history 
of the Declaration’s grievances); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997) (addressing the drafting and social 
history of the Declaration); Armitage, supra note 101 (discussing the Declaration’s 
purpose in terms of international law); Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness”, supra note 62 (discussing the role of the Declaration’s 
preamble in constitutional jurisprudence). 
 324. See CHARLES, supra note 266, at 167–210. 
 325. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776 
(1980). 
 326. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1974); 
CLAUDE H. VAN TYNE, LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2001). 
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British retaliation and then participating in most of the town’s 
destruction.327 
Despite the rebels being responsible, either in part or whole, for 
Falmouth and Norfolk, it was the British, not the rebel militia, who 
were held accountable in the popular print culture.328 This is not 
surprising.  Historians who have waded through the Revolution’s 
historical record can attest to the high level of propaganda that took 
place.329  This includes many of the grievances in the Declaration of 
Independence.330 
Another problem with Kopel’s “history” to consider is that if the 
American Revolution was precipitated by gun control, why were 
there plenty of laws restricting the carriage, use, and firing of guns?331  
Why did colony or state laws require government consent for the 
militia to train?332  Why did some states adopt the Statute of 
Northampton or acknowledge the English common law regarding the 
carrying of arms in the public concourse?333  These are important 
historical variables that are left unexplained and that contradict 
Kopel’s plea for a presumption of liberty when adjudicating gun 
control laws.334  And this is not even taking into account those writers 
who falsely claim that there were virtually no gun control laws in the 
late eighteenth century.335 
The moral of the story is a simple one—the Second Amendment 
will be in historical crisis if we continue down the Standard Model 
path, and to do so would be embarrassing.  This author maintains no 
reservations that Standard Model writers personally believe their 
 
 327. See CHARLES, supra note 266, at 191–200. 
 328. See id. at 190–91, 202–03. 
 329. See, e.g., PHILIP GRANT DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1763–1783 (1941). 
 330. CHARLES, supra note 266, at 85–325. 
 331. See Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 23–25; Cornell, Early 
American Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment, supra note 167; Konig, 
Arms and the Man, supra note 167; see also Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to 
Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597 (2006) [hereinafter Winkler, The 
Reasonable Right to Bear Arms]; Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second 
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Scrutinizing the 
Second Amendment]. 
 332. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1833–34; Charles, The 1792 
National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 326 n.17.  For a full analysis on the states’ 
plenary power to train the militia, see id. at 374–90.  
 333. See Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment, supra note 9, at 7–41. 
 334. See Kopel, supra note 296, at 285–86. 
 335. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller 
World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617 (2012). 
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interpretation of history to be just, fair, and in the best interests of the 
American public.  In other words, they see themselves as the 
pendulum of truth in the advancement of liberty.  However, the role 
of history and the historian is to educate the public about the past, not 
disparage it in the advancement of what one believes or hopes the 
record provides. 
II.  THE EMBARRASSING STANDARD MODEL SAGA CONTINUES 
For those who study historiography, the Second Amendment 
proves to be a fascinating subject.336  As seen throughout Part I, from 
the 1970s to the present day, the right to arms has undergone an 
interpretative transformation that is virtually unrivaled.  Standard 
Model writers see this transformation as restoring a forgotten relic to 
its proper podium, but historians see it as flipping the Constitution on 
its head and advancing a bundle of make-believe rights that would be 
ridiculed by the Framers in scathing dissents.  Take for instance Noah 
Webster’s sarcastic critique of the Pennsylvania Minority, which 
sought to propose a series of rights337 that had nothing to do with 
establishing a constitutional republic: 
But to complete the list of unalienable rights, you would insert a 
clause in your declaration, that every body shall, in good weather, 
hunt on his own land, and catch fish in rivers that are public 
property.  Here, Gentlemen, you must have exerted the whole force 
of your genius!  Not even the all-important subject of legislating for 
a world can restrain my laughter at this clause!  As a supplement to 
that article of your bill of rights, I would suggest the following 
restriction: “That Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of 
America from eating and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent 
his lying on his left side, in a long winter’s night, or even on his back, 
 
 336. In fact, some historians use the Second Amendment as a teaching tool to 
writing an objective history. See, e.g., Department of History: Faculty and Staff 
Profiles, U.N.H., http://www.unh.edu/history/index.cfm?ID=2B1966F3-AC44-D4E7-
54A916E20D9C7ED4 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012) (listing Professor Eliga Gould’s 
class, “HIST 797: Senior Colloquium (Anglo-American Right to Bear Arms)”). 
 337. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the 
State of Pennsylvania, to their Constituents (December 17, 1787), in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 618 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976).  The Heller majority found the Pennsylvania Minority to be “highly 
influential” even though there is no evidence that their “Reasons of Dissent” ever 
influenced Madison. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604 (2008).  If 
this is true, then the courts need to accept their limitations, which include disarming 
criminals and dangerous persons, and regulating arms to prevent “public injury” or 
what is in the interest of the “public good.” See Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra 
note 18, at 27–29.   
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when he is fatigued by lying on his right.” . . .  But to be more 
serious, Gentlemen, you must have had in idea the forest-laws in 
Europe, when you inserted that article; for no circumstances that 
ever took place in America, could have suggested the thought of a 
declaration in favor of hunting and fishing.  Will you forever persist 
in error? . . .  You may just as well ask for a clause, giving license for 
every man to till his own land, or milk his own cows.338 
Webster’s critique is important because the drafters of the Bill of 
Rights sought to include those rights vital for a continuance of a 
democratic republic.339  They were rights that the founding generation 
frequently referred to as the palladiums of liberty.  The description is 
often misunderstood or taken out of context by legal commentators 
to assert broad individual rights separate from government.340  
However, the terminology was not intended to describe libertarian 
notions of liberty.  In the eighteenth century, the “palladium of 
liberty” distinctly described rights or governmental checks that 
balanced the Constitution in favor of “the people.”  These rights and 
governmental checks included political representation,341 the writ of 
habeas corpus,342 the freedom of election,343 the right to trial by jury,344 
and the freedom of the press.345 
 
 338. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.C.), Dec. 31, 1787, at 2; see also NOAH 
WEBSTER, An Address to the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention in 
Philadelphia, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE WRITINGS: ON MORAL, 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 142, 149 (Scholars’ Facsimile & 
Reprints 1977) (1790). 
 339. When the Bill of Rights was submitted for ratification, it included the 
following preamble: 
The Conventions of a number of the States having, at the time of their 
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent 
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and 
restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending the grounds of public 
confidence in the Government will best insure the beneficent ends of its 
institution. 
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MARCH 4TH, 1789, AND IN THE 
THIRTEENTH YEAR OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SAID STATES 123 (New York, 
Thomas Greenleaf 1789) (emphasis added). 
 340. For an example see Charles & O’Neill, supra note 43, at 11, 25–26.  
 341. See THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 430 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845) (describing 
Parliament as the “palladium of liberty”). 
 342. See 7 LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 574 (Paul H. 
Smith ed., 1981) (describing Pennsylvania’s writ of habeas corpus as the “palladium 
of liberty”); 2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, 
L.L.D. 901 (Philadelphia, Bronson & Chauncey 1804) (describing the writ of habeas 
corpus as the “great palladium of liberty”). 
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Most importantly for our purposes, one of the palladiums also 
included the right to keep and bear arms in a well-regulated militia.346  
Not once did the founder generation conflate or confuse armed 
individual self-defense—in private or public—as a palladium of 
liberty.  The phrase was distinctly used to describe the right to keep 
and bear arms in a state sanctioned militia, and rightfully so.347  The 
truth of the matter is that a “well-regulated militia” was seen as 
crucial to a republic.  This cannot be overstated enough.  The 
constitutional body not only provided cost effective physical security, 
but it was the means and ends by which liberty was to be understood.  
Furthermore, it provided an efficient counterpoise to standing armies 
and an oppressive government.348 
Of course, this was all theoretical and idealistic of the Framers.349  
The militia, even after the 1792 National Militia Act, never lived up to 
its intended constitutional and ideological purpose.350  By 1818 the 
militia was described by one anonymous commentator as a “national 
curse.”351  Even Revolutionary War patriot, militia instructor, 
 
 343. See BENJAMIN AUSTIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, IN OPPOSITION TO 
FALLACIOUS FEDERALISM 89 (Boston, Adams & Rhoades 1803) (describing the 
freedom of election as the “palladium of liberty”). 
 344. See JOHN GRAHAM, SPEECHES, DELIVERED AT THE CITY-HALL OF THE CITY 
OF NEW-YORK IN THE COURTS OF OYER AND TERMINER, COMMON PLEASE, AND 
GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE 19 (Albany, Banks and Gould 1812) (describing 
the right to trial by jury as the “grand palladium of all liberty and justice”); 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 221 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(describing the right to trial by jury as the “palladium of liberty”). 
 345. See 10 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 81–82 (1799) 
(discussing the freedom of the press the real palladium of our liberties); GEORGE 
HAY, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 27, 34 (Richmond, Samuel Pleasants, 
Junior 1803) (describing the freedom of the press as the “palladium of liberty” and 
“bulwark of freedom”); 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 
815 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1914) (1782) (describing freedom of the press 
as the “palladium of liberty”). 
 346. The late and great military historian Don Higginbotham was the first to make 
this connection. See Higginbotham, supra note 69, at 40. 
 347. See Charles, supra note 15, at 71–82. 
 348. See generally 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 400; Charles, supra note 15. 
 349. Despite all the political rhetoric in favor of a well-regulated militia throughout 
seventeenth and eighteenth century England, the militia as a functioning military 
entity had failed repeatedly. See generally LINDSAY BOYNTON, THE ELIZABETHAN 
MILITIA, 1558–1638 (1967); J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL ISSUE, 1660–1802 (1965); Eliga 
H. Gould, To Strengthen the King’s Hands: Dynastic Legitimacy, Militia Reform and 
Ideas of National Unity in England 1745–1760, 34 HIST. J. 329 (1991). 
 350. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 347–58. 
 351. Vox Communis, Remarks on Militia Laws, in 2 AMERICAN MONTHLY 
MAGAZINE AND CRITICAL REVIEW 337 (New York, D. Fanshaw 1817). 
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pamphleteer,352 and Federalist Timothy Pickering wrote that a “well 
disciplined militia, as the palladium of liberty, is an empty phrase in 
the mouth of every Patriot.”353  Pickering would later refer to it as a 
“public evil” both in terms of its expense and the national defense.354 
Somehow Standard Model writers view the Second Amendment 
much differently than the record depicts.  This includes seventeenth 
century England historian Joyce Lee Malcolm, who demoted the 
constitutional significance of a “well-regulated militia” to being 
“merely . . . well-trained.”355  Malcolm’s puzzling over-simplification 
of the American right stems from her work on the “have arms” 
provision of the 1689 Declaration of Rights.356  Just as the Standard 
Model was coming to the fold, so too was Malcolm’s research on the 
English right.  And not surprisingly, the former fed off the latter for 
historical credibility.357 
 
 352. In 1770, Timothy Pickering wrote two editorials discussing the importance of 
training, disciplining, and regulating the militia. See Timothy Pickering, Editorial, 
THE ESSEX GAZETTE (Salem), Jan. 31, 1769, at 107; Timothy Pickering, Editorial, 
THE ESSEX GAZETTE (Salem), Apr. 10, 1770, at 147.  Five years later, Pickering wrote 
a militia treatise. See TIMOTHY PICKERING, AN EASY PLAN OF DISCIPLINE FOR A 
MILITIA (Salem, Samuel and Ebenezer Hall 1775).  The treatise was so influential 
and timely that it was adopted by the Massachusetts Assembly for the training of its 
militia and even George Washington ordered personal copies. See Letter from 
Timothy Pickering to George Washington (Dec. 1775), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: REVOLUTIONARY SERIES 627–28 (Philander D. Chase ed., 1987); 
Timothy Pickering’s Plan of Military Discipline to be Hereafter Used and Practised 
in the Colony, in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1774–1776, FOURTH SERIES, at 1300 (Washington 1840), available at 
http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.15272:1.amarch. 
 353. Timothy Pickering, 3 AM. HIST. REC. 33, 35 (1874). 
 354. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Hon. James Lloyd (Dec. 20, 1822) (on file 
with Historical Manuscript Collection, Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, DC). 
 355. Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which 
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 
106 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 356. For this author’s dissent to Malcolm’s over-simplification of the constitutional 
significance of a well-regulated militia, see Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, 
at 1835–39. 
 357. Malcolm’s first professionally published article on the subject appeared 
around the same time as Don B. Kates’s influential Michigan Law Review article, 
and the latter relied on the former “heavily.” Kates, supra note 168, at 204, 206–07, 
215.  For Malcolm’s first published article, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the 
People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 285 (1983) [hereinafter Malcolm, The Right of the People].  However, two years 
earlier, the National Rifle Association reprinted and distributed Malcolm’s 1980 
paper delivered to the Mary Ingraham Bunting Institute of Radcliffe College. See 
JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
RESTORATION ENGLAND (1981) [hereinafter MALCOLM, DISARMED]. 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
2012] HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CRISIS 1795 
The collaboration began as early as 1981 when the National Rifle 
Association reprinted and distributed Malcolm’s first research on the 
subject.358  Instantly, Standard Model writers fell into line as they 
imported Malcolm’s research and conclusions into their own 
writings.359  This would not be a problem if Malcolm’s thesis were 
historically viable.  But as will be discussed in detail below, Malcolm’s 
research and conclusions turned out to be completely “unacceptable,” 
thus further discrediting the Standard Model as viable moving 
forward.360 
A. The Rise and Fall of Joyce Lee Malcolm’s Thesis on the 
Anglo-American Right 
For purposes of historiography, when Malcolm published her first 
article on the English right to arms, historians had just begun 
debating the Second Amendment.361  Other than a scholarly exchange 
between historians Lawrence Delbert Cress and Robert E. Shalhope, 
and J.G.A. Pocock’s classic work The Machiavellian Moment, very 
few historians had dabbled in the subject, let alone examined the 
historical record extensively.362  What made Malcolm’s inquiry unique 
 
 358. See MALCOLM, DISARMED, supra note 357.   
 359. See David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent 
Judicial Trend, 4 DETROIT C.L. REV. 789, 797–98 (1982) (relying on Malcolm’s 
research for the legal understanding of the English right); Robert Dowlut & Janet A. 
Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 177, 181 (1982) (citing to Malcolm for English origins of right); Alan M. 
Gottlieb, Gun Ownership: A Constitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113, 113–14 
(1982) (relying on Malcolm for English right origins of Second Amendment); 
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7 (1981) (citing to Malcolm for English 
origins of right); Hardy, supra note 259, at 572–83 (relying on and citing to Malcolm 
for English origins); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the 
Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 18–24 (1987) (relying on 
Malcolm for account of English right). 
 360. See Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 208; Brief for 
English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
 361. See Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357. 
 362. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 213 (1975).  See generally 
Lawrence Delbert Cress, Radical Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological 
Roots of the American Revolutionary Militia, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 43 (1979); Lawrence 
Delbert Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military Policy 
as an Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 73 (1981); Shalhope, The 
Ideological Origins, supra note 116; Shalhope & Cress, supra note 116.  For some 
prominent works that discussed the politics of standing armies and militias, which 
were in print at this time, see BOYNTON, supra note 349; LOIS G. SCHWOERER, “NO 
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was it set out to be the first attempt of an historian to connect Article 
VII of the 1689 Declaration of Rights with the Second Amendment.  
Like Standard Model writers before her,363 Malcolm read the text of 
the Second Amendment and spotted an interpretative conundrum: 
Was [the prefatory language] a qualifying or an amplifying clause?  
That is, was the right to arms guaranteed only to members of “a 
well-regulated militia” or was the militia merely the most pressing 
reason for maintenance of an armed community?  The meaning of 
“militia” itself is by no means clear.364 
To Malcolm, the “key” in settling the debate rested with “the 
English tradition the colonists inherited, and the English Bill of 
Rights from which much of the American Bill of Rights was 
drawn.”365  Malcolm’s connection between the English and American 
right to arms has proved to be both astute and proper.  James 
Madison referenced Article VII in his notes and a number of early 
nineteenth century constitutional commentators viewed the Second 
Amendment as its lineal descendant.366  The only significant 
difference between the two was that Article VII was linked to socio-
economic status,367 with the Second Amendment containing no such 
restriction.368  Another notable difference between the two rights was 
the structure of government.  England consisted of one national 
government, with concurrent power over the militia divided between 
the crown and Parliament.369  However, in the United States it was a 
bit more complicated.  Not only was there a division of power 
 
STANDING ARMIES!”: THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND (1974); WESTERN, supra note 349; John Miller, The Militia and the Army 
in the Reign of James II, 16 HIST. J. 659 (1973).  
 363. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 364. Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 287. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), available at 
http://www.consource.org/document/notes-for-speech-in-congress/; ST. GEORGE 
TUCKER, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED 
WRITINGS 238–39 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1999) (1803); 2 ST. 
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 n.40 (Philadelphia, William 
Young Birch and Abraham Small 1803); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 126 (Philadelphia, Philip H. 
Nicklin 1829). 
 367. See ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE 
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1964). 
 368. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 358, 365, 378–80, 
383, 385–86, 396, 398–99, 402, 403, 407. 
 369. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 45–52. 
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between Congress and the President, but there was also a complex 
division of federal-state powers, with some of them overlapping.370  
But other than linking the Anglo origins of the right to the Second 
Amendment, Malcolm’s thesis fails to meet its burden. 
For those unfamiliar with Malcolm’s work, the thrust of her 
argument is that in the late seventeenth century arms-bearing 
transformed from a societal duty into a common law right of armed 
self-defense—in both private and public—and Article VII of the 1689 
Declaration of Rights acknowledged this transformation.371 
To date, only those unfamiliar with late seventeenth century 
English history have applauded this interpretation.  David B. Kopel 
wrote, “[Malcolm] sweeps away over two centuries of American—
and British—misunderstanding of the British right to arms, providing 
the first clear picture of what the right to arms meant to the British of 
1689, as well as what it meant to the Americans of 1791 . . . .”372  
Jeremy Rabkin described it as a “careful history, as much a work of 
social and political as of legal history.”373  Robert J. Cottrol and 
Raymond T. Diamond heralded it as a “meticulously researched work 
in political and legal history.”374  And before eighteenth century 
American historian Robert E. Shalhope abandoned the Standard 
Model as a false prophecy,375 he too believed that Malcolm proved the 
right to arms protected “both the individual’s right to keep arms and 
the community’s right to protect itself by means of an armed 
militia.”376 
In contrast to these appraisals, Lois G. Schwoerer knew something 
was amiss.377  In 1981, Schwoerer wrote what has become an essential 
guide to understanding the 1689 Declaration of Rights.  Regarding 
 
 370. For the complexities of this system within the constraints of the 1792 National 
Militia Act, see Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 331–36. 
 371. See generally MALCOLM, supra note 9. 
 372. David B. Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the 
Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (1995) (book review). 
 373. Jeremy Rabkin, Constitutional Firepower: New Light on the Meaning of the 
Second Amendment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 235 (1995) (book review). 
 374. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 
YALE L.J. 995, 1013 (1995) (book review). 
 375. See Shalhope, supra note 13, at 1443. 
 376. Robert E. Shalhope, Book Review, 82 J. AM. HIST. 209, 210 (1995).  For some 
other endorsements by non-seventeenth century English historians, see James E. Ely, 
Jr., Book Review, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 212, 212–13 (1995); Eliga H. Gould, Book 
Review, 111 ENG. HIST. REV. 1290, 1290–91 (1996); Scott A. Merriman, Book Review, 
61 J. MIL. HIST. 158 (1997); Allan D. Olmstead, Book Review, 24 CONTEMP. SOC. 58, 
58–59 (1995). 
 377. Schwoerer, Book Review, supra note 9, at 570–71. 
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Article VII, she concluded the “have arms” provision was connected 
to “neo-Harringtonianism” and gave “men the right to possess arms 
according to their social and economic standing” as a means to check 
government corruption.378  It was a thesis that Malcolm “apparently 
rejected,” but never squared.379  Still, there were other problems with 
Malcolm’s book, the most important being that Malcolm failed to 
prove her interpretation was “universally intended” or “advocated” 
by those who adopted the English Bill of Rights.380  As a result, 
Schwoerer concluded Malcolm’s bottom line thesis “suffer[ed] 
accordingly,” and may not convince other historians specializing in 
this area.381 
Schwoerer’s view only became stronger upon reexamining the 
subject five years later.382  It was concluded that Malcolm’s thesis was 
“unacceptable,” and the criticisms were not minor tit-for-tat 
discrepancies.383  Instead, the evidentiary record unveiled rather 
fundamental methodological and research problems, such as 
mischaracterizing English arms restrictions, the history of the 1689 
Convention, subsequent English history, and taking speakers’ words 
out of context.384  Malcolm never replied to Schwoerer’s critique nor 
has Malcolm ever supplemented her thesis.385  At the time, it was 
unknown whether Malcolm’s silence constituted acceptance or 
whether she dismissed Schwoerer outright.  Based on subsequent 
writings, it must be assumed that it was the latter.386 
 
 378. SCHWOERER, supra note 8, at 78. 
 379. Schwoerer, Book Review, supra note 9, at 571. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 14, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-
1521). 
 383. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 208. 
 384. See id. at 209–21. 
 385. Malcolm has only directly replied to one critique of her work. Compare 
Michael A. Bellesiles, Book Review, 14 L. & HIST. REV. 382, 382–86 (1996), with 
Joyce Lee Malcolm, Response to Bellesiles’s Review of To Keep and Bear Arms: 
The Origins of an Anglo-American Right, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 339 (1997). 
 386. The first such evidence is a 2003 article discussing historian fraud, when 
Malcolm restated her thesis to be the correct one. See Joyce Lee Malcolm, Disarming 
History, REASON MAG. (Mar. 2003), http://reason.com/archives/2003/03/01/disarming-
history [hereinafter Malcolm, Disarming History].  The second such evidence is 
Malcolm’s amicus brief filed in District of Columbia v. Heller. See Brief of the Cato 
Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).  The 
third piece of evidence is Malcolm’s endorsement of Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion 
in Heller as a “carefully reasoned and scholarly opinion.” Joyce Lee Malcolm, The 
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Such a dismissal would not be problematic if other historians or 
experts had come to Malcolm’s defense by supplementing or 
reinforcing her claims.  This did not occur.387  The opposite took 
place,388 with historical antagonism only strengthening over time.389  
This is because a close look at the evidence reveals Scwhoerer’s initial 
suspicions were true.390  Suffice it to say, the historical conclusions that 
Malcolm claims to be substantiated are nothing more than a number 
of independent historical theories, with little if any connection 
between them.391  Such problematic theories include: 
1.  England maintained a virtually unregulated armed society in both 
private and public, which advanced public safety and deterred 
crime.392 
2.  The Convention of 1689 debates and the drafting history of 
Article VII convey the Declaration of Rights sought to protect an 
 
Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1377, 1378 (2009) [hereinafter Malcolm, The Supreme Court]. 
 387. Indeed, Standard Model writers state Malcolm’s history as the correct and 
true version.  However, none of these Standard Model works have produced any new 
evidence to advance Malcolm’s problematic conclusions. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 
41, at 73–75. 
 388. See TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH 
MONARCHY, 1685–1720, at 343 (2006); Konig, A Missing Transatlantic Context, supra 
note 212; Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 14, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-
1521). 
 389. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 356–418; Charles, 
The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 24–60; Charles, The Faces, supra note 
9, at 7–31. 
 390. See Schwoerer, Book Review, supra note 9, at 571; Schwoerer, To Hold and 
Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 208. 
 391. Malcolm herself does not describe her methodological approach as that of 
other intellectual historians by eliciting “total historical context.” Compare Skinner, 
supra note 31, at 202 (“[A historian states results] in the form of ‘inner connections’ 
traced between ideas or events, to suggest not a casual relation but just that they 
‘belong together in a specially intimate way’.”), with MALCOLM, supra note 9, at xi 
(“In investigating the origins of this right, I have been concerned to cast as wide a net 
as possible.  This was essential not only because the subject overlaps many separate 
fields, but because all legal and constitutional history is best understood in context; 
indeed, where direct evidence is deficient there is no satisfactory alternative but to 
dredge clues from the context.”) (emphasis added). 
 392. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 16–30, 65; Malcolm, The Right of the People, 
supra note 357, at 290–95; Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Creation of a “True Antient and 
Indubitable” Right: The English Bill of Rights and the Right to Be Armed, 32 J. 
BRIT. STUD. 226, 229–34 (1993) [hereinafter Malcolm, The Creation]; Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, Remarks, Address at the Seton Hall Second Amendment Symposium 
(Summer 2000), in 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.  829, 831 (2000) [hereinafter Malcolm, 
Address]. 
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individual right to armed self-defense against public and private 
threats to one’s person.393 
3.  Article VII was prompted by individual disarmament through 
both the 1662 Militia Act and 1671 Game Act.394 
4.  William Blackstone described Article VII as a right to armed 
individual self-defense, divorced from the militia, against both 
private and public violence.395 
5.  American colonists understood the English right and Blackstone 
as advancing a right to be armed, but not necessarily that they be 
trained to arms.396 
Each of these unsupported conclusions will be addressed in turn. 
1. England’s Ahistorical Armed Public Against Private and Public 
Violence 
One consistent theme of Malcolm’s writings is that England 
maintained an armed society that was almost unaffected by the 
Statutes of the Realm.397  According to Malcolm, “It is apparent that 
 
 393. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 113–21; Malcolm, The Right of the People, 
supra note 357, at 305–08; Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 243–46; Joyce 
Lee Malcolm, The Role of the Militia in the Development of the Englishman’s Right 
to Be Armed—Clarifying the Legacy, 5 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 139, 140, 144–45 
(1993) [hereinafter Malcolm, The Role of the Militia]; Malcolm, Address, supra note 
392, at 832; Malcolm, The Supreme Court, supra note 386, at 1388–91. 
 394. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 77–112, 121–28; Malcolm, The Right of the 
People, supra note 357, at 302–05; Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 234–43; 
Malcolm, The Role of the Militia, supra note 393, at 143–44. 
 395. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 130, 134; Malcolm, The Right of the People, 
supra note 357 at 285; Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 248; Malcolm, The 
Role of the Militia, supra note 393, at 146–47; Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 
832; Malcolm, The Supreme Court, supra note 386, at 1389–90.   
 396. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 135–64; Malcolm, The Right of the People, 
supra note 357, at 308, 312, 314; Malcolm, The Role of the Militia, supra note 393, at 
148–49; Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 834–36; Malcolm, The Supreme Court, 
supra note 386, at 1392–93. 
 397. For the purpose of historiography, Malcolm was the first historian specializing 
in some facet of English history to make this claim, particularly early seventeenth 
century English history.  However, around the same time, Stephen P. Halbrook and 
David T. Hardy also mischaracterized the enforcement of the Statutes of the Realm 
from the Norman Conquest through Early Modern England.  See HALBROOK, THAT 
EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 40, at 37-43; Hardy, supra note 259, at 562-79.  
Not only did Malcolm, Halbrook, and Hardy omit the history of the Statute of 
Northampton’s enforcement (not to mention other statutes), but they also 
misunderstood Sir John Knight’s case on the subject. Compare Charles, The Faces, 
supra note 9, at 27-30 (rebutting Malcolm, Halbrook, and Hardy’s history of Sir John 
Knight’s case), with HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 40, at 49-
51, MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 104-05, and Hardy, supra note 259, at 565. 
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the regulations in effect before 1640 did not interfere with the basic 
duty of the English people to keep arms for the defence of 
themselves, their neighbors or the realm.”398  Allegedly, it was not 
until the Restoration that arms regulations took hold and the general 
populace was disarmed by the Stuart Monarchy—threatening the 
people’s right to have arms for personal self-defense—which in turn 
led to the drafting of Article VII.399  This historical account is 
misleading and must be qualified. 
To understand arms-bearing in English society one must first come 
to terms with the fact that the possession of weapons was based on 
socio-economic status.  A 1285 militia statute attests to this fact, and 
stipulated, “Every Man between Fifteen Years of Age, and Sixty 
Years, shall be assessed and sworn to armor according to the 
Quantity of their Lands and Goods . . . .”400  Such class-structured 
restrictions on arms remained intact even following the 1689 
Declaration of Rights.401  And they were lawful because Article VII 
left Parliament to define which persons were “suitable to their 
[c]onditions” through statute.402  Thus, not everyone could lawfully 
possess certain arms or use them—a restriction that remained in force 
through the late eighteenth century.403 
Another important aspect concerning arms in English society is 
that the people were not the enforcers of the public peace except for 
limited circumstances.  Malcolm audaciously suggests that citizens 
were individually authorized to raise a hue and cry to alert their 
neighbors and pursue criminals.404  Such a loose assessment needs to 
 
 398. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 11. 
 399. See id. at 31-112; Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 294-
305. 
 400. 13 Edw., c. 6, § 2 (1285) (Eng.). 
 401. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 384-85 (discussing 
Thomas Erle’s failed proposal to extend arms ownership to “every substantial 
shareholder” with ten pounds or more); id. at 394-95 (discussing the conflict of laws 
between the Game Acts and the 1662 Militia Act, which was still in force). 
 402. 1 W. & M. 2, c.2 (1688) (Eng.).  
 403. See GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS, CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE 
LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE MILITIA 17-18 (London, Granville 
Sharp 1782). 
 404. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 2-3 (qualifying that the hue and cry was under 
the “supervision” of the constable or sheriff, but does not retract that the individual 
citizen may raise it when necessary); Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 229 
(“Men were expected to defend themselves and their families and, if need be, their 
neighbors as well.  But the duty was not merely defensive.  Anyone who discovered a 
crime was required to raise a ‘hue and cry’ and join, ‘ready appareled,’ in pursuit of 
the culprit if necessary.”); Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 831 (“if [a person] 
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be qualified, for it suggests that England was an ordered society based 
upon the efforts of an armed populace enforcing the law at will.  This 
is blatantly false.  As numerous legal treatises attest, the hue and cry 
could only be assembled by a government official, most often a 
Justice of the Peace.405  The only common law exception to the rule 
was the castle doctrine, when the hue and cry could be called to 
prevent one’s home from being assailed.406  There were no other 
common law exceptions to the rule, and not even the sources 
Malcolm cites to infer otherwise. This includes Blackstone.407 
Seventeenth century English barrister and court reporter Joseph 
Keble effectively summed up the rule of law on this point in his 1689 
edition of An Assistance to the Justices of the Peace: 
[I]f a Man, hearing that another will fetch him out of his House and 
beat him, do assemble company with force, it will be no unlawfull 
 
saw a crime take place he was to raise ‘a hue and cry’ then join in pursuit of the 
culprit”); Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 291. 
 405. See, e.g., 1 JOHN BOND, A COMPLEAT GUIDE FOR JUSTICES OF PEACE 153 
(London, Richard and Edward Atkins 1696)(“Any person in the Company of one 
Murdered or Robbed, may forthwith repair to the next Constable . . . and give notice 
thereof, and cause him to raise Huy and Cry after the Felon.”); id. (“The Officer of 
the Town where the Huy and Cry is levied ought to send the same in Writing to every 
Town . . . .”); id. at 96-97 (showing a template warrant by the Justice of the Peace to 
raise the hue and cry); id. at 101, 108 (punishing the constable for not calling forth the 
hue and cry when necessary); MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, 
CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 
75 (London, Miles Flesher, James Haviland, and Robert Young 1635) (“Every 
Justice of the Peace may cause Huy and Crie . . . upon murder, robbery, theft, or 
other felonie committed.”); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, A NEW SURVEY OF THE JUSTICE OF 
PEACE HIS OFFICE 38 (London, J.S. 1659) (“Any one Justice of the Peace upon 
Notice, or Report of it, may send forth his Warrant under his hand, of Hue and Cry . . 
. .”); id. at 53 (a Justice of the Peace “may bind . . . such as shall raise false Hue-and-
Cry without any cause”); see also Charles, supra note 15, at 98-99 and accompanying 
footnotes. 
 406. See, e.g., 1 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 136, ch. 63, §§ 8, 10. 
 407. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 147, at 291.  Malcolm relies almost 
exclusively on a treatise written by Richard Burn for her interpretation. See 
MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 2 n.4; Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 229 n.14.  
However, even Burn’s treatise confirms the hue and cry was to be raised by a Justice 
of the Peace. See 2 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH 
OFFICER 17 (Savoy, Henry Lintot 1755) (“When any felony is committed, or any 
person is grievously and dangerously wounded, or any person assaulted and offered 
to be robbed, either in the day or night; the party grieved, or any other, may resort to 
the constable of the vill[age] . . . they are to acquaint the constable with the fact, and 
desire him to search in his town for suspected persons, and to make [the] hue and cry 
after such as may be probably suspected . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Indeed a 
watchman could call the hue and cry, but the watchman was appointed by town 
officials, such as the constable and would have maintained temporary authority to 
call the hue and cry as a deputy of sorts. See id. 
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Assembly, for his House is his hold and Castle. . . .  But if he be only 
threatened that he shall be beaten, if he go to the Market, then may 
he not assemble Company for his aid [i.e. raise the hue and cry], 
because he needeth not to go thither, and he may provide for 
himself by Surety of the Peace [i.e. an appeal to sheriff, constable, or 
justice of the peace for protection] . . . .408 
Keble’s legal analysis of the hue and cry confirms the last and most 
important aspect concerning arms in English society: it was unlawful 
to go armed in the public concourse without the license of 
government.409  This included a prohibition on shooting or carrying 
“Hand guns” unless under the provisions stipulated by statute.410  
Michael Dalton’s The Country Justice is one of a number of legal 
treatises that confirms this rule of law was still in force by the turn of 
the eighteenth century.411  Dalton wrote the Statute of Northampton 
applied to any person that might “wear or carry any Guns, Dags or 
Pistols charged,” including any “persons . . . so armed or weaponed 
for their defence upon any private quarrel, & c.”412  The prudential 
reason for the broad prohibition was that the people could always 
seek the assistance of the constable or the Surety of the Peace to have 
“the Peace against the other persons” enforced.413  “And besides,” 
wrote Dalton, it is the act of going or riding armed that “striketh a 
fear and terror into the King’s Subjects.”414 
Somehow Malcolm completely overlooked these tenets of English 
law.  It is an omission that utterly negates Malcolm’s thesis as a 
 
 408. JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE 
EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 646 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft, and 
H. Sawbridge 1689).  For the rule of law concerning a surety of the peace, see id. at 
410 (Justices “will not grant any Writ for Surety of the Peace, without making an 
Oath that he is in fear of bodily harm.  Nor the Justices of the Peace ought not to 
Grant any Warrant to cause a man to find Surety of the Peace, at the request of any 
Person, unless the Party who requireth it, will make an Oath, that he requireth it for 
safety of his Body, and not for malice”). 
 409. See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.).   
 410. See 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541) (Eng.); KEBLE, supra note 408, at 313, 709.  For 
Malcolm’s unsupported interpretation of Henry VIII’s statute that remained in force 
throughout the eighteenth century, see MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 87-120.  For two 
dissents placing Henry VIII’s statute in context, see Charles, “Arms for Their 
Defence”?, supra note 3, at 394-95, 398, 399; Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, 
supra note 9, at 57-59. 
 411. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF 
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 92-93, 261 (London, William 
Rawlins and Samuel Roycroft 1705). 
 412. Id. at 264. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
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whole, for she relies on the notion that arms restrictions were not 
seriously enforced until the Restoration, which in turn led to the 
recognition of a right to be armed.415  Not true. 
How did Malcolm come to omit such important and damaging 
historical facts?  The answer may rest with her intentions to link the 
1671 Game Act to Article VII416 or to dispel any notion that Article 
VII was linked to militia service and socio-economic status.417  Most of 
the blame, however, can be attributed to Malcolm brushing aside the 
Statute of Northampton as insignificant with little, if any, research on 
the topic.  In 1980, for example, Malcolm virtually dismissed an entire 
series of weapon statutes, and as a result mischaracterized the Statute 
as prohibiting the “brandish[ing of] a firearm so as to terrify 
others,”418 when the Statute actually prohibited the act of carrying 
arms in public.419  Over a decade later, Malcolm again brushed aside 
the Statute as nothing more than a law “against riding armed in 
disturbance of the peace” that was no longer enforced.420  And upon 
publishing her book in 1994, Malcolm ahistorically claimed the 
Statute “had never been enforced” and only applied in circumstances 
that may “terrorize” the public.421 
Wherever the fault lies for Malcolm’s historical omission and 
mischaracterization, we know for certain that the Statute of 
Northampton was strictly enforced as a prohibition on going armed in 
public.422  It was a misdemeanor resulting in forfeiture of arms and up 
to thirty days imprisonment.423  There was no requirement that the 
accused have a specific intent to terrify the public or cause harm.424  
 
 415. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 31-112. 
 416. See id. at xii; see also supra note 393 and accompanying text. 
 417. Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 831 (“It was [militia- and nobility-
focused] distortions, so at odds with the historical record, that prompted me to bring 
my study to the development of a common law right to be armed to the attention of 
American legal scholars and to deploy that history to clarify the original intent of the 
American Second Amendment.”). 
 418. MALCOLM, DISARMED, supra note 357, at 7 (although reprinted in 1981 by the 
NRA, the article was first copyrighted in 1980).  Malcolm restated this conclusion 
again three years later. See Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 293. 
 419. See Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 11-31. 
 420. Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 242. 
 421. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 104. 
 422. Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 11-31. 
 423. 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.).   
 424. Malcolm may have been influenced by David I. Caplan in regards to the 
Statue of Northampton. See Caplan, supra note 19, at 32.  Malcolm’s incomplete 
research and false characterization of the Statute have had far reaching implications 
in Standard Model scholarship, which has proved detrimental in maintaining an 
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This behavior was a separate crime in itself—a felony no less.425  
Instead, it was considered terrifying by itself to go armed without the 
license of government.426 
It does not help Malcolm’s thesis that even before Parliament 
passed the Statute, there is evidence to suggest that going armed in 
public, without the government’s license, violated the common law 
and endangered the safety of the kingdom.427  One such case occurred 
in Oxford. In 1320, six years prior to Edward II’s proclamation 
prohibiting the carrying of arms in the public concourse and eight 
years prior to the Statute of Northampton,428 the University of 
 
objective historical account of the legality of going armed in public.  For a list of 
works misled by or agreeing with Malcolm’s unsupported conclusions on the Statute, 
see David T. Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago: 
The Present as Interface of Past and Future, 3 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 199, 205 (2011) 
(relying on Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of 
Northampton); Kopel, supra note 372, at 1347 (same); David B. Kopel, The Licensing 
of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support from Five State Supreme 
Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 305, 317 (2005) (same); David B. Kopel and Clayton Cramer, 
State Court Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1127, 1133-34 (2010) (same); Carlton F.W. Larson, Four 
Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse 
Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1378-79 (2009) (questioning whether the Statute of 
Northampton was ever enforced); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, 
and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (2009) (relying on 
Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of Northampton); 
Marshall, supra note 294, at 716-17 (same).  Eugene Volokh does not cite to 
Malcolm, but still may have been influenced by Malcolm either directly or by other 
Standard Model writers that relied on her work. See Eugene Volokh, The First and 
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009) [hereinafter 
Volokh, The First and Second Amendments]; Eugene Volokh, Implementing the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a 
Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1481 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms]. 
 425. See 25 Edw. 3, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (if “any Man of this Realm ride armed 
covertly or secretly with Men of Arms against any other . . . shall be judged Felony”); 
1 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1603-04) (Eng.) (also known as the Statute of Stabbing). 
 426. See, e.g., DALTON, supra note 411, at 264. 
 427. See HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 136, ch. 63, § 4; 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK AND 
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD I 583 (1968) (“before the end of Henry III’s reign there were ordnances 
which commanded the arrest of suspicious persons who went about armed without 
lawful cause”); see also 13 Edw. (1285) (Eng.) (Statutes for the City of London) 
(prohibiting the public carrying of arms “unless he be a great Man or other lawful 
Person of good repute”). 
 428. For Edward II’s proclamation, see 4 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD II, 
1323-1327, at 559-70 (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1898) (proclaimed April 28, 1326, 
Kenilworth).  Edward II issued a similar proclamation a month earlier. See id. at 547-
52 (proclaimed March 6, 1326, Leicester) (ordering the sheriff of York to arrest “any 
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Oxford’s Chancellor petitioned the king concerning armed assaults on 
his clerks, scholars, and masters: 
[T]hat the chancellor of the said town of Oxford decrees that the 
King’s peace should be kept and protected there, and the study of 
masters and scholars should be [kept] in tranquility.  Thus he has 
established and commanded that no one in his jurisdiction should 
carry arms, day or night, if he is walking towards the said town, [or] 
leaving the town [if he is] a foreign stranger . . . on pain of 
imprisonment and of losing his arms.  In addition to this, everyone 
who bears arms against the peace of the university is 
excommunicated by the said chancellor.  The laity in the said town 
ordinarily bear arms, from which it happens too often that many 
scholars who go out without arms are mistreated, killed and 
wounded.  And the offenders carrying out [these various] kinds of 
crimes are, because of biased interrogation of their neighbours, too 
easily acquitted before the justices. His aforesaid clerks ask that 
when a man is arrested because he has killed or wounded a clerk, 
that inquiries into the said crimes be made in public and made use of 
in front of justices, with foreigners as well as with inhabitants.  
Besides this, they ask that the bearing of arms should be completely 
forbidden, by the laity as well as clerks, and that the chancellor, in 
default of the mayor, may punish them on all occasions which are 
necessary.429 
The king’s council returned an answer that mirrored what would 
become the Statute of Northampton.  Just as the Statute restricted 
public arms carrying to government officials, the Mayor was 
instructed to “forbid any layman except town officials to wear arms in 
the town.”430  Of course, it was not until the Statute went into effect 
that prohibition was enforced universally.  What helped its 
enforcement, in particular, was that the Statute provided a slew of 
legal reforms, including the establishment of the office of Justice of 
the Peace.431  It also purged corruption within local government, 
unified the kingdom under a body of law, and ensured that the peace 
 
man hereafter [that] go armed on foot or horseback, within liberties or without”).  
For the text of the Statute of Northampton and its amendments, see supra note 409. 
 429. Petition of the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford 
to the King and King’s Council (1320) (Manuscripts Division, British Library, 
London, UK) (emphasis added).  The petition was translated and transcribed by the 
joint efforts of Tessa Webber and Judy Weiss, both of whom are at the University of 
Cambridge.  For another translation of the manuscript, see COLLECTANEA: THIRD 
SERIES 119 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1896). 
 430. COLLECTANEA, supra note 429 (emphasis added). 
 431. See Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order During the Early Years 
of Edward III, 108 ENG. HIST. REV. 842, 849 (1993). 
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was maintained.432  In fact, the Statute’s tenets were of such 
importance to facilitating a well-ordered society that, upon England 
annexing Wales, a prohibition on going armed in the public concourse 
proved to be one of the bases of its new legal system.  No person was 
allowed: 
[To carry any] hand-gun, sword, staff, dagger, halberd, morespike, 
spear or any other weapon, privy coat or armour defensive by any 
person or persons dwelling or resiant within Wales . . . of what estate 
degree or condition soever he or they be . . . unto any Sessions or 
Courte to be holden within Wales . . . or to any place within the 
distance of two miles from the same Sessions or Courte, nor to any 
town, church, fair, market, or other congregation, except it be upon 
the hue and outcry made of any felony or robbery done or 
perpetrated . . . [or] except it be by the commandant, licence or 
assent of the said justices, steward or other officer . . . .433 
In sum, Malcolm’s vision of an armed English society, protecting 
against both private and public violence, is without historical merit.  
Her lack of clarification that the hue and cry was almost solely at the 
discretion of the appropriate officials was careless, and to this day is 
used by lawyers to ahistorically advance a right to carry arms in public 
without license.434  Furthermore, Malcolm’s omission of the Statute of 
Northampton’s purpose and enforcement is embarrassing, which in 
turn causes her thesis to suffer as a whole.  Not only did numerous 
sovereigns decree the Statute in force to prevent or deter crime, but 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth century treatises prove that the 
public carriage of arms violated the law, unless it was for lawful 
purposes, i.e. at the license of government.435 
2. Correcting False Notions of Article VII 
Article VII of the 1689 Declaration of Rights states, “That the 
subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence 
suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.”436  The impetus for 
 
 432. See Bertha Haven Putnam, The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace 
into the Justices of the Peace, 12 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 19, 21-48 (1929). 
 433. 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
 434. See, e.g., Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellants at 34, 
Shepard v. Madigan, No. 12-1788 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
 435. See Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 23-31; see also 7 ACTS OF THE PRIVY 
COUNCIL: A.D. 1558-1570, at 101 (John Roche Dasent ed., 1974) (that the sheriff and 
justices of the peace in Buckes County shall “take order that none be suffred in that 
county to ryde with any goonne or dagge in suspitious maner”) (emphasis added). 
 436. 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.). 
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its adoption was James II “causing several good subjects being 
Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both 
armed and employed contrary to law.”  Like the Second Amendment, 
Article VII presents a textual conundrum for anyone wishing to 
decipher its authors’ intent and constitutional purpose. 
Numerous questions are presented, such as in what stations were 
papists employed as to disarm Protestants?  What made such 
disarmament “contrary to law”?  What does the language “arms for 
their defence” speak to—individual armed self-defense, collective 
defense, etc?  What “condition[s] as allowed by law” can be imposed 
and who can impose them?  To the twenty-first century layman, the 
answers to these questions are to be guided by defining the text of 
Article VII piecemeal and reassembling the whole.  Such persons 
argue because there is no reference to a militia, Article VII must be 
interpreted as an unequivocal right to armed self-defense in both 
private and public.  It is also an argument that Malcolm consistently 
asserts as “history” in context.437  This is not always true. 
The intellectual historian knows better and understands words 
always have an intended meaning and purpose, which requires 
eliciting “total historical context.”438  This principally holds true with 
the text of 1689 Declaration of Rights, where the House of Commons 
turned twenty-eight grievances into thirteen rights, with the language 
of each carefully edited by both Houses of Parliament.439  This 
includes Article VII, where four grievances epitomize its origins: 
1.  The pretended power of dispensing or suspending laws, or the 
execution of the laws by royal prerogative, without consent of 
Parliament, is illegal. 
. . . . 
5.  The acts concerning the militia are grievous to the subject. 
6.  The raising or keeping a standing army within this kingdom in 
time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against 
the law. 
7.  It is necessary for the public safety, that the subjects, which are 
Protestants, should provide and keep arms for their common 
 
 437. See, e.g., Malcolm, The Supreme Court, supra note 386, at 1390 (arguing that 
any reading of “militia service into an English right that does not mention [a militia] 
doesn’t qualify as history”). 
 438. See Skinner, supra note 31, at 214; see also POCOCK, supra note 106, at 106-18 
(discussing the importance of interpreting text according to the writer’s intent and 
the events it references). 
 439. See SCHWOERER, supra note 8, at 22-27, 223-31, 243-47, 295-300. 
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defense, and that arms which have been seized and taken from them 
be restored.440 
Out of these four grievances, three became stand-alone articles in 
the Declaration of Rights.  Yet all are intimately linked when 
examined in the light of the Parliament-Crown dispute over military 
powers.  To begin, it must be understood that the power of the crown 
to raise and maintain standing armies without some form of 
parliamentary consent remained a seriously contentious issue from 
the 1640s to the end of the seventeenth century.441  Parliament never 
questioned the crown’s authority to command the army.  Instead, it 
was the crown’s maintenance of a standing army, without a national 
security threat, that was perceived to violate English liberty.442  It is 
for this reason that Article VI stipulated: “That the raising or keeping 
a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace unless it be with 
the consent of Parliament is against law.”443  The article is particularly 
important because it served as the first time that Parliament retained 
any concurrent power over the army.444 
Power over the militia, however, operated much differently.  As 
early as the thirteenth century, Parliament defined who may have 
arms for militia service suitable to their condition and estate.445  This 
power continued virtually unquestioned until the end of Charles I’s 
reign, when he was accused of maintaining an illegal standing army.446  
It is here that Parliament and the popular print culture advanced the 
somewhat radical idea of lawful resistance, with the militia serving as 
the constitutional counterpoise to do so.447  It was an idea that would 
resurface in the midst of the Exclusion Crisis and continue through 
the Glorious Revolution.448 
 
 440. Id. at 299. 
 441. See SCHWOERER, supra note 362, at 15-154. 
 442. Id. at 137-54. 
 443. 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VI (1688) (Eng.). 
 444. See SCHWOERER, supra note 8, at 71-74. 
 445. For some thirteenth century examples, see 7 Edw. (1279) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 2 
(1285) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.). 
 446. See SCHWOERER, supra note 362, at 33-50. 
 447. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 27-29, 42-44; see also 
Lois G. Schwoerer, “The Fittest Subject for a King’s Quarrel”: An Essay on the 
Militia Controversy 1641-42, 11 J. BRIT. STUD. 45 (1971).  It should be noted that the 
doctrine of lawful resistance predated the mid to late seventeenth century. See 2 
QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AGE 
OF REFORMATION 302-48 (1978) (detailing the right of resistance in the sixteenth 
century). 
 448. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 32-34, 49-54.   
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The resurgence of parliamentary resistance and self-preservation 
doctrine stems from the division of militia powers as stipulated by the 
1661 and 1662 Militia Acts.  In both statutes, Parliament vested nearly 
all militia powers with the restored monarchy.449  As the Speaker of 
the Commons stated on July 31, 1661, “[W]e held it our Duty to 
undeceive the People, who have been poisoned with an Opinion, that 
the Militia of this Nation was in themselves, or in their 
Representatives in Parliament; and, according to the ancient known 
Laws, we have declared the sole right of the Militia to be in Your 
Majesty.”450 
Even more problematic was the fact that Parliament declared the 
doctrine of resistance and self-preservation to be unconstitutional.  
The 1662 Militia Act expressly proclaimed that “both or either of the 
Houses of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend [to have command 
of the militia] . . . nor lawfully may raise or levy any War offensive or 
defensive” against the sovereign.451  This is not to say Parliament felt 
completely unprotected against a tyrannical sovereign.  Members did 
retain the assurance that the day-to-day militia operations rested with 
the landed gentry.452  Members also secured—at least so they 
thought—the long-established guarantee that only well affected 
Protestant Lieutenants would command the militia.453  This assurance 
was short lived, for during the reign of James II, Protestant 
Lieutenants were replaced by Catholics in violation of the statute.454  
This was legally problematic in many respects, but most importantly 
because Lieutenants were the keepers of the armories.  It was 
through their direction that the people as a militia were armed, 
arrayed, and the Constitution was secured.455 
 
 449. SCHWOERER, supra note 362, at 85-88. 
 450. 11 H.L. JOUR. 329 (1661) (emphasis added).  Charles II responded by declaring 
a sole right over the Militia. See THE LETTERS, SPEECHES AND DECLARATIONS OF 
KING CHARLES II, at 116 (Arthur Bryant ed., 1935); see also THE SPEECH OF MR. 
HIGGONS IN PARLIAMENT AT THE READING OF THE BILL FOR THE MILITIA (London, 
Roger Norton 1661) (arguing why the power over the militia must be vested with the 
crown). 
 451. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). 
 452. See SCHWOERER, supra note 362, at 82-83. 
 453. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.). 
 454. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 45. 
 455. See 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.); see also A METHOD FOR 
EXECUTING THE POWERS, RELATING TO THE MILITIA AND TRAINED-BANDS, 
ACCORDING TO THE ACTS OF PARLIAMENT SINCE THE HAPPY RESTAURATION OF 
OUR GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN K. CHARLES THE II, at 13 (London 1684) (“The Lord 
Lieutenant may alone perform, and cause to be put in Execution, all, and every [one 
of] the Powers in the Acts for the Militia.”); A NECESSARY ABSTRACT OF THE LAWS 
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It is here that Article VII is intimately related to Articles I and II 
of the Declaration of Rights.456  One must understand that Catholics 
were deemed a viable threat to public safety, and statutorily 
forbidden from assuming governmental office.457  Although a fair 
number of Catholics resided within the realm, they were viewed as a 
national threat and treated with disdain.  Thus from 1685 to 1688, 
when James II removed Protestant Lieutenants and replaced them 
with Catholics, it was genuinely feared that the law was at an end, and 
that Parliament and the people were left without redress.458 
As early as the Exclusion Crisis (1678-81), members of the 
Commons foresaw such a scenario should James the Duke of York—
who later became James II—assume the throne.  In order to prevent 
Catholics from assuming public office, to include militia Lieutenants, 
on December 7, 1678 the Commons advanced a bill that would permit 
the people to disarm any Catholic commissioned by the king.459  Hugh 
Boscawen promoted the law, stating: 
If we have a Popish Successor, it is likely that Commissions will be 
given to those of his opinion.  Will you make a Law, that those 
Commissions shall be void?  [A]s the Lawyers say, “voidable.” And 
till that is done, will you sit still, and have your throats cut, and be 
mastered by the lesser part of the nation?  If Commissions be given 
to Papists, suppose an hundred, and they endeavor to cut throats, 
must I go and desire the Sheriff to raise the Posse Comitatus?  And, 
it may be, the Sheriff is one of them.  If Gentlemen will propose any 
other way than what has been moved, to secure us, I would willingly 
hear it . . . .460 
When Thomas Meres dissented proposing that any illegal 
commissions should be handled by the magistrate, not through the 
exertions of the people, a number of members hissed in 
disapproval.461  In the end, however, the provision that would have 
allowed “any Protestant” to seize a Catholic in arms, even if 
commissioned by the king,462 did not pass.463  This is because such a 
 
RELATING TO THE MILITIA, REDUCED INTO A PRACTICAL METHOD 2-6 (London, 
Robert Vincent 1691) (discussing the militia powers of Lieutenants). 
 456. 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, arts. I–II (1688) (Eng.). 
 457. 25 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (1672) (Eng.). 
 458. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 45. 
 459. 6 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 329 (1769). 
 460. Id. at 331–32. 
 461. Id. at 332. 
 462. Id. at 329. 
 463. For the bill in statute form, see 30 Car. 2, c. 1 (1678) (Eng.). 
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provision would have legalized “disorder in the Government,” 
“popular sedition,” or a “popular rising.”464  As a result of these 
concerns, the bill instead strengthened the Test Act through oaths of 
allegiance.465  Now even the crown’s servants were required to take an 
oath under penalty of fine.466 
Months later, the Commons again brought up the possibility of 
James II employing Catholic militia officers and the constitutional 
consequences that may result.  After numerous discussions on how to 
best secure the country from popish enemies, a number of 
amendments to the 1662 Militia Act were proposed and debated.  
Richard Cust sought an amendment requiring “all Offices” to be 
placed under the appointment of Parliament, not the king.467 John 
Coventry replied that there was “little hope of succeeding” in such a 
proposition.468  Still, members like John Trevor thought some medium 
solution could be accomplished.  Trevor offered that “the Officers of 
the Navy and Militia, &c. may be by the King told in Parliament, that 
[Parliament] may advise and inform him, whether [the appointments] 
be faithful and fit to be trusted, or not.”469  In other words, it would be 
Parliament that confirmed or denied the king’s appointments through 
some form of parliamentary procedure. 
Thomas Player responded that advising appointment selections 
alone was insufficient.  To Player, it was necessary to amend the 1662 
Militia Act’s non-resistance provision: 
But you will find it absolutely necessary to alter the Oath in the 
Militia Act, about taking up arms against such as are commissioned 
by the King, &c. Under [Charles II] we are not under any 
temptation to break that Oath [of non-resistance].  I believe nobody 
will plunder me, or cut my throat.  A Popish Successor [like James 
II] may send Popish Guards, and we shall not have the honour of 
ancient Martyrdom in flaimes, but die like dogs, and have our 
throats cut; and I must not take up arms to defend myself against 
such rogues [because of the 1662 Militia Act].  Considering how near 
we are to that danger, let us do something speedily, that we poor 
Protestants may be secured from Popish Successors.470 
 
 464. 6 GREY, supra note 459, at 330, 333. 
 465. Compare 30 Car. 2, c. 1 (1678) (Eng.), with 25 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (1672) (Eng.). 
 466. 30 Car. 2, c. 1 (1678) (Eng.). 
 467. 7 ANCHITELL GREY, supra note 459, at 142. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. at 143. 
 470. Id. at 151. 
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Two weeks later, Colonel John Birth also commented on the 
problem of excluding James the Duke of York from the throne and 
the non-resistance provision of the 1662 Militia Act: 
If we can have no safety by a Popish Prince [like the Duke of York], 
it is your duty to take some resolution.  Whilst the [1662] Law of the 
Militia is in being, which obliges a declaration [of non-resistance], 
&c. we cannot fight against any commissioned Popish Successor.471 
That same day, Boscawen delivered similar sentiments to the 
Commons.  He thought it “utterly impossible ever to secure the 
Protestant religion under a Popish Success[or]” unless Parliament 
“totally disable[d]” James II from assuming the throne.472  Boscawen 
argued it was Parliament’s duty to “maintaine our Religion, and 
secure ourselves, and oppose any violence that shall be offered us 
from abroad, then being in danger of having our throats cut every 
moment by those that are amongst us.”473  Thus, it was “out of 
Necessity” that Boscawen felt Parliament needed to “disable” James, 
especially when “his principales [are] so contrary and destructive to 
the Lawes and S[t]atutes and constitucions of this government.”474  In 
stating his opinion, however, Boscawen made it clear that the 
parliamentary right of self-preservation and resistance did not vest 
with the people individually.  Such authority could only be 
administered by Parliament: 
Now as for the point of law I must say that for a private person to 
rise against his Prince is Rebellion.  But when there is an Act of 
parliament of King Lords and Commons to disable him and that 
upon good grounds and reasons as we[] have read against him it is 
reasonable to all the world and we[] have pre[cedents] of that 
kind.475 
Boscawen’s words are significant in understanding what would 
become Article VII or what William Blackstone dubbed the “fifth 
and last auxiliary right.”476  It was Parliament that determined who 
“may have arms . . . suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by 
 
 471. Id. at 242. 
 472. 2 ROGER MORRICE, ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE 158 (John Spurr ed., 
2007). 
 473. Id. at 159. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. (emphasis added). 
 476. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 139; see 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) 
(Eng.). 
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law.”477  In other words, Article VII was more of a parliamentary right 
to check the crown than an individual right, for it was through the 
medium of Parliament that the people were armed, arrayed, and 
capable of restoring the English Constitution against a tyrannical 
sovereign.  This is not to say Article VII was not an individual right in 
any form or fashion. It just means the right was intimately connected 
with government, particularly with the people as a militia.478 
One must remember that Article VII has an operating clause: “By 
causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the 
same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to 
law . . . .”479  The operating clause was not empty rhetoric.480  Not only 
did a similar and more detailed grievance appear in the Scottish 
Claim of Right,481 but also the popular print culture contemporary 
with the Declaration of Rights reveals there was general concern over 
the employment of Catholics as militia Lieutenants, and the 
implications this imposed on the Constitution.482  It was this very 
concern that members of Parliament conveyed when James II 
suppressed Monmouth’s Rebellion with Catholic military officers.483 
Malcolm overlooks the historical record in this regard.484  The 
mistake was intentional, for she purposefully set out to disprove the 
notion that Article VII was at all linked to Parliament’s right of self-
 
 477. 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.) (emphasis added); accord Charles, 
The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 46-54. 
 478. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 363-86 (discussing 
the intended purpose of Article VII, and weighing Joyce Lee Malcolm’s approach to 
the historical record); see also John Hamden, Some Short Considerations Concerning 
the State of the Nation, reprinted in 2 A COLLECTION OF STATE TRACTS, PUBLISH’D 
DURING THE REIGN OF KING WILLIAM III 327 (London 1706) (discussing Article 
VII’s link with militia service and the defense of the nation).  
 479. 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.). 
 480. Standard Model writers mistakenly claim Article VII had nothing to do with 
the employment of Catholic militia Lieutenants. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 259, at 
581–82. 
 481. 9 A.P.S. 28 (1822) (Scot.) (“Disarmeing protestants while at the same tyme he 
Imployed papists in the places of greatest trust, civil and military; such as Chancellor 
Secretaries, Privie Counsellors, and Lords of Sessione, thrusting out protestants to 
make roome for papists, and Intrusting the forts and magazins of the Kingdome in 
ther hands [that the] Disarmeing of Protestants and Imploying papists [was] Contrary 
to Law.”).  It is worth noting that the Scottish Claim of Right “went further” in its 
constitutional claims than the Declaration of Rights. See J.C.D. CLARK, THE 
LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY 1660-1832, at 230-32 (1994). 
 482. For a discussion of these sources, see Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, 
supra note 9, at 49-51. 
    483. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 360–62. 
 484. See supra note 396 and accompanying text. 
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preservation and resistance, and James II’s employment of Catholic 
militia Lieutenants.485  According to Malcolm, any militia reading of 
Article VII “doesn’t qualify as history” because the word “militia” is 
absent.486  Instead Article VII boiled down to an individual right to 
personal self-defense because of its “clear language” of an individual 
right divorced from militia service, and the “accompanying historic 
record.”487 
Each of Malcolm’s arguments must be taken in turn.  To begin, 
Malcolm’s insistence on a textual approach undermines her entire 
thesis when examining the historical record in context.488  There were 
three alterations as to what became Article VII.  The first draft, from 
the Heads of Grievances, stipulated: 
It is necessary for the public safety that the subjects, which are 
Protestants, should provide and keep arms for their common 
defense, and that arms which have been seized and taken from them 
be restored.489 
This language conveyed the political fears and concerns that 
existed among members of Parliament at that time—i.e. there needed 
to be a constitutional means for Parliament to check a tyrannical 
sovereign and restore the English Constitution.  The phrase ordering 
that arms be “restored” was subsequently removed and for good 
reason.  For one, the massive disarming this language described did 
not happen in England, but in Ireland when the Earl of Tyrconnel 
assembled the Protestant militia only to disarm them and turn the 
arms over to Catholics.490  The other reason for removing the clause 
was parliamentary support for the disarming of dangerous and 
disaffected persons.  Throughout the reigns of Charles II, James II, 
 
 485. See, e.g., Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 831. 
 486. Malcolm, The Supreme Court, supra note 386, at 1390. 
 487. Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 306. 
 488. See POCOCK, supra note 122, at 30-31 (discussing the importance of testing 
language by the rules of historical evidence). 
 489. SCHWOERER, supra note 8, at 299.  According to Roger Morrice, the phrase 
“common defence” originally read “own defence.” 4 MORRICE, supra note 472, at 
518. 
 490. See CHARLES CAESAR, NUMERUS INFAUSTUS. A SHORT VIEW OF THE 
UNFORTUNATE REIGNS OF WILLIAM THE SECOND, HENRY THE SECOND, EDWARD 
THE SECOND, RICHARD THE SECOND, CHARLES THE SECOND, JAMES THE SECOND 55 
(London 1689); AN ACCOUNT OF A LATE, HORRID AND BLOODY MASSACRE IN 
IRELAND, OF SEVERAL THOUSANDS OF PROTESTANTS, PROCUR’D AND CARRY’D ON 
BY THE BY THE L[ORD DEPUTY] TYRCONNEL AND HIS ADHERENTS 2 (n.p., n.d.); THE 
POPISH CHAMPION: OR, A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND MILITARY ACTIONS 
OF RICHARD EARL OF TYRCONNEL 13, 18, 19 (London, John Duton 1689). 
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and even William & Mary, Parliament never questioned these 
powers.  If anything, Parliament encouraged said searches and 
seizures.491  Their grievance with James II was that Catholic 
Lieutenants were disarming well-affected Protestants without cause.492  
In fact, the 1662 Militia Act’s search and seizure provision remained 
untouched and unaltered until the adoption of the 1757 Militia Act.493 
Perhaps the most significant alteration to the Heads of Grievances 
was the removal of “should provide and keep arms” in favor of “may 
provide and keep arms.”494  Malcolm believes the change took place 
because “should” “smacked too much of preparation for popular 
rebellion to be swallowed by the more cautious Lords or, for that 
matter William.”495  This explanation is somewhat viable, but needs 
clarification.496  It is important to keep in mind that the Declaration of 
Rights was about parliamentary rights more than individual rights.  
The use of “should” would have implied that the right of self-
preservation and resistance was vested more with Protestant subjects 
than Parliament.  This was corrected to “may” as to denounce such a 
dangerous idea in the seventeenth century—one that the popular 
print culture consistently reflected.497 
Popular rebellion without the medium of government was also an 
idea that members of Parliament denounced.  In the midst of the 
Exclusion Crisis, Hugh Boscawen stated only an “Act of parliament 
of King Lords and Commons” could “disable” the people as to rebel 
against the crown.498  This idea of parliamentary-approved resistance 
was repeated in the House of Commons while forming the 
Declaration of Rights.  On January 22, 1689, the Commons expressly 
denounced the doctrine of non-resistance stipulated in the 1662 
Militia Act.499  This included John Vaughn who stated: 
Our lives, our Estates, our Wives and Children are our own, and if 
the King Commission any persons whatsoever to take them from us 
before Tr[ial], We our selves may resist, those [so] Commissioned 
may call in the Constable and our neighbours to our assistance, may 
call in the Sheriff of the County with his Posse Commitatus, and if 
 
 491. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 372–83. 
 492. See id. at 410. 
 493. See id. at 403–11. 
 494. 10 H.C. JOUR. 21 (1689). 
 495. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 119. 
 496. See Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 40–41. 
 497. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 49–51. 
 498. 2 MORRICE, supra note 472, at 159. 
 499. See id. at 493; 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). 
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he be not strong enough may call in the sheriffs of other Countyes, 
and so all the Kingdome may rise by force to oppose all those 
Commissioned by the King [illegally].500 
Vaughn’s reference to “our selves” was to the authority of 
Parliament.501  It was an idea that had been gaining support for some 
time.  Just before the Glorious Revolution, Roger Morrice recorded 
how rumors were circling of William III’s intent to invade England.  
As a result, Morrice found it strange how quickly “mens interest 
change their opinions.”502  Before news of a potential revolution, 
members of Parliament “alwa[ys] condemned [the] principle of 
tak[ing] up Arms in defence of their Religion or civill Rights,” but 
“now thinke it both lawfull, highly laudable and absolutely necessary 
Perfectum.”503 
In a way, Article VII served as the legal justification for the 
Glorious Revolution.  Leading up to the Revolution, members of 
Parliament differed in opinion as to whether armed rebellion was 
lawful.  This attitude immediately changed as the landed gentry began 
seizing militia stores, replacing the Catholic militia Lieutenants with 
well affected Protestants, and raising a military force against James 
II.504  Questions were asked about the “lawfullnesse of this 
undertakeing, and how it was consistent with the Oath of Allegiance, 
or with the other Acts of Parliament . . . especially that clause That it 
was not lawfull upon any pretence Whatsoever” to take up arms 
against the king.505 
To quell such concerns Parliament needed to denounce the 
doctrine of non-resistance in a manner that ensured the right of self-
preservation and resistance was lawful, yet limited in scope.  This 
brings us to Article VII in its final form as modified by the House of 
Lords.  Other than the phrase, “That the Subjects which are 
Protestants may,” the rest of the language was drastically altered.506  
The new language, “may have Arms for their Defence suitable to 
their Conditions, and as allowed by Law,” adequately placed 
 
 500. 4 MORRICE, supra note 472, at 493-94 (emphasis added). 
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. at 318. 
 503. Id. 
 504. See id. at 406. 
 505. Id. at 407. 
 506. Compare 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.), with 10 H.C. JOUR. 21 
(1689). 
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concurrent power over the sword with Parliament.507  Not only did the 
language ensure Parliament may arm Protestants to exercise its right 
of resistance, but it ensured that Parliament could define which 
persons may be armed—“suitable to their Condition”—and under 
what circumstances those arms may be borne—“as allowed by 
Law.”508 
In contrast, Malcolm contends the revisions, especially the removal 
of the phrase “common Defence,” denoted a shift away “from the 
public duty to be armed and toward the keeping of arms solely as an 
individual right” for self-defense.509  Malcolm does not provide one 
broadside, pamphlet, letter, or record of the debates—prior to, 
during, or immediately following the adoption of the Declaration of 
Rights—that agrees with this interpretation.  This evidence is 
important for Malcolm’s evolutionary or customary right thesis to be 
even considered plausible, yet is completely absent.510 
Even Malcolm’s account of the Convention debates is problematic.  
As Lois G. Schwoerer and this author have extensively outlined, 
Malcolm’s historical assessment of the Convention is consistently at 
odds with each speaker’s intended context and the social literature 
available at the time.511  Given those critiques have been stated 
elsewhere there is no need to repeat them here, except to say that 
Malcolm’s history is troubling on a number of levels.512  This includes 
a pure textualist approach to Article VII, for if “arms for their 
Defence” definitively speaks to a non-militia or parliamentary 
independent right to “have arms,” there should be a number of 
examples advancing Malcolm’s interpretation.  But this evidence too 
is non-existent.  It does not help Malcolm’s cause that there exist 
numerous instances where members of Parliament stated “arms for 
 
 507. Conflict over the militia powers culminated in the midst of the Exclusion 
Crisis, and remained an issue of discontent upon James II assuming the throne. See 2 
DAVID OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGN OF CHARLES II 574 (2d ed. 1955); ANNABEL 
PATTERSON, THE LONG PARLIAMENT OF CHARLES II 219–20; WESTERN, supra note 
349, at 81–85. 
 508. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 47–54. 
 509. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 118. 
 510. See POCOCK, supra note 122, at 29–31 (discussing how words can have 
multiple meanings, which places importance on placing those words in context 
through historical evidence and tests). 
 511. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 368–81; Schwoerer, To 
Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 209–19. 
 512. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 118. 
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their defence” or some alteration of the phrase as a parliamentary 
right of self-preservation and resistance.513 
3. The 1662 Militia Act and 1671 Game Act Evidentiary Debacle 
Malcolm’s interpretation of Article VII may be attributed to her 
mischaracterization of the roles that the 1662 Militia Act and 1671 
Game Act served in precipitating the Glorious Revolution.514  Her 
thesis hinges on the personal belief that the drafters of the 
Declaration of Rights sought to undo the alleged atrocities committed 
under both acts by codifying a personal right to have arms for all 
Protestants.515  According to Malcolm this in turn required Parliament 
to adopt “future legislation” that eliminated the discrepancies 
between what Article VII guaranteed and what the acts prescribed.516  
It is here that Malcolm’s thesis unravels even further.  Not only is 
there no evidence linking the 1671 Game Act with Article VII (a 
deficiency admitted),517 but Malcolm completely misunderstands the 
grievance with the 1662 Militia Act. 
Starting with the latter, Malcolm asserts members of the 
Convention not only objected to, but hoped to alter the search and 
seizure provision as a violation of the right to have arms.518  There is 
no evidence of such an objection, at least not when one places the 
Convention debates in context.519  In terms of amending the act itself, 
Malcolm provides as evidence a failed 1689 militia bill approved by 
the House of Commons.520  Indeed, the bill did not contain a search 
and seizure provision akin to the 1662 Militia Act, but there is no 
 
 513. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 387–91, 405–06; Charles, 
The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 53–54. 
 514. Since 1980, Malcolm has persisted with this claim despite a lack of 
substantiating evidence. See MALCOLM, DISARMED, supra note 357, at 18–23. 
 515. See, e.g., Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 242–43, 246. 
 516. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 120. 
 517. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 116 (“It was this political use of disarmament 
[through the 1662 Militia Act] to enhance the Crown and its standing army, not the 
stringent qualifications of the Game Act, that [Parliament] objected to.”); Malcolm, 
The Creation, supra note 392, at 244 (“The Game Act was not specifically 
mentioned” during the Convention debates); Malcolm, The Role of the Militia, supra 
note 393, at 145-46 (“Although the Game Act of 1671 had not been specifically 
mentioned during the Convention debates . . . .”). 
 518. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 115–16, 123; Malcolm, The Creation, supra 
note 392, at 243-44, 246; Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 306. 
 519. Compare Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 368–81, and 
Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 209-19, with MALCOLM, supra 
note 9, at 115–21. 
 520. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 123. 
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evidence that suggests or infers the reason for its omission.  The only 
historical certainty is that the bill was rejected outright by the House 
of Lords,521 with William III and Parliament continuing the use of the 
search and seizure provision to disarm dangerous and disaffected 
persons.522  No one ever questioned these seizures as a violation of a 
right to arms in either Parliament or the popular print culture.523  This 
includes the seizures conducted during the reigns of Charles II and 
James II.524 
Not even Thomas Erle,525 who scribbled down detailed militia 
reforms to the Convention, objected to the search and seizure of 
arms.526  A member of the Convention, in 1683 Erle was one of the 
Deputy Lieutenants instructed to carry out disarmament orders in the 
town of Poole, and likely carried out similar orders until sacked from 
office in 1688.527  It is interesting that Erle never expressed 
dissatisfaction with the search and seizure of arms, yet took issue with 
the employment of Catholic officers.528 
This view was expressed twice within Erle’s instructions.  One 
instance appears where Erle advocated for punishing persons “not 
being legally qualified” for public office to have “£500 levied upon 
them accord to law.”529  The other instance appears when Erle urged 
the Convention to place “militia arms into such hands that have 
estates of their own [rather] than into lewd dissolute persons’ custody 
that will as soon fight for any body else as those that entrust him.”530  
The mention of “lewd dissolute persons” referenced James II 
dispensing with the Test Acts and employing Catholic officers.531  
Being a former Deputy Lieutenant himself, Erle knew the 1662 
 
 521. See WESTERN, supra note 349, at 87-88. 
 522. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 382–83. 
 523. The opposite held true for the employment of Catholic militia officers and the 
passive obedience. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9, at 31–
34, 40–54. 
 524. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 365–68, 373–75. 
 525. Thomas Erle is important because Malcolm cites to him in support of her 
interpretation. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 116–17.  For two earlier dissents to 
Malcolm’s characterization of Erle, see Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra 
note 3, at 384–85; Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 217. 
 526. See Mark Goldie, Thomas Erle’s Instructions for the Revolution Parliament, 
December 1688, in 14 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 337, 337–47 (1995). 
 527. Id. at 342. 
 528. Id. 
 529. Id. at 344. 
 530. Id. 
 531. Id. at 342, 344. 
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Militia Acts placed the powers of arming, arraying, and organizing the 
militia with the Lieutenants532—a status quo that was problematic if 
the Lieutenants were inimical to Parliament and the Protestant 
religion.  Erle sought to fix this problem from ever presenting itself 
again by not only ensuring militia officers complied with the Test Act, 
but by also requiring each to “have a good estate to bear the expense 
of such an office, as it hath been in ancient times.”533 
All together, these facts severely undermine Malcolm’s historical 
assessment.  This is not to say Malcolm is completely wrong in 
characterizing the 1662 Militia Act as a matter of tension between 
Parliament and the crown.  As discussed in Part II.A.2 of this Article, 
the provisions that vested sole authority over the militia with the 
crown, and prohibited parliamentary resistance, were an issue of 
discontent from the 1670s through the Glorious Revolution.  This 
dissatisfaction can be found in both Parliament and the popular print 
culture—a fact that Malcolm completely ignored.534  It does not help 
Malcolm’s case that the provision against parliamentary resistance 
was immediately amended and discarded following the Glorious 
Revolution,535 but the search and seizure provision remained intact 
until the passing of the 1757 Militia Act.536 
Malcolm’s errors concerning the 1662 Militia Act are amenable 
compared to her treatment of the 1671 Game Act.  There is no 
mention of any game act, let alone the 1671 Game Act, being an issue 
of discontent among members of the Convention Parliament.  There 
is nothing in the Heads of Grievances or different drafts of the 
Declaration of Rights that infers it.537  Still, Malcolm assures 
historians that James II turned to the 1671 Game Act in an attempt to 
disarm the political dissenters, and Parliament sought its amendment 
to comply with Article VII.538  There is no substantiating evidence for 
 
 532. See supra note 455. 
 533. Goldie, supra note 526, at 345 (emphasis added). 
 534. See supra note 515. 
 535. 1 W. & M., c. 8, § 11 (1688) (Eng.). 
 536. 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 1 (1757) (Eng.). 
 537. Malcolm admits to this historical deficiency in her scholarship, but still 
stresses that there is a connection. See supra note 514.  However, in her 1980 article, 
Malcolm contended there was a link. See MALCOLM, DISARMED, supra note 357, at 
22 (“Such disarmament of Protestants, which Parliament’s passage of the Militia Act 
and Game Act had made possible, shocked and outraged its own members and was 
cited in the Declaration of Rights as infringing upon the ancient right of Englishmen 
to keep and bear arms.”). 
 538. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 105, 120; Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, 
at 242–44, 246; Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 305, 308–09. 
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these claims either, leaving historians to ponder where the 
“accompanying historical record”539 is that Malcolm clings to. 
Malcolm’s 1671 Game Act claim would not be so damaging if 
limited to the suspicion that James II used the Act to disarm political 
dissidents.  This is a plausible link on its face, but it unravels once we 
learn there is no evidence suggesting this was James II’s intent—
none.  The same evidentiary deficiency presents itself in Malcolm’s 
claim that the 1671 Game Act was “plainly at odds” with Article VII, 
with Parliament seeking to remove guns from the “prohibited 
devices” on all game laws.540  Neither Malcolm, Schwoerer, nor this 
author have found any evidence stating, implying, or inferring 
Parliament viewed the game acts as an impediment to Article VII.  
When one places the subsequent amendments to the 1671 Game Act, 
the 1692 Game Act, and the 1706 Game Act in context, it was done to 
correct a conflict of laws, not advance a right to have arms against 
both public and private violence.541  In fact, one of the few pieces of 
evidence Malcolm points to as proof actually undercuts her thesis 
altogether.542  Overall, there is nothing in the text of the laws 
themselves or the debates even suggesting Malcolm’s theory to be 
plausible.543 
4. William Blackstone Said What?—Misconceptions of the “Fifth 
Auxiliary Right” Continue 
Part I.B.1 of this Article corrected the Standard Model’s continued 
perversion of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.544  
 
 539. Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 306. 
 540. Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 246; see MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 
126. 
 541. 4 W. & M., c. 23, (1692) (Eng.); 6 Ann., c. 16 (1706) (Eng.); Charles, “Arms 
for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 393–98. 
 542. Compare MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 128, with 1 BURN, supra note 407, at 443 
(“And indeed it was not at all necessary to insert a gun in this act, since the carrying 
of a gun is prohibited under double the penalty by the statute of H.8. hereafter 
following.”). 
 543. Michael Dalton’s different editions of The Country Justice do not help 
Malcolm either.  They show that Henry VIII’s statute was to be strictly enforced to 
the letter of the law. See DALTON, supra note 411, at 92–93, 261 (showing Henry 
VIII’s statute was to be strictly enforced); MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY 
JUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, AS WELL IN, AS 
OUT OF SESSIONS 92–93, 261 (London, John Walthoe 1715) (same); MICHAEL 
DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE, DUTY AND POWER OF 
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, AS WELL IN, AS OUT OF SESSIONS 141–43, 377, 562 
(Savoy, E. Nutt, R. Nutt, and R. Gosling 1727) (same). 
 544. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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It seems that David I. Caplan was the first to advance the false 
notions of Blackstone’s “fifth auxiliary right,”545 but Malcolm is 
undoubtedly the first professional historian to concur and give weight 
to such an assessment.  A close examination of Malcolm’s 
publications reveals slight variations as to the four corners of 
Blackstone’s “fifth auxiliary right.”546  Yet, in all her writings, 
Malcolm contends or infers that Blackstone was articulating a right to 
be armed in public and private.547 
Perhaps Malcolm’s loose interpretation is best defined in a 
presentation that she gave at Seton Hall Law School.  There, 
Malcolm deferred to Stephen P. Halbrook’s interpretation, with the 
latter stating: 
Examining Blackstone’s commentaries, we see that Blackstone had 
written that there are certain underlying manners in which the 
personal rights of private property, personal security, and personal 
freedom or liberty are protected.  One of those rights was to have 
and use arms for self-preservation and defense.  Referring to an 
individual right to resist criminal attacks, a right to be armed permits 
an individual to do so.  He linked adjunct rights to the primary rights 
of protection of personal liberty and personal security.548 
Malcolm agreed with Halbrook’s armed public thesis by asserting 
that Blackstone was understood to be advancing the constitutionality 
of “armed crowds” and the forming of “voluntary armed groups.”549  
As discussed in Part II.A.1, such an advancement of English law turns 
history on its head.550  When one reads Blackstone in context there is 
no advancement of such a right.  In fact, Blackstone expressly wrote 
the calling of the hue and cry—the means by which the people may 
(at the license of government) be publicly armed to repel violence—
required the person reporting the felony to “acquaint the constable of 
the vill[age] with all the circumstances which he knows of the felony, 
and the person of the felon.”551  It is at that point the constable may 
raise the hue and cry, resulting in the “constable and his attendants 
 
 545. Caplan, supra note 19, at 34. 
 546. See supra note 392. 
 547. See supra note 392. 
 548. Stephen Halbrook, Address at the Seton Hall Second Amendment 
Symposium (Summer 2000), in 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 815, 819 (2000) (emphasis 
added).  Attorney Alan Gura, who litigated both Heller and McDonald, is of a similar 
opinion of William Blackstone. See Gura, supra note 157. 
 549. Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 832–34. 
 550. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 551. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 407, at 291. 
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hav[ing] the same powers” of “protection, and indemnification, as if 
acting under the warrant of a justice of the peace.”552 
In all fairness, there are instances where Malcolm grasps 
Blackstone’s articulation of the “fifth auxiliary right” in context.553  
However, in most places, she breaks the bounds of historical elasticity 
by casting Blackstone in modern libertarian terms.554  Such an 
interpretation is embarrassing, especially when one compares 
Blackstone with the writings of other contemporary authors.555  In the 
four volumes of the Commentaries there is not one instance of 
Blackstone stating or inferring such a libertarian understanding of the 
right.  He does not mention a right to arms in his sections of life, 
personal liberty, personal security, the hue and cry, or self-defense 
and homicide.556  If anything, Blackstone undercuts Malcolm’s 
interpretation when he affirmed the Statute of Northampton as a 
lawful exercise of police power557—the very same statute that 
Malcolm mischaracterizes and claims was never in force.558 
5. The Anglo-American Intellectual Deficiency 
Given the aforementioned problems with Malcolm’s writings, it 
should come as no surprise that there are substantial deficiencies 
when applied to the Second Amendment.  Indeed, Malcolm is correct 
to point out Article VII is a lineal ancestor to the Second 
Amendment.559  Other than this fact, however, Malcolm’s American 
thesis suffers from the same methodological flaws as her English one. 
From her first publication in 1983, Malcolm made the fatal mistake 
of equating a well-regulated militia with an armed citizenry.  This is 
unsupported by the evidentiary record.560  She wrote that the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory language is clearly “an amplifying rather 
 
 552. Id. (emphasis added). 
 553. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 142–43. 
 554. See, e.g., Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 248 (“[Blackstone] 
accepted the contention, spelled out in the original draft of the arms article by the 
convention, that a right to have arms was necessary for public safety.  Indeed, he 
regarded it as a vital prop of all the rights of Englishmen.”). 
 555. See supra notes 146, 159–62. 
 556. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 119–36; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 
3–4; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 183–95, 290–92. 
 557. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 147, at 168–69. 
 558. See Malcolm, The Creation, supra note 392, at 242; Malcolm, The Right of the 
People, supra note 357, at 293. 
 559. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 560. See generally Charles, supra note 15; Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, 
supra note 25. 
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than a qualifying clause,” and the “twin concepts of a people armed 
and a people trained to arms were linked, but not inseparably.”561  In 
coming to this conclusion, Malcolm relied solely on a rudimentary 
understanding of eighteenth century militia laws, and made no effort 
to conduct an intellectual inquiry into the American right.562 
In a 1993 article, Malcolm again imported her problematic thesis to 
the Second Amendment.563  The rich intellectual history of a well-
regulated militia was again cast aside to be nothing more than a 
“preference for a militia over a standing army.”564  Only the operative 
clause mattered.  Like Article VII, it preserved “a right to be armed 
for individual self-defense,” but differed in that the Americans “never 
copied English restrictions on the right” because the Second 
Amendment forbids “any ‘infringement’ upon the right of ‘the 
people’ to keep and bear arms.”565 
Malcolm makes a rather broad statement that needs qualification.  
While she is correct that the American right was not limited to 
Protestants or socio-economic status,566 Malcolm is incorrect to 
assume the founding generation did not import English laws touching 
upon arms, weapons, guns, etc.  For instance, we know that the 
common law touching upon affrays, riots, discharging arms, the 
prohibition of public carriage of arms, and laws to prevent public 
injury were all part of eighteenth century American law.567  
Furthermore, eighteenth century militia laws strictly regulated the 
arming, arraying, disciplining, mustering, training, and discharging of 
arms.568  There is no historical evidence (at least in historical context) 
to suggest the people had an independent right to associate in their 
own militias without government consent.569  But Malcolm came to 
 
 561. Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 314. 
 562. See id. at 289, 314. 
 563. See Malcolm, The Role of the Militia, supra note 393. 
 564. Id. at 147-48. 
 565. Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 
 566. Compare id. at 148, with Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3, at 
449. 
 567. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1822-35; Charles, Historical 
Guideposts, supra note 18, at 23-26. 
 568. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 326-27 and 
accompanying footnotes. 
 569. Id. at 374-90. 
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the opposite conclusion with no supporting evidence.570  She then 
restated this thesis in a 2010 article.571 
In Malcolm’s defense, up to this point, however, she dedicated but 
a few pages to the Second Amendment.  It was not until her 1994 
book To Keep and Bear Arms that Malcolm dedicated a chapter to 
the American right.572  Yet the additional pages of analysis did little to 
advance the understanding of the right, for most of the chapter 
affirmed what historians already knew—the founding generation 
preferred a well-regulated militia over a standing army.573  Regarding 
the constitutional scope of the American right, Malcolm did not 
deviate from her earlier assessments.574  At no point did she examine 
the intellectual origins and constitutional pieces of a well-organized 
militia in depth.  Instead, Malcolm once again brushed aside its 
significance, writing, “The reference to a ‘well regulated’ militia was 
meant to encourage the federal government to keep the militia in 
good order”—nothing more.575 
To date, Malcolm has never examined or acknowledged the rich 
intellectual history of a well-regulated militia, nor has she provided 
historians with any subsequent evidence affirming her conclusions.576  
It is also problematic that Malcolm asserts the founding generation 
understood Blackstone’s “fifth auxiliary right” in modern libertarian 
terms.577  They did no such thing.  James Otis, Samuel Adams, the 
Boston Town Council, and a number of other writings all confirm that 
the founding generation understood Blackstone in context.578  To 
conclude otherwise, by interpreting text loosely, is to commit what 
Herbert Butterfield termed a “pathetic fallacy,”579 an act of which 
Malcolm and Standard Model writers are undoubtedly guilty. 
 
 570. See Malcolm, Address, supra note 392, at 832-34 (asserting “armed crowds” 
and the forming of “voluntary armed groups” are protected by the right to arms). 
 571. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 355, at 104. 
 572. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 135-64. 
 573. See id. at 143-59. 
 574. Compare id. at 162-63, with Malcolm, The Role of the Militia, supra note 393, 
at 147-49, and Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 357, at 314. 
 575. MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 164; see also Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 
357, at 106 (stating a well-regulated militia was “merely . . . well-trained”). 
 576. Based upon a 2009 U.C.L.A. Law Review article, one can assume that 
Malcolm sees no fault with her methodological approach or thesis, for she applauded 
the Heller majority as employing “historical analysis according to the proper rules for 
historical investigation.”  Malcolm, The Supreme Court, supra note 386, at 1397. 
 577. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 144-45, 157, 162. 
 578. See supra notes 146, 159-62. 
 579. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 30. 
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B. The Standard Model “Domino Effect” and Subsequent 
“Domino Defect” 
Despite all the methodological faults and unproven conclusions, 
Malcolm’s work on the Anglo-American origins of the right retains 
iconic status among Standard Model writers.  Starting as early as 
1980, the Standard Model adopted and endorsed her work without 
question.580  This reliance only strengthened after the publication of 
Malcolm’s 1983 article The Right of the People to Keep and Bear 
Arms.581  By the time of her 1994 book, Malcolm and the Standard 
Model were already entwined to the point that one could not write 
about the latter without citing the former.582  And as of today this 
reliance has not changed, not one iota.583 
This phenomenon may be referred to as the “domino effect.”  It 
occurs when a historical work (or any work for that matter) is so 
influential that a number of writers rely on it as a foundation for their 
own propositions.  Neither the general thesis nor its findings are 
questioned.  Instead, the writers get behind a thesis or certain 
conclusions because it meshes with their own ideological 
predispositions or presumptions about a subject.  Under such 
conditions the dominos easily fall one after the other in harmony. 
What happens, however, when the relied-upon writing, i.e. the first 
domino(es) or a number of intermediate dominoes, are removed from 
the sequence as historically unattainable or unproven?  The answer is 
it produces a “domino defect,” meaning the domino chain falls out of 
the necessary sequence as to permit the other dominos to fall.  This 
would include any subsequent domino chains built upon the initial or 
intermediate domino sequence, for they too cannot fall without the 
aid and assistance of the preceding dominoes. 
The Standard Model’s unshaken reliance on Malcolm’s work 
qualifies as a “domino defect,” for upon disproving the historical 
viability of Malcolm’s work, all works reliant upon her findings suffer 
from the same defect.  The “domino effect” and consequent “domino 
 
 580. See supra note 359. 
 581. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second 
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 313-
14, 321, 324 (1991). 
 582. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 4, at 467, 474-77.  According to Lexis, Joyce 
Lee Malcolm’s problematic findings have been cited in over two hundred law review 
articles.  Indeed, some of these articles are dissents from non-Standard Model 
writers, but these critiques are in the minority.  For some of the Standard Model 
works that have relied on her findings, see supra note 424. 
 583. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 34, at 318-21. 
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defect” is not limited to the Model’s reliance on Malcolm’s work.584  It 
also appears frequently as a result of Standard Model writers relying 
heavily on each other’s historically suspect works.  Whether it is Don 
B. Kates’s problematic 1983 Michigan Law Review article or Eugene 
Volokh’s interpretation of preambles in the wrong century, Standard 
Model writers have been quick to fall into line with one another 
without ever questioning each other’s findings.585  It has created an 
unprecedented domino web of overlapping layers that refuses to fall 
when all the interlinking dominoes are removed.  In the words of late 
historian Don Higginbotham, “[B]orrow[ing] heavily from each 
other” and “recycling the same body of information” is the Standard 
Model’s “fundamental testament.”586 Yet, at the same time, it is the 
Model’s downfall.  Not only is the Model’s “narrowly legalistic” 
approach frequently at odds with historical context,587 but more 
importantly, it is in direct conflict with the goal of historical 
scholarship—to understand the past for the sake of understanding the 
past.588 
This last point is crucial, for one of the historian’s functions is to 
continuously improve one’s understanding of the past.  This process 
often requires revisiting the evidentiary foundation upon which 
previous historical writings rest.  It also requires engaging in an 
intellectual discourse with other historians in search of the truth.  
Such was the case in the 1980s when Lawrence Delbert Cress and 
 
 584. Since Lois G. Schwoerer’s devastating critique of Joyce Lee Malcolm’s book 
in 2000, neither Malcolm nor any of her Standard Model colleagues have addressed, 
corrected, or supplemented the historical errors. See Schwoerer, Book Review, supra 
note 9.  The same dilemma presents itself to this author’s critiques published in 2009 
and 2010 respectively. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 3; 
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation, supra note 9.  Since 2009, the only Standard 
Model writer to even attempt to defend Malcolm is David T. Hardy.  But Hardy does 
not address, correct, or supplement any of the errors. See Hardy, supra note 34, at 
318-21; Hardy, supra note 41, at 73-75; David T. Hardy, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago: Fourteenth Amendment Incorporation and Judicial Role Reversals 26-27 
(May 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061920.  Hardy merely claims 
that Malcolm is correct without reconciling the errors or providing any new evidence.  
This is discouraging in terms of intellectual transparency, for the role of a historian is 
to understand the past for the sake of the past, not merely advance what they 
personally agree with. 
 585. See supra Part I.B.5 (showing the problems with a number of Standard Model 
theses and the impact those theses have had on subsequent works). 
 586. Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 263, 263-64 (1999). 
 587. Id. at 263. 
 588. See supra Part I.B.5. 
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Robert Shalhope debated the “collective” versus “individual” right 
theories.589  The debate provided historical academia with the first 
responsible look at both sides of the argument.  Furthermore, it 
established a research agenda to guide future historians.590  As a 
result, we know today that the Second Amendment was meant to 
guarantee both an individual and collective component.591  This 
includes the interests of state governments to the chagrin of Standard 
Model writers that argue otherwise.592 
Therein lies a problem with the Standard Model.  There has been 
no serious disagreement among its proponents nor has there been any 
strengthening of the poor foundation upon which the Model rests.  
One methodological error is built upon another without ever fixing 
the initial errors.  It seems the last and only serious disagreement 
between Standard Model writers occurred in the 1980s,593 when Don 
B. Kates withdrew his original conclusion that the Second 
Amendment did not protect the right to carry guns outside the home, 
unless “in the course of militia service” or at the license of 
government.594  In 1986, Kates altered this stance by agreeing with 
Stephen P. Halbrook, with the latter asserting it is “inconceivable” 
that the founding generation “would have tolerated the suggestion” 
that the people needed the “permission of state authority” to carry 
arms in the public concourse.595  Kates replied: 
[My earlier] conclusion was based upon a historical/linguistic 
analysis which I leave to Professor Halbrook’s reply, since I must 
concede that his evidence invalidates my position. Nothing in 
 
 589. See Shalhope & Cress, supra note 116.   
 590. See Higginbotham, supra note 69. 
 591. Shalhope modified his original stance on the Second Amendment from the 
1980s in light of later historical findings. See Shalhope, supra note 13.  For some 
historical writings in this debate, see supra notes 8, 9, and 12. 
 592. Compare Charles, supra note 15, at 3-9, 64-71 (showing the state interests 
considered and protected by the Second Amendment), with Kates, supra note 4, at 
1215 (inaccurately claiming “not a single comment can be found describing the 
Second Amendment as a collective right or a right of the states”).  State interests and 
powers concerning the right to arms is more than sufficiently catalogued with the 
history of the 1792 National Militia Act. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 
supra note 3, at 71-79, 139-53; Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, 
at 331-58. 
 593. This is something that Standard Model writers admit. See Kates, supra note 4, 
at 1222 (stating Halbrook “demolished” the theory the Second Amendment was 
limited to the home). 
 594. Kates, supra note 168, at 267.   
 595. Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of 
the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 162 (1986). 
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Professor Halbrook’s linguistic evidence, however, gainsays the fact 
that, from early common law, the right to carry arms abroad was not 
absolute—as was the right to possess ordinary arms in the home.  A 
statute of Edward II, reenacted in the time of Richard II, seems to 
have forbidden both the carrying of arms abroad in general and the 
carrying of them into particular places, such as courtrooms and 
Parliament.  This common law tradition would suggest the validity 
of the many substantially similar American gun controls.596 
From this point onward, the Standard Model view of the right to 
bear arms has been virtually unlimited in scope.597  Its proponents 
argue that any limits on armed self-defense, in public or private, are a 
serious impediment on the Second Amendment.598  It does not matter 
how many public regulations or restrictions are unearthed by 
historians, with no evidence of them being an infringement on the 
English or American right to arms.599  Regardless, Standard Model 
writers like Nelson Lund will continue to advance the notion that the 
Founders “enjoyed an almost unlimited right to keep and bear arms” 
and there is “virtually no historical evidence” about its limits.600 
Lund’s “no historical evidence” viewpoint may be attributed to 
denial, and perhaps his continued association with the National Rifle 
Association.601 Lund is well aware of the voluminous literature that 
 
 596. Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 143, 149 (1986).   
 597. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 328-30.    
 598. See, e.g., Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra 
note 424, at 1515. 
 599. See supra note 167. 
 600. Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas Ginsburg, Brett 
Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 30, 30 (2012).  
The lack of any research and the failure to acknowledge any eighteenth century 
police powers may have to do with Standard Model works being predominantly 
funded by the National Rifle Association.  Within a period of fourteen months, the 
National Rifle Association distributed over half a million dollars for research, 
conferences, and scholarship supporting their view of the Second Amendment.  This 
includes grants to David B. Kopel ($320,000), David T. Hardy ($52,000), Stephen P. 
Halbrook ($75,000), Clayton Cramer ($15,000), and Don B. Kates ($6,000). 
Supported Research, NRA C.R. DEF. FUND, http://www.nradefensefund.org/ 
previous-years-research.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
 601. Nelson Lund’s chair as Patrick Henry Professorship of Constitutional Law at 
George Mason School of Law is funded by the National Rifle Association. See 
Foundation Endows Law Professorship, TRADITIONS: A PUBLICATION OF THE NRA 
FOUND. (Spring 2003), at 5, 18.  Lund also represents the National Rifle Association 
as an advisor. See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 57-59, 150, 284-86 (2011). 
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contradicts this conclusion.602  In addition, some of the blame can be 
traced to Joyce Lee Malcolm, Lund’s colleague at George Mason Law 
School.  Again it was Malcolm who advanced false notions of 
England’s armed society,603 which in turn precipitated a “domino 
effect” of ahistorical legal scholarship.  This especially holds true with 
the notion that the common law only punished the carrying of 
weapons with the “specific intent” to terrify the people.604  If Standard 
Model writers are correct on this point,605 why are historians without 
any historical examples supporting it?606  Also, why does all the 
historical evidence point to the fact that public arms-bearing was at 
the license of government, either in one’s individual capacity or as a 
member of the militia?607 
Overall, there are numerous examples of how the “domino effect” 
and subsequent “domino defect” applies to Standard Model 
scholarship.  While they cannot all be restated here, the Model’s 
vision of an individualized militia or “the people” as an urban militia 
that deters crime provides a great working example.  Just recently, in 
a case before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,608 the Second 
Amendment Foundation advanced this alleged “history” by citing a 
series of loose unconnected sources, and then interpreting those 
sources well beyond the bounds of historical elasticity.  The 
Foundation briefed the court as follows: 
[In Sir John Knight’s case] the carrying of arms was not forbidden as 
a matter of public safety or crime reduction, but because doing so 
might hurt the King’s public image.  Of course, the King wanted to 
preserve his own power, and looking weak may have encouraged 
revolt or usurpation.  Nevertheless, the court imposed a judicial 
gloss on the Statute [of Northampton], that for a conviction the 
prosecution must prove that the carrying of arms was “to terrify the 
 
 602. See supra note 167; see also Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 
supra note 331; Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, supra note 331. 
 603. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 604. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 104-05. 
 605. See supra note 424 and accompanying text. 
 606. See generally Charles, The Faces, supra note 9. See also POCOCK, supra note 
122, at 106 (discussing the need for historical evidence that can be tested and 
“making as few assumptions” as possible). 
 607. See generally Charles, The Faces, supra note 9; see also Charles, Scribble 
Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1830-39; General Election, New Hampshire, WORCESTER 
MAG., July 1786, at 162, 164 (noting that Major General John Sullivan “hopes the 
privates will avoid a practice so unsoldierly, expensive and dangerous; all firing 
should be when troops are embodied, and such as the commanding-officer present 
may direct.” (emphasis added)). 
 608. Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 6, 2012). 
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King’s subjects,” or “with evil intent”—“malo amino.” [I]n order to 
preserve the common law principle of allowing “Gentlemen to ride 
armed for their Security.”  Since the term “Gentlemen” included 
“one, who, without any title, bears a coat of arms, or whose 
ancestors have been freemen,” this would include in America all 
members of the militia; that is “all citizens capable of bearing 
arms.”609 
To paraphrase, according to the Second Amendment Foundation, 
we are to understand the “domino effect” of an individual right to 
publicly carry arms as an unorganized militia as follows: 
(1) The holding in Sir John Knight’s case required “evil intent” → 
(2) the Statute of Northampton punished only “evil intent” → (3) 
this confirms a right for “gentlemen” to ride armed → (4) English 
“gentlemen” and American citizens are legal equivalents → (5) 
every citizen is a member of militia → (6) the people as an 
unorganized militia have a right to carry arms for their security to 
deter crime. 
Here the Foundation advances five domino links that require the 
historical integrity of the former link for any subsequent links to fall.  
Thus, should any of the links prove historically untenable, the 
Foundation’s alleged “domino effect” results in a “domino defect.”  
Not surprisingly, given the poor foundation upon which the Standard 
Model is built, the Foundation’s “domino defect” presents itself at 
numerous points.  In fact, all five domino links can be dismissed by 
illuminating three very serious historical errors: (1) a 
misunderstanding of Sir John Knight’s case, (2) the 
mischaracterization of the Statute of Northampton’s prosecutorial 
scope, and (3) applying these two errors to claim the Founders 
believed a publicly armed populace or unorganized militia prevents 
and deters crime. 
Beginning with Sir John Knight’s case,610 as early as the 1980s, 
Standard Model writers have consistently misinterpreted the facts, 
legal issue, and holding as supporting a right to carry arms for self-
defense,611 when the case’s history actually undercuts it.612  At issue 
was whether Knight could be charged in violation of the Statute of 
Northampton, which stipulated that no person shall “go nor ride 
armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of 
 
 609. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6-7, Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. May 
23, 2012) (citations omitted). 
 610. See Rex v. Knight, [1686] 90 Eng. Rep. 330; [1686] 87 Eng. Rep. 76. 
 611. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 359, at 794-95. 
 612. See Charles, supra note 9, at 27-30. 
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the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.”613  It is 
important to note that a violation of the Statute was a misdemeanor, 
not a felony, meaning that the day-to-day enforcement of its 
provisions did not require a jury.  Knight’s case, however, was 
different.  He was not just any person carrying arms in the public 
concourse.  Knight was one of a number of armed government 
officials who seized a Catholic priest much to the anger of James II, 
yet he was also the only person imprisoned and charged with violating 
the law.614 
Aware of the political nature of the charges and without any proof 
that Knight acted outside the scope of his authority, the jury acquitted 
him.615  Knight never rested his defense on a right to go armed for 
personal self-defense.  Instead, he defended his case in terms of 
“[l]oyalty.”616  In particular, Knight relied upon the public official 
exception to the Statute of Northampton.617  This is why the English 
Reports reference “evil intent,” for the crown’s attorney would have 
been required to prove that Knight intentionally acted beyond the 
scope of his employment—a burden the attorney failed to prove. 
There is absolutely no indication in either the English Reports or 
other contemporary sources that Knight’s case stands for the 
proposition that “the carrying of arms was not forbidden as a matter 
of public safety or crime reduction.”618  The Second Amendment 
Foundation’s argument in this regard is not history, but the lawyering 
of historical sources to advance its own interests.  In fact, the opposite 
held true regarding the Statute’s purpose, scope, and subsequent 
enforcement.  There are a number of examples where the Statute was 
enforced to prevent crime and maintain the peace.619 
 
 613. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.).  
 614. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES II, 1686-87, at 118 (May 1, 
1686); see also id. (June 7, 1686, Sir John Knight to Earl of Sunderland). 
 615. Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 28-29. 
 616. Id. at 29-30. 
 617. 20 Ric. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.); see also DALTON, supra note 411, at 37-38 
(“[T]he King’s Servants in his presence, and Sheriffs, and their Officers, and the 
other Kind’s Ministers, and such as be in their company assisting them in executing 
the King’s Process, or otherwise in executing of their Office, and all others pursuing 
the Hue and Cry . . . may lawfully bear Armour or Weapons.”). 
 618. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6, Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. May 
23, 2012) (citations omitted). 
 619. See Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 21-22. 
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The Foundation’s second historical error is the mischaracterization 
of the Statute of Northampton.620  In Joseph Keble’s 1689 treatise 
alone there are numerous sections that prove that the public carriage 
of arms was highly regulated.621  This included restrictions on 
shooting, traveling, or assembling with arms without the license of 
government.622  One such example appears when Keble paraphrases 
Henry VIII’s statute623 prohibiting the use or discharging of handguns: 
Every Person finding or seeing any to offend the Statute [of Henry 
VIII] against the shooting in Cross-bows and Hand-Guns, may 
arrest and bring or convey him to the next Justice of the Peace of the 
County where he was found offending, who upon due Examination 
and Proof thereof before him made, may be his Discretion Commit 
him to the Goal, there to remain till he shall truly pay the one 
Moiety to such first bringer or conveyor.624 
Then there is Keble’s analysis discussing the Statute of 
Northampton’s prosecutorial scope, which clearly prohibited the 
carrying of arms without the license of government: 
Yet may an Affray be, without word or blow given; as if a man shall 
shew himself furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually 
worn, it will strike a fear upon other that be not armed as he is; and 
therefore both the Statutes of Northampton (2 Ed. 3. 3.) made 
against wearing Armour, do speak of it, by the words, Affray del 
pais & in terrorem pouli, surety.625 
Keble’s reference to arms “not usually worn” did not mean that 
individuals maintained a right to go armed with “common weapons” 
as some Standard Model writers have concluded.626  Instead, the 
phrase “not usually worn” confirms that there were instances where a 
person was licensed to carry arms in public, the most common 
 
 620. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6-7, Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. May 
23, 2012). 
 621. See KEBLE, supra note 408, at 147-51, 311-14, 644-66, 708-10.   
 622. Id.; see also 4 & 5 Phil. & M., c.2, § 17 (1557-58) (Eng.) (providing that anyone 
required to supply an arquebus could “carye not or use not the same Haquebut in 
any Highe waye, oneles it be coming or going to or from the Musters, or marching 
towares or from the Service of Defece of the Realme”); 8 TUDOR ROYAL 
PROCLAMATIONS 703 (Paul L. Hughes & James Francis Larkin eds., 1964) 
(proclamation of 1579 forbidding persons to carry calivers, etc. “under cover of 
learning or exercising to shoot therein to the service at musters (a matter to be in 
good sort favored, but not to be misused)”). 
 623. See 25 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1533-1534) (Eng.). 
 624. KEBLE, supra note 408, at 709.   
 625. Id. at 147. 
 626. See, e.g., Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 424, at 101. 
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exception when “the Sheriff, or any of his Officers, for the better 
Executing of their Office . . . carry with them Hand-guns, Daggers, or 
other Weapons, invasive or defensive,” notwithstanding such 
prohibitions.627  There were indeed other exceptions—militia service, 
the hue and cry, and the nobility with armed attendants—but all were 
regulated by statute and at the license of government.628  To read 
Keble’s treatise otherwise would make his reference to striking “a 
fear upon other that be not armed as he is” superfluous.629  Also it 
conflicts with another portion of Keble’s treatise that confirms that 
the prohibition was general: 
Again, if any person whatsoever (except the Kings Servants and 
Ministers in his presence, or in executing his Precepts or other 
Officers, or such as shall assist them, and except it be upon the Hue-
and-cry make to keep the peace, &c.) shall be so bold as to go or 
ride Armed, by night or by day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other 
places . . . then any Constable, or any of the said Officers may take 
such Armour from him for the Kings use, and may also commit him 
to the Goal; and therefore it shall be good in this behalf for these 
Offices to stay and Arrest all such persons as they shall find to carry 
Dags or Pistols, or to be appareled with Privy-Coats or Doublets . . . 
.630 
Keble’s analysis is consistent with other contemporary legal 
commentators.  In 1705, for instance, Michael Dalton wrote that the 
Statute of Northampton prohibited the “wear[ing] or carry[ing] any 
Guns, Dags or Pistols charged” in the public concourse.  Preparatory 
self-defense was not an excuse.631  As Dalton noted, “persons . . . so 
armed or weaponed for their defence upon any private quarrel” were 
not immune because they could seek the assistance of constable to 
have “the Peace against the other persons” enforced.632  Like Keble,633 
 
 627. KEBLE, supra note 408, at 711; see also 20 Ric. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.). 
 628. Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 11-41. 
 629. KEBLE, supra note 408, at 711. 
 630. Id. at 224.  
 631. DALTON, supra note 411, at 264. 
 632. Id.; see also 1 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 126, ch. 40, § 1 (“[A]ny justice of the 
peace may, according to his discretion, bind all those to the peace who in his presence 
shall make any affray, or shall threaten to kill or beat any person . . . or shall go about 
with unusual weapons or attendants, to the terror of the people.”); id. at § 2 (“[A]ll 
persons whatsoever, under the king’s protection, being of sane memory . . . have a 
right to demand surety of the peace.”); KEBLE, supra note 408, at 646 (“[I]f he be 
only threatened that he shall be beaten, if he go to the Market, then may he not 
assemble Company for his aid [i.e. raise the hue and cry], because he needeth not to 
go thither, and he may provide for himself by Surety of the Peace.”). 
 633. See KEBLE, supra note 408, at 709.   
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Dalton described going or riding armed as an act that “striketh a fear 
and terror into the King’s Subjects,”634 not a fabricated Standard 
Model intent requirement.635 
Even William Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown comports with this 
interpretation, when read in both sequence and context.  Hawkins 
wrote that “any Justice of the Peace, or other person . . . impowered 
to execute” the Statute of Northampton may “seize the Arms” of 
“any Person in Arms contrary” to its provisions.636  This included the 
seizure of arms for preparatory self-defense in the public concourse.  
As Hawkins aptly put it, “[A] Man cannot excuse the wearing such 
Armour in Publick, by alledging that such a one threatened him, and 
that he wears is for the Safety of his Person from his Assault.”637 
There were three legal exceptions to the general prohibition.  The 
first exception was homebound self-defense.  The rationale being 
“because a Man’s House is . . . his Castle,” there shall be no penalty 
for a person “assembling his Neighbours and Friends in his own 
House, against those who threaten to do him any violence therein.”638  
The second exception applied to persons carrying arms with the 
license of government.  There was no legal presumption to “terrify 
the People” if a “Person[] of Quality,” i.e. person licensed for public 
carriage, wore “common Weapons” approved by law.639  The third 
and last exception was the assembling of arms for the hue and cry, 
posse comitatus or militia.640  In the words of Hawkins, there is no 
violation of the Statute of Northampton when a person “arms himself 
to suppress or resist such Disturbers of the Peace or Quiet of the 
Realm.”641  This exception was not a free license to enforce the peace 
at an individual’s pleasure.  Instead, the assembling of the hue and 
cry, posse comitatus or militia was solely at the discretion of 
government.642 
 
 634. Id. 
 635. See supra note 424. 
 636. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135, ch. 63, § 5. 
 637. Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 8. 
 638. Id. 
 639. Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 9. Handguns and crossbows were prohibited to be worn 
and borne by any person, regardless of condition or station; see 25 Hen. 8, c. 17 
(1533-1534) (Eng.); KEBLE, supra note 408, at 709. 
 640. See supra Part II. 
 641. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 136, ch. 63, § 10. 
 642. See supra Part II. 
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Somehow Standard Model writers643 and the Second Amendment 
Foundation644 arrive at the opposite conclusion.  They read the 
licensing exception as the general rule, which would swallow 
Hawkins’ other sections as superfluous.  This argument is best 
articulated by Standard Model writer Eugene Volokh, who writes 
that “public carrying ‘accompanied with such circumstances as are apt 
to terrify the people’ was . . . seen as prohibited,” but “‘wearing 
common weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’ was legal.”645  This 
interpretation is untenable upon examining the historical record.  Not 
only does it conflict with the clear intent and enforcement of the 
Statute of Northampton for four centuries,646 but it would require 
erasing Sections 5, 8, and 10 of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown.647  
Furthermore, historians would have to exclude legal commentators 
like Keble and Dalton from the historical record in order for 
Volokh’s analysis to be credible.  To be blunt, the Standard Model 
approach to history is not history. 
This brings us to the Second Amendment Foundation’s third 
historical error—asserting that the founding generation perceived the 
“militia” as a publicly armed populace that would prevent and deter 
crime.648  Indeed, there were instances where the colonies armed, 
arrayed, and mustered the militia to conduct security patrols to 
prevent Indian attacks and potential slave revolts.649  However, these 
forces were regulated by law and called forth by a government-
appointed officer.650  There was no independent right to go publicly 
 
 643. See Kates, supra note 168, at 261; Kopel, supra note 50, at 1386 n.96; David B. 
Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court 
has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 173-74 
(1999); Marshall, supra note 294, at 716-17; Volokh, The First and Second 
Amendments, supra note 424, at 101-02. 
 644. See Appellants’ Brief and Required Short Appendix at 37, Moore v. Madigan, 
No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 2012). 
 645. Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 424, at 102 (quoting 1 
HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 136, ch. 63, § 9). 
 646. Compare Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 7-36 (providing substantiated 
research on the Statute of Northampton in historical context), with Volokh, The First 
and Second Amendments, supra note 424, at 101-02 (selectively quoting Hawkins and 
other legal treatises). 
 647. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135-36, ch. 63, §§ 5, 8, 10. 
 648. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6-7, Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. May 
23, 2012). 
 649. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 18, 74. 
 650. See, e.g., GEORGE WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF 
PEACE 223-24 (Williamsburg, William Parks 1736). 
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armed and enforce the law,651 yet this is what the Second Amendment 
Foundation tries to advance by equating the people with an 
unorganized militia that deters crime.652 
The Foundation’s argument weakens further by the fact that the 
Supreme Court has actually denounced such an interpretation of the 
right to arms.  In 2008, the Heller majority made it clear “no one 
supporting [the individual right] interpretation has contended that 
States may not ban” independent militias.653  In other words, the 
Court upheld and affirmed its nineteenth century holding in Presser 
v. Illinois, which stipulated: 
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms 
constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United 
States as well as of the states, and, in view of this prerogative of the 
general government . . . the States cannot . . . prohibit the people 
from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of 
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and 
disable the people from performing their duty to the general 
government.654 
The Presser Court was clear that individuals do not possess a right 
to go publicly armed under the disguise of effectuating the Second 
Amendment’s “well-regulated militia”: 
It cannot be successfully questioned that the state governments, 
unless restrained by their own constitutions, have the power to 
regulate or prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except 
in the case of peaceable assemblies to perform the duties or exercise 
the privileges of citizens of the United States, and have also the 
power to control and regulate the organization, drilling, and 
parading of military bodies and associations, except when such 
bodies or associations, are authorized by the militia laws of the 
United States.  The exercise of this power by the states is necessary 
to the public peace, safety, and good order.655 
The Presser Court was not articulating a novel concept.  Calling 
forth the militia was a power that had always been left to the political 
 
 651. For a history of independent militias in the late eighteenth century, see 
Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 374-90. 
 652. This is not the first time the Second Amendment Foundation has advanced 
this argument before the Seventh Circuit. See Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11-12, Ezell 
v. City of Chicago, No. 10-cv-05135 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010); Complaint at ¶ 12, Ezell 
v. City of Chicago, No. 10-cv-05135 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010). 
 653. United States v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 (2008). 
 654. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). 
 655. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis added). 
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branches, inherent in sovereignty, and that government had always 
regulated.656  The Founders undoubtedly agreed with this 
constitutional principle, as is evidenced in contemporary state Second 
Amendment analogs referencing subordination to the civil 
authority.657  Standard Model writers have argued, however, that most 
of Presser should be cast aside as dicta and inconsistent with modern 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.658  Another argument is that 
Presser has nothing to do with the right to arms, and everything to do 
with the federal-state spheres of government concerning the militia.  
Thus, it should have no impact on how the Supreme Court interprets 
the Second Amendment moving forward.659 
The Heller majority disagreed.660  The Court confirmed Presser’s 
holding that the Second Amendment does not protect an 
independent militia right of association or a right of the people to go 
publicly armed under the auspices of an unorganized militia.661  
Certainly, Standard Model writers will continue to argue that Presser 
 
 656. See JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN 
ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 298–99 (David Lieberman ed., 2007); 1 
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 338–39 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005); 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF 
NATURE 200 (Ian Hunter & David Saunders eds., 2003). 
 657. See, e.g., MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XVII (“The people have a 
right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence . . . and the military power 
shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority and be governed 
by it.”); N.C. CONST. 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVII (“That the people have a 
right to bear arms, for the defence of the State . . . the military should be kept under 
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”); OHIO CONST. 1802, art. 
VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves 
and the State; and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they 
shall not be kept up: and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to 
the civil power.”). 
 658. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 581, at 348; Stephen P. Halbrook, The 
Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last 
Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 943, 987-89 (1999); Kopel, supra note 50, at 1460.  Not all Standard Model 
writers view Presser in a negative light. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple 
Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the 
Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 980-81 (1995) (stating the opinion stands 
for the proposition that the “state’s right to restrict the lawful bearing of arms is not 
absolute”); Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an 
“Underenforced Constitutional Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 761 (1998) 
(stating the opinion confirms the Second Amendment protects an “armed populace” 
of “unorganized militia”). 
 659. Kopel & Little, supra note 154, at 530-31. 
 660. See United States v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620-21 (2008). 
 661. See id. 
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is bad law, but the 1886 decision was unanimous.662  One of the 
Justices was John Marshall Harlan, who later delivered a series of 
constitutional lectures at Columbia Law School.  When addressing 
the Second Amendment, Harlan dispelled the notion that a publicly 
armed citizenry or unorganized militia was the “militia” 
constitutionally triggered by the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
language.  Harlan stated: 
What do you mean by militia here?  Why, it means the men that are 
not in the regular forces . . . The militia is composed of the people 
outside of the regular forces, and every man is of the militia 
according to the law of the state in which he lives.  He may be called 
into service.  That is necessary to the security of a free people, and it 
is because it is necessary for the security of a free people that this 
country has never had a large standing army . . . . 
[The militia] would be mustered then in the service of the United 
States.  Being thus mustered in the service of the United States they 
are under the control of the United States from thenceforward.  The 
particular object of [the Second Amendment], however, was to 
make it certain that the Congress of the United States should never 
have it in its power to say to any state, “You shall have no regular 
trained militia with arms in their hands.”  This militia, as 
contradistinguished from regular troops, are the boys at home 
around their local government, attached as they ought to be to their 
home and to their local government, and therefore ready if 
emergency requires to defend that home government against a 
government outside.  Therefore, the fathers said that is necessary to 
the freedom of the people, to the security of the people, and 
therefore an act of Congress which should say that no state should 
have any militia, should have no troops with guns in their hands, is a 
nullity.  It is a declaration, to put it in plain English, that the 
Congress of the United States, now keep within the limits of your 
power; execute the laws of the union; carry out the Constitution of 
the United States; don’t you come down here to our states to 
overturn our local government, to interfere with our domestic 
affairs; if you do we have a right under this Constitution to have a 
militia to meet you, and defend, if need be.  That was the provision 
of the Bill of Rights, “And the right to keep and bear arms, shall not 
be infringed.”  Well, there was a statute in the state of Kentucky 
which punished a man for carrying concealed deadly weapons.  A 
man carried a pistol, and he was tried and fined under the statute for 
carrying concealed deadly weapons.  And he said, “Under the 
Constitution of the United States, as well as the Constitution of 
 
 662. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
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Kentucky, I have a right to bear arms.”  “No,” says the court. “It is 
the militia that may bear arms, and you, going around here among 
your peaceful neighbors, pretending to be as unprotected as they are 
but carrying a concealed deadly weapon, that is doing something 
that the state may prevent.”663 
A close reading of Harlan’s words reveals what historians have 
already proven to be true.  First, Harlan confirms that the militia is 
under the concurrent authority of the federal and state 
governments,664 and traditional preemption doctrine cannot 
constitutionally negate state militia powers.665  This means that the 
states retain concurrent authority in deciding when the militia “may 
be called into service” within their territorial confines, and that the 
federal government is prohibited from legislating that “no state 
should have any militia.”666  Second, Harlan gives the proverbial nod 
to states prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse.  In doing so, Harlan properly inferred that persons, in 
their individual capacities, were not “the militia.”667 
In summary, the Second Amendment Foundation’s “domino 
effect” that connects an armed public with the Founders’ well-
regulated militia is completely without historical merit.  It suffers 
from a “domino defect” at every link in the chain, and is in direct 
conflict with the fact that the Constitution was ratified to prevent a 
“disjointed, unregulated, and unwieldly mass” of a militia.668  There 
are indeed other “domino defects” present in Standard Model 
 
 663. Brian L. Frye et al., Justice John Marshall Harlan: Lectures on Constitutional 
Law, 1987-98, at 233-34 (Hofstra Univ. Sch. Of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 12-05), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003116. 
 664. See Charles, supra note 15, at 63-71; see also Higginbothom, supra note 69.  
For some Standard Model works that ahistorically advance that the Second 
Amendment protects no state interests, see Kates, supra note 4, at 1215; Hardy, supra 
note 34, at 329-30. 
 665. See Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 340-66.  For 
Standard Model works that advance the federal preemption myth, see supra note 
248. 
 666. Frye et al., supra note 663, at 233-34. 
 667. Id.  Other late nineteenth century writings show that the power over the 
militia was seen as concurrent. See Charles E. Lydecker, An Unconstitutional Militia, 
134 N. AM. REV. 631 (1882); Albert Ordway, A National Militia, 134 N. AM. REV. 395 
(1882).  
 668. William H. Sumner, An Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia to a Free 
Commonwealth, 19 N. AM. REV. 275, 276 (1824); see also id. at 287 (“There is 
something seducing to unmilitary or inexperienced minds in an encampment.  It is 
believed that if men are placed under the canvass a few weeks, they become expert 
soldiers.  There is doubtless a great error in this.”). 
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literature, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, the 
point here is that the historical record can be easily manipulated 
through either misguided scholarship or carefully crafted litigation.  It 
is only upon the conducting of proper historical methodologies that 
one may discern the truth.  Still, the important question moving 
forward is whether the Supreme Court can and should differentiate 
faux history from real history.  The next section takes up these 
questions. 
III.  WHAT’S THE SUPREME COURT TO DO WITH THE 
EMBARRASSING STANDARD MODEL?—ASSESSING THREE 
HISTORICAL OPTIONS 
In a June 1838 edition of the monthly periodical Common School 
Assistant there appeared a question-and-answer article entitled The 
Judiciary.669  The questions asked and answered covered a number of 
constitutional issues such as state privileges and immunities, trial by 
jury, excessive bail, warrantless searches, and so on.  The second to 
last question and answer was in regard to the Second Amendment, 
and read as follows: 
Q.—Have the people of the United States a right to keep and bear 
arms? 
A.—Yes; inasmuch as a well-regulated militia is necessary to the 
security of a free country.670 
For nearly four decades, legal academics, historians, and laymen 
have written thousands of pages over the meaning of the Second 
Amendment, yet within the span of only twenty-nine words a 
teaching assistant’s book succinctly asked and answered a 
constitutional question as the Founding Fathers envisioned.  A well-
regulated militia was not merely an armed citizenry.671  It was so much 
more.  In the words of Secretary of War James Barbour, a well-
regulated militia was an unquestionable “political maxim . . . 
universally subscribed to . . . [as] the natural defence of a free 
people.”672 It was of such importance to the success of the Early 
 
 669. The Judiciary, COMMON SCH. ASSISTANT (June 1838), at 46, 46. 
 670. Id. at 47. 
 671. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 9, at 1835-39. 
 672. James Barbour, Militia of the United States Circular, NILES’ WKLY. REG., 
Aug. 12, 1826, at 423.  These sentiments are in line with James Madison’s during the 
debate of the 1792 National Militia Act. See Militia Bill, Under Consideration, FED. 
GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 10, 1791, at 4 (“[W]e cannot but be 
convinced, that the authority was intended to be given us for the establishment of an 
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Republic that Barbour requested the states amend and improve the 
1792 National Militia Act accordingly.  He hoped “in an object of 
such vital importance as a well regulated militia, minor objections will 
be sacrificed to the attainment of so great a good.”673 
Today there is little, if any, dispute that the necessity of a well-
regulated militia in our everyday life is minimal.  In the late 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, however, a well-
regulated militia served a larger societal purpose.  Its “advantages” 
were not “confined to its military and civil uses exclusively.”674  A 
well-regulated militia also provided a “moral influence on society and 
individual character” that was so “deserving” of American 
admiration.675  As stated in an 1833 article published in The Military 
and Naval Magazine of the United States: 
It regulates the eccentricities of youth, inculcates subordination to 
authority, teaches obedience to the laws, and respect for those who 
are entrusted with their administration.  Its associations promote 
civility, good manners, and friendly intercourse in society.  Its 
exhibitions are public, encouraging cleanliness of person, and 
eliciting that pride of character which leads to the fear of reproach, 
and enlivens the desire of distinction.  Its employments are active, 
requiring judgment and decision.  Its exercises are manly, giving 
grace to the person, vigor to the muscle, and energy to the mind.  Its 
duties are scientific, inciting to study, and inducing inquiry.  Its 
objects are patriotic, animating the best feelings of the heart.  Its 
offices, open to all, are the incentives of honorable ambition, 
affording to those in humble stations, whose merits might otherwise 
remain unnoticed, opportunities for disclosing those virtues and 
talents which recommend them for civil preferment, as well as 
military promotion; and thus it is, this truly republican institution, in 
conne[ct]ion with our systems of public education and 
establishments of religious instruction, contributes to produce that 
 
effective militia—a militia that hitherto was not so effectually established as to 
censure a sufficient defence against foreign invaders; or efficient enough to destroy 
the necessity of a standing national force; or in case of such a force being raised, and 
turned against the liberties of our fellow-citizens, adequate to repel the hostile 
attacks of mad ambition.  Let us not, by false construction, admit a doctrine 
subversive of the great end which the constitution aimed to secure, namely, 
perfection to the union, the means of insuring domestic tranquility, and providing for 
the common defence.” (emphasis added)). 
 673. Barbour, supra note 672, at 423. 
 674. Militia of the United States, 1 MIL. & NAVAL MAG. U.S. 352, 352 (1833).   
 675. Id. at 352. 
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just subordination in society which influences all its conduct, and 
constitutes an orderly community.676 
After reading this powerful narrative it is dumbfounding how 
anyone can equate a well-regulated militia with a mere armed society.  
Yet this poor definition is what so many Standard Model writers have 
prescribed.677  What is worse is that Heller’s dicta seems to have 
endorsed it with but one sentence: “[T]he adjective ‘well-regulated’ 
implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and 
training.”678 Then in an attempt to sync the Second Amendment’s 
prefatory language with its operative clause, the Court wrote: 
We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with an operative 
clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits 
perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation 
knew . . . .  It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the 
right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The 
prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the 
only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly 
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. But 
the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the 
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that 
right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written 
Constitution.679 
Here, the Court’s reference to a “citizens’ militia” is perplexing.  
One may read such dicta to protect unorganized militias independent 
of government.  Given that the Court upheld Presser as good law, 
however, this interpretation is unlikely.680  Only one interpretative 
option remains—that the Court consents to a tyranny model of the 
Second Amendment.681  This means that the “citizens’ militia” cannot 
be negated to prevent “the people” from exercising lawful 
rebellion.682  But this interpretation is also perplexing because the 
historical record reveals that the right of self-preservation and 
resistance rested with the legislative branches of government, not the 
 
 676. Id. at 353. 
 677. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 41, at 67. 
 678. 554 U.S. at 597. 
 679. Id. at 598-99 (citations omitted). 
 680. Id. at 620-21. 
 681. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 4, at 467–68. 
 682. Heller, 554 U.S. at 600. 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
2012] HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CRISIS 1845 
people in their individual capacities.683  This fact is evidenced by the 
history of the Glorious Revolution,684 documents like the Declaration 
of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms685 and the 
Declaration of Independence,686 and the historical fact that the 
militias of the American Revolution were arrayed, armed, trained, 
and mustered at the direction of legislative bodies.687  Furthermore, 
there is the overwhelming amount of historical evidence that the 
Second Amendment was drafted to quell state fears of federal 
tyranny.688 
These are just some of the historical facts that are missing from the 
Court’s hypothetical “tyranny” interpretation of the Second 
Amendment.  There are indeed more, but the point worth making is 
that Heller’s dicta consists of countless reefs and shoals that have yet 
to be navigated and squared with proper historical methodologies.  
The worst thing the Court can do is move forward under the 
assumption that Heller’s dicta advances a comprehensive and 
objective “history” of the Second Amendment. 
 
 683. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 9, at 
47-59.  My position in this Article and previous articles overrides my 2009 conclusion 
that the Second Amendment “does not support” that “the people may employ arms 
to usurp unjust government.” CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 
95.  A well-regulated militia was a constitutional means through which this end could 
be accomplished. Charles, supra note 15, at 51-86. 
 684. See Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 9, at 
26-27. 
 685. DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (1775) 
(“Our cause is just.  Our union is perfect. . . .  Lest this declaration should disquiet the 
minds of our friends and fellow-subjects in any part of the empire, we assure them 
that we mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily subsisted 
between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored. . . .  In our own native land, 
in defence of the freedom that is our birthright, and which we ever enjoyed till the 
late violation of it—for the protection of our property, acquired solely by the honest 
industry of our fore-fathers and ourselves, against violence actually offered, we have 
taken up arms.  We shall lay them down when hostilities shall cease on the part of the 
aggressors, and all danger of their being renewed shall be removed, and not before.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 686. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776) (“In every stage of 
these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our 
repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury.”); see also Charles, 
The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 376-77 (Representative Michael 
Stone confirming that the Revolution was not based on “outrage and violence,” but 
on the legislative consent of the state and continental governments); Charles, supra 
note 62, at 481-82, 488, 490-502 (discussing the “right of self-preservation and 
resistance” and the role the Declaration of Independence played in forming a new 
government on equitable principles). 
 687. See, e.g., Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, supra note 25, at 374-90. 
 688. See supra note 658; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
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Thus, the Second Amendment is in historical crisis.  As this Article 
has demonstrated, the Model’s general approach to “history” is not 
history, even in a basic form.  Instead the Model picks and chooses 
evidence at its leisure and casts it in a manner that supports a desired 
end.  Acclaimed historian J.G.A. Pocock would describe the Model’s 
approach as being “designed to produce, or elicit, formal 
relationships or empirically testable propositions, not with what 
eigentlich happened or—the special form which this take in the 
history of thought—what eigentlich was meant.”689  In other words, 
the Model “is not concerned with what the author of the statement 
made in a remote past meant by it so much as with what he in his 
present can make it mean: what he can do with it for purposes of his 
own, which may or may not—and therefore do not have to—coincide 
with those of the author.”690 
The question moving forward is whether the Supreme Court will 
make the effort to square its dictum with the historical record.  
Certainly the Court is within its right to continue down the Standard 
Model path laid by Heller.  That path remains one of the three 
options available as future challenges come before the Court.  There 
are two other options, however, that allow the holdings in Heller and 
McDonald to stand, yet guide Second Amendment jurisprudence 
down a more historically conscious path.  All three options will be 
explored below, including the benefits and consequences of each. 
A. Option 1: Standard Model Dictum Wins, History Loses—But 
Should It? 
One of the first lessons that law students learn is that court 
precedent is more persuasive than secondary sources.  Whether the 
secondary source is a legislative record, legal dictionary, legal treatise 
or law review article, precedent is the foremost guidepost by which 
the judiciary decides cases and controversies.  When the case is 
Supreme Court precedent, there is no higher source.  The reason why 
lawyers rely more on precedent than secondary sources lies in its 
predictability and reliability.  It is important for legislative bodies and 
the people to be informed of the means and bounds by which the law 
operates, especially the powers of the legislature and the rights of the 
people. 
 
 689. POCOCK, supra note 122, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 690. Id. (emphasis added). 
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If one applies this simple “lesson” to Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is fair for advocates to argue that Heller and 
McDonald’s texts comprise the central guidepost from which all 
future Supreme Court decisions must be decided.  This guidepost 
includes the dictum that facially endorses the Standard Model view.691  
If this is the case, scholarship endorsing that bottom line should 
receive persuasive primacy as well, thus making Heller and 
McDonald’s dicta a jurisprudential springboard from which other 
Second Amendment rights will be acknowledged.  Meanwhile, any 
scholarship that criticizes or is inconsistent with the Standard Model 
should be discarded as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.692 
The following jurisprudential construct is exactly what advocacy 
groups like the Second Amendment Foundation693 advance.  Their 
briefings draw heavily from sections of Heller and McDonald’s dicta, 
and are then supplemented with Standard Model historiography.  In 
these instances, they discard historical objectivity and accuracy.694  
This is understandable, seeing that it is neither the goal nor duty of 
the advocate to be a historian, nor has it ever been.695  If anything, the 
advocate is the anti-historian, for the advocate’s entire purpose is to 
pick and choose evidence that places his or her client in the best 
position.696  And in an adversarial system such as ours, in many cases 
both sides advance false notions of history, leaving it solely to the 
judiciary to retain some sense of historical consciousness. 
Historians are not aloof to the adversarial system, nor do historians 
naïvely believe that the judiciary will get history right all the time.  
This does not mean historians cannot educate the judiciary about 
poor historical paradigms in an attempt to preserve our past.697  This 
especially holds true when a paradigm will lead to major 
historiographical consequences.  It is part of the historian’s role to 
ensure that the judiciary remains cognizant of its historical duty, for 
 
 691. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 692. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply Brief at 4-5, Shepard v. Madigan, No. 12-
1788 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 693. See, e.g., Appellants’ Reply Brief, Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 694. Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 11. 
 695. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the 
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945). 
 696. Melton, supra note 95, at 382. 
 697. See Paul Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American 
Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77-78 (1963). 
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by selecting history “X” as true, the judiciary props up the belief that 
it is.698  As historian David Thomas Konig aptly puts it: 
When [myths are] given constitutional status, these invented 
traditions become norms, and they reinforce popular beliefs . . . .  
Put bluntly, once a court uses the past as a foundation for an 
opinion, the court redefines the meaning of the past and gives a new, 
expanded use for that past to a court with a much broader 
jurisdiction—the court of public opinion, whose black letter law is 
the dreaded conventional wisdom.  When judges re-write history, 
they give it legitimacy that serves their needs and the needs of the 
regime they lead.  That is, historical argument, when employed to 
give a decision more constitutional authority, confers social and 
political constitutive authority.699 
Herein lays the problem with the Supreme Court seemingly 
endorsing the Standard Model view.700  It has propped up the belief 
that “arms” are the centerpiece of the Second Amendment in both 
private and public.701  This runs in direct contradiction to the key 
maxim behind the right to arms—“every citizen is a soldier, and every 
soldier a citizen.”702  The ancient Machiavellian principle703 does not 
stand for the notion that every person be able to carry “common use” 
weapons, in both public and private, to deter crime and prevent 
invasions twenty-four hours a day.704  Instead, it emphasized that in a 
 
 698. Konig, Heller, Guns, and History, supra note 12, at 177. 
 699. Id. at 177-78. 
 700. For a discussion on the Second Amendment and popular constitutionalism, 
see Blocher, supra note 17. 
 701. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 137. 
 702. See, e.g., Militia of the United States, supra note 674, at 361 (“But is not our 
wish to turn citizens into soldiers in time of peace.  The object of our military 
establishments, on the contrary, is to preserve to us the enjoyment of our civil 
blessings. . . .  The term citizen soldier accurately conveys the character of an 
American militia man: and the constitutional object and design of his enrollment and 
instruction cannot be better expressed, or defined, than by the use of those 
convertible terms.  The citizen soldier of peace is to become the soldier citizen of war; 
but, neither in peace nor war, is the character of either the citizen or soldier to be 
merged in the other.  Thus will the principles of military subordination contribute to 
the good order of civil society, and the pride of honorable distinction furnish new 
incentives to virtuous efforts.”). 
 703. For a history on the Machiavellian influence on the right to arms, see 
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 362, at 124, 137, 148, 176, 201-3, 
209, 231-32, 240, 244, 248, 263, 272-73, 289-95, 306-7, 312, 317, 293, 410-20, 427, 431-
32, 435, 442, 450, 458, 507, 528.  For a discussion on the use of arms in the public 
concourse, including the hue and cry, see supra Part II. 
 704.   One recent judicial opinion improperly inferred that the Second Amendment 
ensures we “have a lawfully armed populace” that “makes it less likely that a band of 
terrorists could make headway in an attack on any community before more 
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well-regulated society there was a time and a place to take up arms in 
the advancement of government,705 i.e. through a well-regulated 
militia, and there was a time and a place to return to civil society.706  
In either instance, obedience and support of just government were 
the end goals, not individual preferences.707 
Maintaining historical accuracy in this regard is not something only 
historians should care about.  Seeing that jurisprudence relies on 
history for accuracy, it is also important that the judiciary make the 
attempt to get history right.708  At the same time, it is equally 
important that the judiciary adhere to its own precedent and 
rationales supporting it.  The question moving forward is how should 
the two necessities of accuracy and legitimacy be balanced?  On the 
one hand, to give Heller and McDonald’s dictum complete weight 
would lead to the continuance of numerous historical inaccuracies.  
On the other, to give no weight might call into question the Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy.  Here again, the point of this Article is not to 
question Heller’s holding of armed self-defense in the home with a 
handgun.  It is to merely point out that the Court is holding a double-
edged sword. 
 
professional forces arrived.” See Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 464 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Gould, J., concurring), vacated en banc, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 705. This is what the founding generation referred to as the “public good.”  For a 
working example in late eighteenth century literature, see Charles, Scribble Scrabble, 
supra note 9, at 1824-29.  For historical analysis on the founding generation’s view of 
a well-regulated society, see Charles, supra note 62, at 490-517. 
 706. The principle is immortalized by the story of the River Rubicon.  In Roman 
times, it was unlawful for armies to cross the Rubicon.  Any soldier that disobeyed 
this law was declared a public enemy.  To remind soldiers of their duty to the state, 
and the importance of civil regulation or arms bearing, an inscription was erected, 
stating, “If any general, or soldier, or tyrant in arms whosoever thou be, stand, quit 
thy standard, and lay aside thy arms, or else cross not this river.” See CHARLES, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 3, at 114.  This is also reflected in state Second 
Amendment analogues placing the civil authority superior to the military. See supra 
note 657. 
 707. See Charles, supra note 15, at 86-102; CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 
supra note 3, at 97-130. 
 708. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Much, too, has been said concerning the principles of construction which ought to 
be applied to the Constitution of the United States.  On this subject, also, the Court 
has taken such frequent occasion to declare its opinion, as to make it unnecessary, at 
least, to enter again into an elaborate discussion of it.  To say that the intention of the 
instrument must prevail; that this intention must be collected from its words; that its 
words are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those 
for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted 
into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor 
contemplated by its framers; is to repeat what has been already said more at large 
and is all that can be necessary.” (emphasis added)). 
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It does not help matters moving forward when Heller’s dictum only 
sharpens the sword.709  At numerous sections, the majority contradicts 
itself in terms of methodology, historical accuracy, and conclusion.  A 
few examples are listed below in Chart I. 
CHART I—Heller’S CONFLICTING DICTA 
 STATEMENT 1 STATEMENT 2 CONFLICT 
OUTSIDE 
OF HOME 
DICTUM 
“[T]he right secured in 
1689 as a result of the 
Stuarts’ abuses was by the 
time of the founding 
understood to be an 
individual right protecting 
against both public and 
private violence.” 554 U.S. 
at 594. 
“From Blackstone 
through the 19th-century 
cases, commentators and 
courts routinely explained 
that the right was not a 
right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever 
purpose.” 554 U.S. at 626. 
If the Second Am-endment 
protects against both 
“public and private 
violence,” yet does not 
extend to “any weapon” in 
“any manner,” what is the 
scope of the right beyond 
the home?  Does judicial 
balancing or history 
determine the answer? 
MILITIA 
DICTUM 
“[I]f . . . the organized 
militia is the sole 
institutional beneficiary of 
the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee—it does not 
assure the existence of a 
‘citizens’ militia’ as a 
safeguard against 
tyranny.” 554 U.S. at 600. 
“[N]o one supporting [the 
individual right] 
interpretation has 
contended that States may 
not ban such 
[paramilitary] groups.” 
554 U.S. at 620. 
How can the Second 
Amendment protect a 
“citizens’ militia” separate 
from government, yet allow 
the states to ban 
paramilitary or 
independent military 
groups?   
HISTORICA
L METHOD-
OLOGY 
DICTUM 
“Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive 
historical analysis today of 
the full scope of the 
Second Amendment, 
nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, 
or laws forbidding the 
“But since this case 
represents this Court’s 
first in-depth exam-
ination of the Second 
Amendment, one should 
not expect it to clarify the 
entire field, any more than 
Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145 (1879), our 
first in-depth Free 
Exercise Clause case, left 
that area in a state of utter 
Does the presumption of 
constitutionality solely 
apply to the list provided by 
the Heller majority or to all 
gun control regulations 
seeing that the Court did 
not “clarify the entire 
field”?  Also, what is the 
historical burden of proof 
necessary to support a 
“longstanding 
prohibition”?  Does the 
 
 709. For critiques of Heller’s dictum, compare Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s 
Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
703 (2012), with Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There More?) 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487 (2011). 
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carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as 
schools and government 
buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.” 
554 U.S. at 626–27. 
certainty. And there will 
be time enough to 
expound upon the 
historical justifications for 
the exceptions we have 
mentioned if and when 
those exceptions come 
before us.” 554 U.S. at 
635. 
burden fall upon the 
government to show a 
“historical tradition” of 
regulation or to the 
challenger to prove a 
history of perceived 
unconstitutionality? 
 
Chart I illustrates a serious problem with relying on Heller’s 
dicta—confusion and unpredictability.710  Lower courts have been 
forced to balance and choose which dicta to rely upon or give 
primacy, which in turn has led to a myriad of analyses.711  The lower 
courts’ conflicting precedents are reason enough to discard most of 
Heller and McDonald’s dicta and start anew.  Discarding Heller and 
McDonald’s dicta would leave the Court’s core holding—armed self-
defense in the home with a handgun—untouched, yet ensure each 
Second Amendment case or controversy is given its proper 
consideration in light of the historical evidence.712  As Chief Justice 
John Marshall aptly put it: 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in 
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which 
those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent 
suit when the very point is presented for decision.  The reason of this 
maxim is obvious.  The question actually before the court is 
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other 
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their 
 
 710. In addition to Chart I, see Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to 
Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225 (2008).  
 711. For some critiques on the different standards of review employed by the lower 
courts, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn 
H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water (Mark)? Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2009); Darrell Miller, Guns as Smut: 
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); 
Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-
McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012); Mark Tushnet, Permissible 
Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1425 (2009). 
 712. I have referred to this in past writings as the “historical guidepost” approach. 
See Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 21-27. 
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relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other 
cases is seldom completely investigated.713 
In other words, jurists should tread cautiously in applying either 
needless or conflicting dicta to future cases and controversies.  It 
ensures the judiciary’s primary virtues of accuracy and legitimacy are 
met and sustained.714  And if one applies this rule of thumb to Heller 
and McDonald it means discarding the Court’s “general expressions” 
in subsequent suits.715  There are many ways to distinguish what 
constitutes an opinion’s general expressions from the necessary 
analytical foundations.  It is generally accepted, however, that a court 
will examine the material facts of a prior case and the legal analysis 
concerning those facts when distinguishing dictum from holding.716 
Seeing that Heller and McDonald were both about whether armed 
self-defense in the home, with a handgun, was within the 
constitutional scope of the Second Amendment, this would require 
the reexamination of all statements unnecessary to this outcome.  
Now there is room for debate as to which statements and analyses by 
the Court qualify in this regard,717 but there is general agreement by 
the lower courts that neither the facts nor holding of either case had 
anything to with the Second Amendment as a militia right or outside 
the home.718  And in the case of McDonald, references to both 
hunting rights and the Amendment’s “well regulated militia” 
 
 713. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821).  
 714. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000-09 
(1994). 
 715. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935); see also Kastigar 
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972) (stating that broad language “cannot be 
considered binding authority”). 
 716. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 717. At least one Standard Model writer, Nelson Lund, has expressed disfavor with 
Heller’s dictum, albeit for different reasons than this Article sets out. See Nelson 
Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1343 (2009). 
 718. For some lower courts that have stated that neither Heller nor McDonald 
defined the scope of the Second Amendment outside the home, see Kachalsky v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 
411, 415 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 122-23 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Madigan, 
842 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1100 (C.D. Ill. 2012); Shepard v. Madigan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 774, 
777 (S.D. Ill. 2012).  However, a minority of federal district courts has relied on 
Heller’s dictum to extend the Second Amendment beyond the home. See Moore v. 
Madigan, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25264 (7th Cir. 2012); Bateman v. Perdue, No. 5:10-
cv-265-H, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47336, at *11-12 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2012); United 
States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr-00222, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *11 (S.D. W. 
Va. Mar. 7, 2012). 
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language were noticeably absent, further illustrating the narrowness 
of the holding.719 
The dictum problem is not limited the Court’s conflicting 
statements on the Second Amendment’s scope.  The problem also 
presents itself in terms of historical methodology, particularly in 
terms of what role, if any, historical evidence should play in defining 
the Second Amendment right.  If one follows the methodology 
employed by the Heller majority, historical sources should be 
reasonably adapted to support modern conceptions of the right to 
arms.720  In McDonald, however, it seems the majority backed off 
from this “pathetic fallacy”721 by admitting there is “room for 
disagreement about Heller’s analysis of the history of the right to 
keep and bear arms.”722  Indeed, the McDonald majority did not 
reexamine the historical record, but this was due to the fact that 
McDonald contained the same constitutional question as Heller, not 
because history should not be given its due weight. 
Justice Scalia’s McDonald concurrence sheds important light on 
this point.  In Heller, Scalia stated that the Court’s historical analysis 
was not “exhaustive,” and that it would “expound upon the historical 
justifications” in future cases or controversies.723  Here, Scalia left 
open the question of how historical evidence was to be utilized for 
future Second Amendment controversies.  In McDonald, however, 
Scalia elaborated on the use of history for constitutional adjudication: 
Historical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving 
threshold questions, and making nuanced judgments about which 
evidence to consult and how to interpret it.  I will stipulate to that.  
But the question to be decided is not whether the historically 
focused method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial 
Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means available in an 
imperfect world.  Or indeed, even more narrowly than that . . . I 
think it beyond all serious dispute that it is much less subjective, and 
intrudes much less upon the democratic process.  It is less subjective 
because it depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned 
analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First 
 
 719. For the absence of hunting from McDonald, compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 
with McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021-88.  For the absence of the Second Amendment’s 
“well regulated militia” language from the opinion, see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3108, 
3113. 
 720. See supra Part I for discussion. 
 721. This is Herbert Butterfield’s term for interpreting text loosely. See 
BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 30. 
 722. 130 S. Ct. at 3048 (2010). 
 723. 554 U.S. at 626, 635. 
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Principles whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any 
direction the judges favor.  In the most controversial matters 
brought before this Court . . . any historical methodology, under any 
plausible standard of proof, would lead to the same conclusion.  
Moreover, the methodological differences that divide historians, and 
the varying interpretive assumptions they bring to their work, are 
nothing compared to the differences among the American people 
(though perhaps not among graduates of prestigious law schools) . . . 
.724 
On the one hand, Scalia informs us that history will have an 
important role to play in jurisprudentially defining the Second 
Amendment moving forward.  Yet, on the other, many questions 
about methodology are left unanswered.  For instance, who qualifies 
as a “historian”—members of historical academia, those who write 
works accepted by historical academia, or any amateur historian 
without academic approval?  How much evidence is required to meet 
Scalia’s “body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis”?  Does 
the evidence have to affirmatively state what its author’s claim, i.e. 
total historical context, or can it be susceptible to any modern 
interpretation?  Lastly, what “historical methodolog[ies]” are 
acceptable, and which are not, to meet the “plausible standard of 
proof”? 
The answers to these questions are taken up in Part III.B.  It 
provides the Court with two historical paradigms that respect both 
historical methodologies and the evidentiary record. 
B. Options 2 and 3—the Judiciary, Historical Consciousness, 
and Preserving the Historical Record 
There is no denying that history and constitutional interpretation 
have a love-hate relationship.725  As long as there have been 
politicians, lawyers, and legal academics, historical pieces of evidence 
have been used to advocate for “X” or “Y” in order to advance 
 
 724. 130 S. Ct. at 3057-58 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 725. See Kelly, supra note 131; Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A 
Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997); see 
also Jonathan Lahn, The Uses of History in the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause 
Jurisprudence, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233 (2006) (discussing the objective and 
context problems of the use of history for takings clause jurisprudence); Tracey 
Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth 
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 897 (2002) (arguing the 
Supreme Court’s use of history for Fourth Amendment adjudication is 
unpredictable). 
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certain ideals.726  Even should some professional guidelines be 
adopted as to hold advocates and legal academics accountable for 
advancing false notions of history, the practice will never stop.  Of 
course this does not mean our jurisprudence should needlessly 
embrace false notions of history.  It is here that the judiciary plays 
historical gatekeeper, and serves the vital role of preserving the 
Constitution’s historical origins for both present and future 
generations. 
It is indeed impossible for the judiciary to get history right all the 
time.  Errors will be made either through insufficient pleadings, the 
use of ideological scholarship masquerading as “history,” the lack of a 
historical consensus on a subject matter, and even the judge’s own 
personal bias.  The best anyone can hope for is that jurists maintain 
some form of historical consciousness when interpreting the 
Constitution.  This requires understanding the Constitution’s 
historical origins and sins before importing the past for use in the 
present.727  In other words, the past must be understood by its own 
terms and on the face of the record, not what can be inferred or 
created. 
To maintain “historical consciousness” is not necessarily the same 
as using one’s “historical imagination.”  The two are distinct in terms 
of what the evidentiary record provides.  The latter is theoretical, 
which can be dangerous in terms of building a historically objective 
foundation.  Moreover, it often involves importing the societal 
conditions of the past piecemeal as a means to better understand our 
present.728  Meanwhile, the former is based on total historical context, 
a substantiated evidentiary foundation, and being true as to what the 
historical record provides.729  In other words, historical consciousness 
requires a “generalized awareness of the structure and behavior” of 
the society’s past as a whole.730 
 
 726. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 727. See J.G.A. Pocock, British History: A Plea for a New Subject, 47 J. MODERN 
HIST. 601, 614-15 (1975) (discussing the importance of historical consciousness). 
 728. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 117, at 16 (discussing how this approach to 
history is whiggish). 
 729. See supra Part I.B.4 for working examples. 
 730. POCOCK, supra note 106, at 148.  At least one post McDonald concurrence has 
agreed with this approach. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 714 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Rovner, J., concurring) (“If [the courts] are to acknowledge the historical 
context and the values of the period when the Second and Fourteenth Amendments 
were adopted, then we must accept and apply the full understanding of the citizenry 
at that time.”). 
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Applying this basic construct to constitutional jurisprudence, there 
are two interpretational options available for the courts to preserve 
the historical record.  The first is the importation of accepted 
historical methodologies wholesale, and the second is the responsible 
use of historical guideposts.  Each will be taken in turn. 
Of the two, the more difficult option would be to import of 
accepted historical methodologies wholesale.  What this entails is the 
interpretation, understanding, and application of historical evidence 
in total historical context.731  The judiciary can neither read nor infer 
interpretational constructs that are not there or use its “historical 
imagination.”  If the judiciary should feel the need to fill any 
historical gap(s), it must rely on accepted historical works to do so.732  
An accepted work is not one that a respective jurist agrees with, but a 
work that garnered a consensus among academic historians in the 
field.733 
If one applies this interpretational option to Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Standard Model, as currently constituted, must be 
cast out as untenable.  This would not require the Supreme Court to 
overrule its previous holdings in Heller and McDonald.734  It just 
means that both opinions’ dicta are historically problematic moving 
forward.  As discussed throughout Parts I and II, the Model is built 
upon a poor foundation and its historical claims break the bounds of 
historical elasticity many times over.735  It is the persistence of these 
methodological errors that prevents the Model and its writers from 
garnering a consensus among historians.  Indeed, there are a few 
historians who prescribe to the Model, including Joyce Lee Malcolm 
 
 731. Skinner, supra note 31, at 214. 
 732. At least one Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer, seems to agree with this 
approach. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S 
VIEW 77 (2010) (“If there is no historical material directly on point, what should the 
Court do?  Create historical ‘assumptions’ designed to draw answers from a historical 
void?  Or refuse to answer a question of practical importance . . . on the basis of a 
skimpy, uncertain record of eighteenth century practice?  If the Court is to decide 
major constitutional questions on the basis of history, then why not ask nine 
historians, rather than nine judges, to provide these answers?”). 
 733. I do not disagree with David B. Kopel and Clayton Cramer, who argue that 
historical “[f]acts are facts, no matter who writes about them.” Kopel & Cramer, 
supra note 320, at 378.  However, when claiming that a conclusion is a historical fact, 
they need to be proven through accepted historical methodologies, which in turn will 
receive the approval of academia. 
 734. See supra Part III.A, discussing how the holdings in Heller and McDonald can 
be jurisprudentially squared. 
 735. See supra Parts I and II. 
CHARLES_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:45 PM 
2012] HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CRISIS 1857 
and Robert Cottrol, but acceptance by a few academic historians is 
not a consensus.  It is an insular minority. 
Certainly, the wholesale adoption of historical methodologies is not 
without objectivity concerns.  For one, the use of history to adjudicate 
the law can often lead to more questions than answers, including the 
difficultly of accepting the moral opinions of generations prior as 
guiding the present.736  In many instances, what was deemed moral in 
the eighteenth century is no longer moral today.737  As Kent 
Greenawalt aptly put it, “Customary law depends on existing 
customary practice.  What has once been a rule of customary law can 
cease to be so if customary morality or practice alters radically.”738  
Thus, solely relying on history to interpret the Constitution fails in 
that it does not take into account the evolution of legal customs, 
particularly as guided by judicial precedent.739 
Another objectivity concern is whether jurists will know which 
historical pieces to credit and discredit.740  As historian Saul Cornell 
has pointed out, the varieties of interpretation that can be found in 
any historical era are voluminous.741  Not every statement or 
interpretation can be reasonable or consistent with the intent of the 
Constitution.  This dilemma only multiplies when legal scholarship 
masquerades as objective history.  Search engines have made it easy 
for any advocate, clerk, or jurist to cut methodological corners by 
searching for and finding an interpretation with which they agree.  Of 
course, if the rule regarding accepted historical works is followed, this 
problem should be extinguished.  Yet this author and others have 
doubts that the judiciary will always exercise due diligence in locating, 
reading, and digesting the relevant and accepted historical works. 
It is due to these concerns that a third interpretational option 
would be more prudent.  Known as a historical guidepost approach, it 
operates on the presumption that the past and the present are not one 
and the same.742  The past is only to be applied to a legal case or 
 
 736. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 363-65 (1986) (discussing the difficulty 
in conducting historical analysis with integrity). 
 737. See id. at 387-99 (discussing the different outcomes of Brown v. Board of 
Education should one apply different objectivity theories, including originalism). 
 738. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 183 (1992). 
 739. Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 
452-55, 474-95 (1984). 
 740. This was Justice Stevens’ concern. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3116-18 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 741. See Cornell, Originalism on Trial, supra note 12, at 626-31. 
 742. Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 21-27. 
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controversy in the context of what is affirmatively proven.  
Meanwhile, what remains unknown, i.e. what the historical record 
does not prove on its face, is not explained away in an attempt to 
ideologically prop up modern ideals.743  This means that the judiciary 
needs to be honest and forthright in staking out the unknown, which 
in turn preserves the historical record.744  To do otherwise would let 
the imaginative processes dictate history—a premise that is in direct 
conflict with the concept of historical consciousness. 
What weighs in favor of a historical guidepost approach is that it 
has already gained traction in the Supreme Court.  Just last year, in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchant Association, the Court surveyed 
the historical record to weigh the constitutionality of a California 
statute prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to 
minors.745  In particular, the Court held that the statute was outside of 
scope of the California legislature’s powers, stating “new categories of 
unprotected speech may not be added to the list” outside of those 
prescribed when the Constitution was ratified.746  The Court further 
stated that the protective scope of the First Amendment cannot be 
altered by any legislature “without persuasive [historical] evidence” 
that the “content is part of a long tradition . . . of proscription.”747 
A year earlier, the Court applied a similar approach in United 
States v. Stevens, when it struck down a federal statute that 
criminalized depictions of animal cruelty.748  In the process, the 
government’s invitation to hold that depictions of animal cruelty are 
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment was rejected.  The 
Court instead stressed that it is disinclined to recognize new 
categories of unprotected speech.749   Writing for an 8-1 majority, 
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that speech will be deemed 
 
 743. For a discussion on what constitutes as explaining away history, see supra Part 
I.B.5. 
 744. To accomplish this objective the Supreme Court has the authority to request 
court appointed amicus briefs. See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 
693, 703-04 (1988) (“[I]t is well within this Court’s authority to appoint an amicus 
curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that judgment.”).  
 745. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 746. Id. at 2734. 
 747. Id. (emphasis added). 
 748.  130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).  The challenged statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48, was aimed 
primarily at the interstate market for “crush videos,” which depict women slowly 
crushing small animals like mice or hamsters to death “with their bare feet or while 
wearing high heeled shoes,” sometimes while “talking to the animals in a kind of 
dominatrix patter.” Id. at 1583 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 2 (1999)). 
 749.  Id. at 1586. 
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categorically unprotected only if it has so been treated by 
longstanding historical tradition: 
Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of 
the First Amendment.  Maybe there are some categories of speech 
that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been 
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.  But if so, 
there is no evidence that “depictions of animal cruelty” is among 
them.  We need not foreclose the future recognition of such 
additional categories to reject the Government’s highly manipulable 
balancing test as a means of identifying them.750 
If one applies this jurisprudential approach to the Second 
Amendment, it stipulates that the federal and state legislatures retain 
the authority to regulate arms, in both public and private, if there is 
evidence that there has been a “long tradition” of regulation in the 
prospective area.  And if what constitutes a “long tradition” is the 
equivalent of regulations dating back to the eighteenth century, this 
means that legislatures have deference to pass gun control laws that 
protect the public against injury, aliens, hunting, felons and the 
mentally ill, the carrying of arms in public, concealed weapons; that 
limit the types of arms individuals may possess, the transportation of 
arms, and the discharging of arms in public.751  These were all areas of 
regulation that are consistent with the founding generation’s 
perception of the “public good.”752 
This leads us to the question: “What kind of legislative deference 
should be given to regulate on these areas?”  As it stands today, a 
number of Circuit Courts have answered this question by adopting a 
historical test that extinguishes the Second Amendment claim should 
the challenged conduct fall outside the scope of the right circa 1791.753  
It is only when the conduct falls within the protective scope of the 
Second Amendment that the court applies “some level of ‘means-
ends’ scrutiny to establish whether the regulation passes 
 
 750.  Id.  
 751. See Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 23-25. 
 752. See Charles, Restoring, supra note 62, at 502-17; Charles, Scribble Scrabble, 
supra note 9, at 228-35. 
 753. The First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have adopted this 
approach. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Rene 
E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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constitutional muster.”754  To date, however, only a few federal courts 
have decided a Second Amendment case or controversy by applying 
the historical test.755 
This essentially leaves open the question of how the Supreme 
Court should weigh and assess historical regulations into Second 
Amendment jurisprudence.  On the one hand, the Court could place 
the burden on the challenging party to provide historical evidence 
that the above mentioned areas of regulation were perceived as 
violating the right to keep and bear arms.  On the other hand, the 
Court could place the burden on the government to show a “long 
tradition” of regulation.  Wherever the burden is placed, the Court’s 
test should be flexible enough756 as to allow legislatures to update or 
tailor the “long tradition” of regulation by taking into account the 
capabilities of modern weapons and firearms.757 
Most importantly, when incorporating, analyzing, and applying 
historical guideposts to Second Amendment jurisprudence the Court 
needs to remain cognizant as to what the evidence does and does not 
provide.  Just because an eighteenth century legislature required 
persons to carry arms to church for militia training, to quell slave 
revolts, and suppress Indian attacks, does not mean the founding 
generation perceived it to be a right to carry arms to church.758  The 
Court needs to understand that laws like these reflect the 
government’s power to array, arm, and muster its militia accordingly 
for the common defense, not that an armed citizenry is the equivalent 
 
 754. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 755. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding 
firearm prohibitions on unlawful aliens based upon historical evidence); Kachalsky v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir 2012) (upholding New York’s gun 
licensing scheme based upon historical evidence of regulation); NRA of Am. V. 
Bureau of Alcohol, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding federal prohibition on 
sale of firearms to persons under 21 years of age based on historical evidence). 
However, the majority of cases rely on “means-ends” scrutiny despite the fact that 
the historical test is meant to be flexible. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
641 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that modern gun control regulations do not need to 
“mirror” 1791 restrictions).   
 756. Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 15 (“It will be a rare occasion 
that a modern Second Amendment issue, case, or controversy will exactly replicate 
eighteenth century facts or restrictions on the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ circa 
1791.  However, this should not disparage that there existed longstanding political 
and philosophical restrictions on arms circa 1791.”). 
 757. For a “social costs” discussion between eighteenth century and modern 
firearms, see Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 45-48. 
 758. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants, By Obliging the 
Male White Persons to Carry Fire Arms To Places of Public Worship (Ga. 1770), in 
A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157-58 (1800). 
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of a well-regulated militia, or that the people have an individual right 
to enforce the law through armed force.759 
The same holds true with historical evidence showing the founding 
generation owned pistols or loved arms.  Just because eighteenth 
century persons owned, used, and loved arms does not mean it was 
perceived to be a constitutional right to do “X” or “Y” with arms.760  
The distinction is important.  Today most people prefer to drive over 
the speed limit and jaywalk at their leisure.761  However, just because 
people prefer or love to do these things, it does not stand for the 
proposition that it is their constitutional right to do so and the 
legislatures should be prohibited from passing laws in advancement of 
the public good. 
Therefore, it cannot be stressed enough that when applying a 
historical guidepost approach to constitutional interpretation, the 
Court needs to remain historically conscious of what the evidence 
actually provides in understanding the eighteenth century rule of the 
law.  Let us return again to the Statute of Northampton, which 
prohibited the act of carrying dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse.762  From the fourteenth century to the nineteenth century, 
the Statute’s tenets were enforced in England, Wales, Ireland, the 
American colonies, and the subsequent American states.763  
Throughout this entire period of history, historians, legal academics, 
and Standard Model writers have not found any evidence that this 
prohibition was a violation of the right to have, keep, or bear arms.  
There have indeed been modern misinterpretations of the Statute’s 
prosecutorial scope by legal academics,764 but this was due to poor 
research and spinning historical text to make up for their 
methodological deficiencies.765 
 
 759. For a discussion, see supra Part II. 
 760. See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and 
Public Safety in Early America, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 699 (2008) (showing that 
eighteenth century persons owned pistols, but ahistorically claiming there were “no 
apparent limitations concerning handguns” as compared to other firearms). 
 761. William Schultz, Would You Drive 55?, TIME, July 25, 2008 (claiming that 
only twenty percent of the American population follows the highway speed limits). 
 762. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 763. Charles, The Faces, supra note 9, at 7-41. 
 764. See supra note 424. 
 765. See, e.g., Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 359, at 202 n.105 (explaining away the 
Statute of Northampton with limited research). 
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This still leaves open the question whether jurists can distinguish 
real from faux history.766  Again, a legal database search can turn up 
any number of law review articles that support preferred stance “X” 
or “Y.”767  Yet, how is a jurist to know whether stance “X” or “Y” is 
historically viable or has been rebutted through accepted historical 
methodologies?  Does the jurist even understand historical 
methodologies in the first place?  Certainly, one cannot expect jurists 
to look at a law review article’s footnotes and decipher whether the 
author’s claim is historically credible.  For the most part (but not 
always), only historical experts in the field at question are capable of 
pinpointing these deficiencies.  This is why professional history 
journals require some form of peer review before publication.  Law 
reviews, however, work much differently.  Law students with virtually 
little, if any, knowledge of historical subjects or methodology are 
selecting, cite checking, and reviewing so-called “history.”  How are 
law students to know that their prospective author is citing to and 
relying on works that have proven to be historically false and are 
based on poor methodologies?768 
And given these concerns, it is fair to argue that any historical 
approach to adjudicating the Second Amendment is objectively 
problematic.  Seeing that our constitutions and precedent are history 
in themselves, however, the need to use history for constitutional 
jurisprudence, in some form or fashion, is undeniable.769  Given that 
the importation of historical methodologies wholesale results in more 
problems than solutions,770 the use of history for constitutional 
 
 766. For a discussion on the difficulty of using history in context to adjudicate cases 
and controversies, see William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986). 
 767. See, e.g., State v. Christian, 274 P.3d 262, 286 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (Armstrong, 
J., dissenting) (stating commentators are “split as to the interpretation” of the Statute 
of Northampton, yet never comparing the evidentiary foundation and research 
methodology of the different commentators). 
 768. See supra note 13. 
 769. Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 11-13; Richards, supra note 
725, at 890; see also Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme 
Court’s Use of History, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1745 (2006) (showing a consistent use of the 
First Congress’s records by the Supreme Court since 1803); Julius Goebel, Jr., 
Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1938) 
(discussing the use of history for constitutional interpretation); Robert M. Spector, 
Legal Historian on the United States Supreme Court: Justice Horace Gray, Jr., and 
the Historical Method, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 181 (1968). 
 770. See supra Part II. 
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interpretation must adhere to a guidepost approach.771  Of course, like 
any jurisprudential test, the guidepost approach is not perfect, but it is 
a starting point to adjudicating the Second Amendment consistent 
with historical tradition and preserving the historical record so long as 
the following guidelines are followed: 
1. Historical sources must be read and understood in total historical 
context, not merely presented as some “random collections of facts 
which might seem to bear on it.”772  The ultimate goal of the 
Supreme Court is to avoid “law office history” or the use of 
evidence in such a way as to distort the historical record.773 
2.  Eighteenth century legal understanding should first be discerned 
in terms of longstanding policies or restrictions—philosophical, 
ideological, and political—on the use of arms in both public and 
private.774  This provides the legal presumption or standard of 
scrutiny by which the Court can adjudicate modern laws restricting 
the use of arms.775 
3.  The legal presumption can be defeated with proof that such 
policies or restrictions were unconstitutional.  This requires 
historical evidence facially stating that such policies or restrictions 
were unconstitutional or a serious impediment on the right to have, 
keep, or bear arms.  The legal presumption cannot be defeated with 
historical inferences or one’s historical imagination.  It can only be 
defeated by substantiated evidence that policy or restriction “X” 
was deemed unconstitutional or a serious impediment on the right. 
4.  If the legal presumption is defeated, a higher level of scrutiny 
applies. 
What differentiates the historical guidepost approach from the 
adoption of historical methodologies wholesale is that the latter 
would require discarding Heller and McDonald’s dictum altogether.  
Meanwhile, the former will iron out Heller’s dictum case by case.  It 
 
 771. See, e.g., Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: Rethinking the 
Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 538-40 
(2006). 
 772. Skinner, supra note 31, at 204. 
 773. Murphy, supra note 697, at 77. 
 774. Charles, Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 14. 
 775. The legal presumption or standard of scrutiny can be applied in a number of 
ways.  For a categoricalism approach, see Blocher, supra note 711.  For a historical 
balancing approach, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the 
Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017288.  For a 
traditional level of scrutiny approach dependant on historical category, see Charles, 
Historical Guideposts, supra note 18, at 21-33. 
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will give historians, legal academics, and Standard Model supporters 
the time to explore and debate the subject further while allowing the 
courts to move ahead with Second Amendment jurisprudence.  In 
other words, the historical guidepost approach is what will best 
facilitate an open discourse about the past with accepted historical 
methodologies.  This approach allows the free press to serve as a 
historical pendulum of truth as the founding generation intended.776  
In the words of John Toland: 
[T]he more important any Controversy is, the more Reasons there is 
for the Liberty of the Press, that [the people] may examine with all 
diligence imaginable the Tenets of their adversaries as well as of 
their Guides; and that the more they heard the one Party, the more 
they should read the other; and that if they fall into any Error by so 
doing, they would not be accountable for it.777 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in 1989, Sanford Levinson wrote “it will no longer do” for 
“members of the legal academy” to “treat[] the Second Amendment 
as the equivalent of an embarrassing relative, whose mention brings a 
quick change of subject to other, more respectable,” amendments in 
the Constitution.778  Thus, to Levinson, it is embarrassing not to “take 
rights seriously” in light of their text, history, and tradition.779  
Historians maintain no qualms with these statements so long as the 
historical record is respected and preserved in the pursuit.  When the 
historical record is manipulated to achieve ahistorical ends, however, 
is it not equally if not more embarrassing?  Does not the Standard 
Model qualify as an embarrassment in this regard? 
Historians understand that in our adversarial system it is accepted 
that arguments will be advanced that stretch the foundation of law 
and history so that the respective party can succeed on the merits.  In 
this pursuit, history will be carefully tailored to comport with a 
desired end.  This scenario alone thrusts the judiciary in the position 
of historical gatekeeper whether it wants to acknowledge it or not.  It 
is not a duty that judges should ever take lightly, for the picking and 
choosing of history can have far-reaching consequences. 
 
 776. Charles & O’Neill, supra note 43, at 14-16, 22, 52-53. 
 777. JOHN TOLAND, A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, SHEWING, THAT A 
RESTRAINT ON THE PRESS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROTESTANT RELIGION, AND 
DANGEROUS TO THE LIBERTIES OF THE NATION 14-15 (London 1698). 
 778. Levinson, Embarrassing, supra note 192, at 658. 
 779. Id.  
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Of course, the consequences are not limited to Second 
Amendment.  The lack of a historically conscious judiciary can 
equally impact other constitutional provisions so far as to amend the 
Constitution itself, and even impact future generations’ 
understanding of our past.  Unless the Supreme Court is willing to 
engage historians when presented with controversial history or accept 
their methodologies wholesale (both of which are doubtful), the best 
the Court can do is use history as a responsible guidepost.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes knew this when he wrote that the “consult[ing] of 
history and existing theories of legislation” was “the most difficult 
labor” for any judge.780  It required linking the past with the present, 
yet being able to distinguish the two responsibly. 
Again, historians understand this burden and accept that the 
Supreme Court will not get history right all the time.  The historian’s 
role is limited to furnishing the Court with “complementary modern 
architectural materials so that [the Justices do] not have to rely upon 
scrap lumber, salvage bricks, and raw stone for its buildings.”781  In 
this pursuit, historians must ensure they produce the “most accurate, 
thoroughly documented, and impeccable history” they are capable of 
producing.782  This in turn places the Court in the best position to 
remain historically conscious.  So long as the Justices respond in kind 
by not letting their historical imagination overcome what historians 
have shown to be the historical reality, our jurisprudence will 
progress in a manner that both acknowledges the importance of our 
past and preserves it.  Hopefully the same can be said for the future 
of Second Amendment jurisprudence as we move beyond Heller and 
McDonald. 
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